Description

Situation overview

eGain is not a new story, given that it went public in 1999. It’s a company that has had some very strong periods in its history as well as some fairly weak ones. Although in the last five fiscal years the company has grown revenue at a CAGR of nearly 10% while remaining cash flow positive, EGAN is currently in a weak period, having reported three consecutive quarters of negative quarterly sequential growth with guidance for a fourth. This is good news however, as the stock is priced as such, and the path to a period of stronger performance seems reasonably apparent.

So what has changed? Is it a totally different product? New management team? No on both! There is no giant difference. It is still the same management team and company iterating on its product and marketing strategy, but at its current valuation of 1.3x TTM revenue (~$200mm market cap), and with nearly 40% of its market cap in net balance sheet cash, not many things need to go right to earn an attractive return (although if many things do go right, returns could be significant) and there is padding to downside returns.

I also hesitate to state that there is an ai angle to this writeup. To be clear, this is not an ai writeup, but EGAN has incorporated ai capabilities into its products, which has (i) attracted clients looking to boost their businesses with ai and (ii) increased the roi that eGain’s Knowledge Hub product offers to its clients.

This is a company that survived the bursting of the tech bubble and the long following winter, successfully transitioned to a cloud-hosted model, successfully transitioned to a saas subscription model, opened up its product to plug into many other products and systems that its clients use, and is now taking advantage of generative ai. It should probably be acquired at some point by a large enterprise saas platform. While I don’t expect eGain to be a rocket ship, it currently appears to be a good odds-on bet.

Company and industry overview

eGain Corporation (Nasdaq: EGAN) is a saas company that sells knowledge aggregation and distribution, customer communication, and analytics software “mostly to large enterprises across financial services, telecommunications, retail, government, healthcare, and utilities”. The company is headquartered in Sunnyvale, CA and has offices in Newbury, England and Pune, India. EGAN employs 580 full-time employees (208 in product development, 240 in services and support, 84 in sales and marketing, and 60 in finance and administration). The company sells both directly and through partners, with 78% of revenue in the U.S. and 22% in Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and 83% of its revenue comes from “large enterprises,” which EGAN defines as companies with revenue exceeding $1 billion and government agencies. The company has many large, blue-chip clients such as Allianz, Barclays, Bell, Comcast, Vodafone, Ford, the U.S. VA, and the IRS. eGain’s fiscal year ends in June.

The company’s knowledge product (“Knowledge Hub”) is its flagship product and provides a centralized hub where contact center agents have access to the full body of information (collected as a single source of truth) necessary to respond accurately and promptly to customers. The knowledge hub may also be a repository for internal company information such as policies and procedures. By using and maintaining a centralized hub, clients can ensure that employees are using information that is accurate and up-to-date.

Conversation Hub, the communications product, provides a digital-first, omnichannel platform allowing client employees to interact with their own customers via chat, messaging apps, SMS, email, phone, etc. The product’s architecture allows clients to connect external bots, messaging channels, contact agent software, CRM products, and content management platforms. Analytics Hub is what it sounds like and helps clients measure and optimize their service operations as well as generate product improvement and customer insights.

Approximately 50% of EGAN’s revenue is from Knowledge Hub while Conversation Hub is ~35% and Analytics Hub is ~15%. The company reports in a single segment and only breaks out Subscription revenue vs Professional Services revenue. Subscription revenue is a fairly consistent 91-92% of revenue with 75-80% gross margins. Professional Services has historically been a mid-high single digit gross margin but in the last two fiscal years has delivered marginally negative gross profits due to increased investments to support ai-related sales processes, which tend to require higher levels of consultation. The company expects to grow into this expanded cost structure in the coming quarters and return professional services margins to historical levels.

Okay here comes the ai part. I SAID HERE COMES THE AI PAAAAART!!!!! Knowledge Hub uses ai. Yup that’s it. I’m making fun of it obviously because of the massive hype and every company tripping all over themselves to claim to be an ai company, but I do actually think that in EGAN’s case it makes sense for both product and marketing reasons and they’re going about it in a sensible way. From a product perspective, the first step of using Knowledge Hub is to actually create the knowledge base. As we know, while you would never trust the job completely to ai, it can save tons of time in coming up with initial drafts, suggesting changes, or creating summary materials from more granular materials. Thus the content creation team’s role goes from writing all materials to the much faster task of shaping, suggesting, and editing. In fact, the company cited an example on its FQ324 conference call of a client who reduced their knowledge build effort by a factor of five while simultaneously improving answer quality by 6x (no I don’t know 6x of what, but it seems like a lot. I’m assuming this means cutting the rate of wrong answers by five sixths).

This gets to the second reason ai is a good product fit here. The ai will be operating off of a carefully curated set of inputs, meaning it is much less likely to get the kind of wild answers that we can get from ChatGPT which is trained on all kinds of conflicting information. Although I’m far from an ai expert (if you haven’t already concluded that, you’re not paying attention), EGAN is taking what appears to me to be an intelligent approach by allowing clients to swap in their own models. Thus eGain can outsource the capital-intensive (and constantly progressing) model development to others, while owning the client interface and getting all the credit for a model’s successes while not being responsible for its failures. In fact, one of the laudations that the company has received from Gartner has been for its “composable experience platform,” i.e. allowing clients to plug into all sorts of tools from companies like Microsoft (Dynamics), SAP, Salesforce, ServiceNow, IBM, Adobe, Apple, Amazon, Cisco, Avaya and more while still themselves owning the client interface (paging Ben Thompson and the aggregator playbook).

The marketing reason that ai is a good fit for EGAN (and why every company is now an ai company) is that ai has completely changed their go-to-market dynamics. Rather than beating the pavement looking to sell their Hubs, EGAN now has clients coming to them with ai-specific budgets, looking to fill those budgets. And why do those clients come to EGAN? For one thing the company has received a bunch of accolades from firms like Gartner and Forrester New Wave around its knowledge product, which is all the more impressive given its small size. Specifically, the company: was named a visionary in Gartner’s 2023 Magic Quadrant for CRM Customer Engagement, earned the top score in Gartner’s 2023 Critical Capabilities report for CRM customer engagement (beating Salesforce, Oracle, ServiceNow, Microsoft, and Zendesk. The company also competes with LivePerson, NICE, Ltd., and Verint Systems), and earned the top score in most recent (2021) Forrester New Wave report on Digital-First Customer Service.

So the clients come in steered by these scores and awards (which I acknowledge are sometimes meaningless). Are they disappointed with EGAN’s actual offering? It looks like not! As of this writing, eGain holds a rating of 4.7 out of 5.0 based on 100 Gartner Peer Insights customer reviews. If we’ve established that the product is good enough, we have to then ask: is the market big enough? A June 2023 McKinsey Digital report states that businesses will spend $1.5 trillion annually on customer service and could reduce this figure by $400 billion through ai adoption. The company believes it has a TAM of at least $20b and lays out a propaganda slide in their latest quarterly presentation suggesting a $10 billion opportunity in customer service and another $10 billion opportunity in enterprise services. The latter, which refers to simply using ai knowledge products to make enterprise employees more productive on a day-to-day basis, contemplates 100 million enterprise employee seats paying eGain $100 each per year. Clearly EGAN isn’t going to generate that much business, but the point is that for a company with annual revenue of ~$100mm, capturing even a small fraction of this opportunity could be a multi-bagger event. For what it’s worth, the company estimates that clients would realize $1,000 of productivity per employee per year (i.e. a 10x client roi) and this seems low to me. If we use $150k as a sample annual enterprise employee salary, the implication is that these tools will save an employee just over one single hour per month, which seems low (two hours per month at $75k per year still seems low to me).

On the customer service side, EGAN estimates that each seat can save $10,000 of contact center agent costs per year through reduced time and more calls getting the answer right the first time (again, with a significant roi given a cost to the client of $300 per agent per year). Multiplied by 17mm contact center agents globally, this is a $5.1 billion TAM. There is also an opportunity to save clients money through better self-serve customer service interactions (e.g. a chatbot through which clients’ customers can access the knowledge base within Knowledge Hub) that the company values at another $5 billion. eGain believes that it can save clients $5 per customer contact with its self-service knowledge capability, at a cost to the client of $0.10 per contact.

If you add these all up you get potential total global client savings of $520 billion. This, along with McKinsey’s $400 billion number, obviously involves a lot of estimation, but it’s clear that there’s a very large opportunity, that eGain can address it while providing significant value to clients, and that capturing even a small fraction of it would multiply EGAN’s revenue by a few times. While the above figures all contemplate ai-powered customer service products, it’s worth mentioning that in 2022 (prior to the November 2022 launch of ChatGPT), Gartner had named knowledge management as the number one technology investment for customer service. So there was already significant value there, and ai just adds to it.

I’ll finish this section with just a couple of client success stories to demonstrate the magnitude of the improvement that EGAN’s solutions can provide: (i) a leading telco improved its net promoter score by 30 points, first contact resolution by 37%, and training time by 50% across 13,000 contact center agents and retail store associates, (ii) a “mammoth” federal agency deflected up to 70% of calls, boosted taxpayer service by 400%, and reduced case handling time by 25%, and (iii) a “hypergrowth” saas company improved agent confidence by 60%, answer consistency by 62%, and speed to answer by 67%.

How we got here

eGain has, well, been at this for a while. For some quick history, the company went public in late 1999 at a share price of $12, leading with a focus on its communications capabilities. I guess this was new and value-add at the time! Interestingly, the company does reference its knowledge capabilities at this point (as well as its “100% Web-native architecture”!) but only as a support to the communications angle. You already know what happened next. By the end of the year EGAN’s stock price was over $375 and by February 2000 it was over $675. And! The stock price in June of 2000, 2001, and 2002 was ~$121, ~$27, and ~$2.60. After the 2002 meltdown, the company bounced around ~$20 million of revenue and a $1 stock price for about five years. All under a typical historical license and service (i.e. not subscription other than some hosting revenue) model. To the company’s credit, they were able to make it through this time by cutting cash burn from $75mm in FY01 to ~$6mm within two years, and then $1-2mm in the following years. In this period, EGAN largely still talked about themselves as a communications company though knowledge (“eGain KnowledgeAgent”) was starting to be featured more prominently, and they were highlighting ROIs to clients more than previously.

eGain’s performance saw inflection points in fiscal years 2008, 2011, and 2013-2014 with revenue growth for these years of 34%, 47%, 36%, and 19% driven by an OEM partnership agreement with Cisco, increased client demand and sales and marketing investments, and a shift to a cloud delivery model, respectively. However with gross margins only in the high 60s vs today’s low-mid 70s, cash flow generation was nominal. Nevertheless, the stock responded, reaching ~$11 in late CY2011 and ~$14 in late CY2013 (approximate range of 1x-4x revenue), only to decline for the next few years to a low of under $2 (sub-1x revenue) near the end of FY17 after two years of negative revenue growth driven by the continuing transition of the revenue stream toward subscription revenue as historical license revenue dropped to only 8% of total revenue. Overall this meant revenue growing from ~$30mm in FY08 to ~$75mm in FY15, and then down to ~$58mm in FY17.

As of the start of FY18, EGAN was selling only subscription arrangements for new business. This era (through today) has seen the company generate positive cash flow every year in the mid-single digit to low double digit millions and included FY22 revenue growth of 17%. The stock price has ranged from ~$6 to $10 (~1.5x-4x revenue), exceeding $15 during spikes in CY18 and (not surprisingly) CY20. Fiscal year revenue has grown from ~$61mm in FY18 to $98mm in FY23.

Over its long history, eGain has invested in its product, growing R&D spend from ~$5mm in FY09 to ~$27mm in FY23. In FY22-23 in particular, EGAN stepped up R&D in order to build a marketplace for other vendors to sell value-added services on top of Knowledge Hub. Not only is this another page from the aggregator playbook (although to be clear I’m not arguing that EGAN is going to become aggregator-sized), it’s a model that has worked well for many software companies, and it was something that was requested of the company by its clients. At least as importantly (especially for a software company), the company has grown sales and marketing spend from $10.5mm to $31.7mm without burning tons of cash and betting the farm that the next two years will deliver the company (note that in FY24 the company reduced spend to a low $20s run-rate, further demonstrating expense discipline). EGAN has also supported and invested in its Cisco OEM relationship, which, including sales to and through Cisco, represents ~20% of EGAN’s revenue. It is worth noting that the deal began in the FY08 timeframe and in FY16 Cisco began bundling EGAN’s products with its own rather than simply offering them as an add-on.

More recently, EGAN noted in its FQ422 (June 2022) call that it saw a more difficult macro environment. Regardless, in FQ123 (September 2022 quarter) the company announced a $20mm share buyback (one of the benefits of managing expenses and building up a large cash pile), stating that investing in the stock (then at $7.89 or a ~20% premium to the current price) was a good use of excess cash and wouldn’t affect the company’s growth plans. EGAN further acknowledged the macro environment in FQ423 with saas revenue growth slowing from ~17% in FY22 to ~7% in FY23. In addition, the release of ChatGPT in late calendar 2022 caused many companies to step back and reevaluate their overall software strategies in the context of an ai-enabled world. Despite this pause, EGAN said that clients came back excited about how the company fits into the picture. eGain also stated on the FQ423 call that client activity was already ramping up though it was still cautious given macroeconomic uncertainty. Shortly afterward in September 2023, EGAN released its AssistGPT ai product.

Actual performance thus far in FY24 has matched the company’s commentary about both a difficult macroeconomic environment and positive momentum in client activity. Although the first three quarters of fiscal year 24 have all seen negative revenue growth and EGAN is guiding to a fourth quarter of negative growth, management has consistently cited progress with new logos and pilot programs. Specifically, by FQ324 (March 2024, the most recent reported quarter), eGain reported that FYTD new logo and RFP counts had both increased 50% over the prior year. That is a lot! In addition, the company beat its guidance in both FQ124 and FQ224. In FQ324 however, EGAN missed due to a change in the timing of the shift in Cisco revenue from upfront to ratable recognition. I’ll give them the benefit of the doubt on that one and call it a meaningless miss. More importantly though, the company is guiding to a sequential revenue decline in the coming quarter of nearly 5%. This is a large decline and is driven by an unexpected loss of two clients (together representing $8mm of ARR) of eGain’s less sticky and less differentiated products: Conversation Hub, and Analytics Hub. In the former case the client is choosing to consolidate vendors for all of their digital customer communications, while the latter client is going to build their own solution. I discuss the financial implications of this loss in the valuation section below.

Most recently, and perhaps as an indicator of management’s confidence in the current trajectory, the company announced at the end of May that it had almost completed its original $20 million repurchase authorization and is expanding the program by another $20 million.

Where we are now

A reasonable question to ask at this point is “why so much overview and background information?” and my answer to this is that pitching a 25+ year-old software company whose market cap is only ~$200mm merits some context! Anyone whose “value trap” alarm bells are going off I think raises a valid question, and I’ve certainly looked at plenty of software and services companies who would announce great things every few quarters only to have a loss elsewhere in the business shortly afterward resulting in net progress of zero.

So the question presents itself: Is EGAN a value trap that is now trying to sell its story by jumping on the ai bandwagon? I would argue no. At a very superficial and perhaps misguided level, I would argue that if you avoided falling into the trap of ever thinking “okay now this thing is a rocket ship,” you have had many opportunities to buy this stock at a low multiple and make an attractive return, provided you were not greedy. Similarly, if you haven’t bought into the hype and owned it during its occasional peaks, there haven’t been that many opportunities to lose a lot of money. As you’ll see, I don’t contemplate particularly high multiples in any of my valuation cases below.

More importantly, however, I think the correct context for eGain is not to ask why it isn’t worth a billion dollars, but rather to acknowledge that it has a good, though obviously not world-changing product, along with a management team that has steered it through a lot of different industry changes. It would have been entirely reasonable for this company to die instead of surviving the bursting of the tech bubble and the long ensuing winter, instead of transitioning to a cloud product, instead of transitioning to a subscription model, instead of connecting to all kinds of other products that clients use, or instead of integrating ai capabilities, but it’s still here and trading at 1.3x revenue. This seems like the right time to mention that CEO Ashutosh Roy, also the company’s co-founder and CEO since 1997, owns nearly 30% of the company i.e. a ~$60mm position representing ~60x his annual compensation (or ~229x his FY21 comp). This fits well with the company’s history of surviving, adapting, and making incremental positioning improvements. Roy has always been protecting and nurturing his own stock position. Interests are aligned.

Which leads us to the current opportunity: we have a company with TTM revenue of $95mm, of which 92% was recurring revenue, ending ARR of $74mm, gross margins of ~71%, $79mm of net cash, a history of positive cash flow generation, and a buyback program in place. With a market cap of ~$207mm, this gives us an EV of ~$124mm, or 1.3x TTM revenue, 1.4x TTM recurring revenue, and 1.7x ending recurring revenue. This is cheap.

On another hand, we have revenue growth slowing from 17% in FY22 to 7% in FY23, three quarters in FY24 of negative sequential growth, with the company now guiding to a fourth. While this isn’t good performance, it is also the source of the opportunity, as EGAN’s stock price has traded from over $10 to its current level of $6.60.

On a third hand, we have good data coming in over the last few quarters that hasn’t yet made it into the financials: large upswings in new logo wins and RFP counts, backed by a total net dollar retention rate of 96%, and a total net dollar expansion rate (the degree to which existing retained clients increase their spend) of 105%. The knowledge product’s metrics are even stronger with 97% retention and 109% expansion. And all of this is backed by a CEO who is very heavily invested in the company’s stock.

So we’re ultimately left with the question of (i) whether new logos (which will likely be focused on Knowledge Hub) will actually convert into recurring revenue and expand at a rate that will offset any weakness in the Conversation Hub and Analytics Hub products, (ii) whether the market will give the company some recognition of these successes in the form of a higher multiple, and (iii) whether some other regime change will come along that will put the company into yet another transitional period. While I certainly don’t expect perfect straight-line performance and do expect some bumps along the way, I think the odds are on the company returning to attractive financial performance (consider that the more Knowledge Hub outpaces the other two products, the more the revenue mix becomes weighted toward knowledge, and the higher quality the overall revenue stream becomes), and on the market giving the company a better multiple of TTM revenue than 1.3x.

Valuation and expected outcomes

Valuation overview

While the days of just throwing a 5x revenue multiple on any software company and calling it a day are fortunately behind us, the valuation math here is not complicated and I don’t intend to make it complicated. Simply put, eGain’s recent client loss obscures the actual underlying growth potential in the business that management has referenced in terms of RFP’s and new logo wins being up over 50% in the last nine months, and pilot conversion rates at 75%.

The midpoint of EGAN’s revenue guidance for the quarter ended June 2024 implies a 4.9% sequential revenue decline. This is not great. However, if we adjust $2mm of revenue out of the prior quarter to remove the sequential impact of the two lost clients, we are left with positive 4.4% sequential guided growth. This is the implied revenue growth for the rest of the business outside of the client loss, and sequential growth of 4.4% is very different from a decline of 4.9%. My base and high cases consider that this 4% growth rate is the more correct way to forecast the business (i.e. they won’t be having client losses like this every year), but first let’s consider what things look like if that is too optimistic. In all cases, we find that the company’s positive cash flow generation and significant balance sheet cash both boost returns in the better outcomes and dampen losses in the downside cases. I’ll also note that nearly all of my valuations below use a revenue multiple. I realize that is a yellow flag for some investors (who would, in EGAN’s case be correct in their concern that the standalone company doesn’t have enough earnings or cash flow at the current revenue level to support an earnings-based valuation), but given the low multiples I’m using again along with the company’s cash generation and balance sheet cash, I’m comfortable with it here.

Downside cases

For my downside case I assume that EGAN’s guided June 2024 sequential revenue decline of 4.9% is actually representative of the business and continues on for the medium term (i.e. further client losses). This results in revenue declines of ~18% per year! Obviously in such a scenario management will be doing their best to cut expenses. For this case I forecast gross margins declining from ~71% to 50% by FY27 and opex declining from $60mm to $35mm. This is a large cut to be sure, but I think it’s fair to assume that multiple years of 18% revenue declines would put management fully into emergency mode. I also note that actual performance in FY10 was gross margin of ~68% and opex of ~$19mm at only ~$30mm of revenue. While I acknowledge that expense reduction isn’t as simple as just going back to a historical year, we clearly have a reasonable amount of padding here. So what does this case mean for EGAN stock? I use a 0.7x revenue multiple for a broken software company, which, when combined with cash burn in this case of about $5mm per year, gives us a stock price of $3.90 as of FY26 and $3.49 as of FY27, or down 41% and 47% from current levels. I find this to be an acceptable level of downside given the severity of this downside case.

For a less severe but still “underlying growth thesis is wrong” case, I looked at 5% annual revenue declines. In this case gross margin drops 10 points to 60% and management is able to remove about $17mm of opex by FY 27. Under these assumptions EGAN generates a few million of cash per year. Sticking with our 0.7x revenue multiple, we end up with a value of $4.78 for FY 27, or a manageable decline of 28%. A DCF with a 10% discount rate results in a stock price of $4.14 or a decline of ~37%. In both of these cases, there is significant time for management to try to figure the situation out as EGAN has no debt and is either burning only about 7% of its cash pile annually (lower case) or generating cash (higher case).

Base case

To suggest that the client loss is completely a one-time non-recurring event (i.e. taking the adjusted 4.4% sequential growth at face value) sounds like high case underwriting. My base case instead applies a haircut of 50%, resulting in a 2.2% sequential quarterly growth rate, which works out to ~5% annual growth in FY25 and ~9% growth in FY26 and FY27. This feels about right to me for the characteristics of this business. The implication is that the client loss was one of EGAN’s weaker relationships and the remainder of the business sees better retention with reasonable growth from knowledge products and AssistGPT. A 2.2x revenue multiple for this moderately growing business results in a stock price of $10.19 or upside of ~54%. I realize that this doesn’t seem like a ton of “juice” relative to the low cases, but I’d remind you that the low cases contemplate a 0.7x revenue multiple, usually reserved for imminently failing, cash-burning businesses, while EGAN is currently a 70% gross margin business with positive cash flow. Thus I think this is a relatively conservative base case being compared to a very conservative downside case.

High case

It is certainly possible that eGain outperforms all of the above projections. First, and very simply, if the client loss is truly non-representative of the company’s go-forward potential, the implied adjusted quarterly sequential revenue growth is 4.4%, which if carried forward results in ~10% annual growth in FY 25 and ~19% annual growth in each of FY26 and FY27. This results in ~$134mm of FY27 revenue which, at 2.5x revenue, results in a stock price of $12.85 or 95% upside.

My second high case started life as a base case example but turned out growthy enough that it belongs here instead. If we use EGAN’s 50% split between the knowledge product and the comms and analytics products and carry forward the trends implied by the client loss (i.e. $2mm of quarterly revenue lost from the comms and analytics revenue stream), the implied projections are ~18% quarterly sequential declines in comms and analytics revenue and ~8% quarterly sequential growth in knowledge revenue. As you might guess, this results in rapid declines in the comms and analytics revenue of ~50% annually, while the knowledge product grows at ~25-35%. By FY27 we have a business that is growing ~25% and is over 90% weighted toward knowledge revenue. A 2.5x revenue multiple results in a stock price of $11.57 or upside of ~75% from current levels.

Key risks

--The most obvious risk here is “this is a value trap, and they’ve just temporarily convinced you that this time is different.” It is certainly possible that this is true. However although I wouldn’t give EGAN the consistency award, I think the major thing that sets the company apart from a value trap is that they have delivered strong performance during many periods in their history, ultimately growing revenue to $100mm. It hasn’t been solely big broken promises with now being the one time it’s actually going to succeed. In some ways, a company’s value trap-ness is dependent on the expectations that you put on it and I think that even without stellar execution, the odds are that they return to the reasonable growth that I’ve forecasted.

--To balance the above discussion, it is worth acknowledging that this situation does require a change in trajectory in order to be cheap. If it turns out that the positive client momentum and retention data they’ve reported doesn’t actually flow through to the financials and revenue declines continue as they are, then the company is not cheap.

--While the Cisco contract appears to be strong and strengthening, at ~20% of revenue, this is a relationship that the company needs to maintain. Losing or significantly shrinking this relationship would not only result in a meaningful financial impairment, but would also hamper the company’s product and sales investment efforts, and would likely result in a further rerating of the stock downward.

--Although I haven’t come across specific indications of this with eGain, with software and services companies that have been around for a while, there is always the risk that they have some buried contracts with too-high pricing that are vestiges of an era before some sort of commoditization. These contracts would need to be repriced lower, resulting in sudden revenue drops. The risk of this seems a little lower with EGAN since they’ve gone through a number of product shifts over the years (including most recently shifting to a subscription model) which would provide good opportunities for clients to demand market pricing.

Catalyst

--Conversion over the coming quarters of logo wins and RFPs to recurring revenue

--Continued dollar expansion of existing client relationships

--Announcement of FQ424 earnings (likely early or mid-September) with FY25 guidance given

--Repurchases and reductions in share count, backed by moderate cash generation

--Potential acquisition by one of the very large enterprise saas platform providers