Description
There is no
size in this idea and it’s not appropriate for a fund. It’s illiquid; plain and simple. This idea can be an attractive opportunity
for someone with a smaller personal account.
I’m conflicted about posting this idea because of these anti-VIC features
and I’ll likely get some low ratings based on the size of the stock alone, but
I find it might be worthwhile as a personal investment for some VIC members. There’s no reason to proceed any further if you
cannot make an investment less than
the $150,000 that is 10% of potential equity value of only $1.5
million.
Surety Capital
Corp (SRYPQ) (“the Company”) is an illiquid nano-cap stock in bankruptcy that
doesn’t have current financials (hasn’t filed numbers since Q3 06) and whose
former CEO may have breached his fiduciary duty to the company. I came across the Company like most of us
normally do. I woke up Christmas morning
and read a local newspaper article discussing the Company’s bankruptcy filing.
The thesis here
is simple. Surety Capital has three
assets: Surety Bank (“the Bank”), and two potential causes of action: (1) a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the former chairman, sole
director(!), and CEO (Richard Abrams, hereinafter “Abrams”), and (2) a claim
for recovery or cancellation of stock improperly issued to Abrams and his
associates. The current market price is
attractive when compared to the discounted value of these assets.
Background
A quick rundown:
Sale of the company is
proposed:
(02/28/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000006/sryp14a.htm
Sale of the company is
terminated by buyer:
(07/10/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000010/sry8k-2007.htm
Turns out Abrams is potentially-crooked:
(08/15/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000012/sry8k-2007.htm
(10/01/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000014/sryp8k.htm
Evidence of Abrams’s wrongdoing
emerges:
(12/14/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000135448807002104/form8kdec07k.htm
The Company files for BK to
sale company over Abrams’s objections:
(12/25/07) http://www.star-telegram.com/business/v-print/story/377287.html
(12/26/07) http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000135448807002164/ex991.htm
The Bank
A bankruptcy
sale of the Bank will likely (not certainly) bring $9 million. According to bankruptcy filings, “[t]he Bank
is unprofitable, but its tangible book value is approximately $6 million. . .
. [the Company] believes the Bank is
worth at least $9 million or 1.5 times book value.” Now where did this $9 million come from?
Surety Capital
already had an offer from Pax Holdings for $9.513 million. See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000006/sryp14a.htm
. That offer fell through. See
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000010/sry8k-2007.htm
. Why did the deal fall through? According to bankruptcy filings, “[t]he prior
controversies regarding [Abrams’s] self-interested management have tarnished
the Bank’s reputation and hindered previous efforts to sell the Bank outside of
bankruptcy.”
Jerry says that
Pax Holdings is not the unidentified bank that has offered $8.5 to $9 million
for the Bank but that the Company currently has such an offer. See,
http://www.star-telegram.com/business/v-print/story/377287.html . This offer appears strong enough for the
Company to actually state, in its debtor’s schedules, $9 million as the value
of its 100% stock ownership of the Bank.
I’ve talked to Jerry, and my understanding is that [1] the Company
had/has a pre-filing offer; [2] Jerry realized Abrams and his son (owning 18%
combined) are going to object to the sale; [3] can bypass Abrams by selling whilein Chapter 11; and [4] can attempt to
recover shares issued by Abrams to himself and his friends (see below).
So we have a
range of enterprise value (TEV) of $8.5 to $9 million. Let’s figure out the equity value. The Company has $6.7 million in liabilities;
the largest liability is $6.4 million in publicly traded debentures. (Note: I don’t have any price
information on these. Given that I’m
writing an investment thesis for the most junior claim—equity—any debentures
that can be bought for distressed, or even stressed, prices may prove more attractive. Of course, do your own due diligence on these
debentures if they’re available.)
According to bankruptcy filings, “[t]he debentures mature on March 31,
2008 and [the Company] has no cash with which to pay them. The debenture holders have sued for failure
to make scheduled interest payments. A
sale of the Bank is the only way to generate the cash necessary to pay off the
debentures at maturity. Properly
advertised and managed, a sale should generate sufficient proceeds to pay all
creditors in full and make a meaningful distribution to shareholders.”
With 15 million
shares outstanding (but this number is contested, see below), the current price
of $0.13/share puts equity value at $1.95 million. Assuming a sale of the Bank at $9 million, the
value leftover for equity—after $6.7 in liabilities—would be $2.3 million or
$0.1533/share. This unadjusted return is
17.95%. At a sale price of $8.5 million,
the value leftover for equity—after the $6.7 in liabilities—would be $1.8
million or $.12/share. This unadjusted
return is -7.69%.
The Bank is
only one of the three assets the Company has.
Let’s check out the other two.
Claim of Fiduciary Duty
According to
bankruptcy filings, “[t]he [Company] was mismanaged for a long period of time
by [Abrams], who is also one of the Debtor’s largest single shareholder. In addition, [Abrams’s] son [], the Abrams
Family Trust, and [Abrams’s] girlfriend are also substantial
shareholders.” Abrams owns 10.7% and
Rodney Abrams owns 7.95% of the Company.
This is why, according the newspaper link above, “[Jerry] Weiner,
chairman and chief executive of Surety Capital Corp. since Oct. 1, described
the Chapter 11 move as a means to overcome possible shareholder opposition to a
desired sale of the holding company.”
Again from bankruptcy filings, “[Abrams] has been prohibited from
engaging in certain activities in the banking industry as documented by a June
2007 Consent Order, effective October 1, 2007.”
See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000012/sry8k-2007.htm
.
According to an
article entitled, “Pax Kills Surety Bank Deal,” published July 11, 2007, “[i]n
February the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency charged that Surety Capital's chairman and chief executive officer,
Richard Abrams, used unsafe and unsound banking practices, and in June it
barred him from the banking industry and required him to pay a $15,000 fine.”
The Company has
listed “Potential Claim Against former management for breach of fiduciary duty”
as an asset on the debtor’s schedules.
The current value is listed as “unknown.” I’m unsure what the Company might get in
pursuing a potential claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Abrams. My sense is that it may be used as leverage
in pursuing a claim for recovery or cancellation of stock improperly issued to
Abrams and his associates.
Stock Improperly Issued
Following
Jerry’s appointment as Chairman, see
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000078493207000014/sryp8k.htm,
he discovered that there had been 3.5 million shares issued to Abrams and his
associates, see
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/784932/000135448807002104/form8kdec07k.htm
.
In my non-insider opinion, the
Company would have a good shot at recovering under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code
as an insider preference. Under § 547,
the Company can look to payments made to insiders a year before the bankruptcy
filing, and no presumption of insolvency is needed. The Company will have to show that Abrams and
his associates received more value than they would have received if the
bankruptcy case were a Chapter 7 liquidation.
My only input here is that courts generally view Chapter 7 values as
very low, because courts use fire sale prices and large chapter 7 trustee
administration fees.
If the company
can recover the 3.5 million shares issued, then the ‘true shares outstanding’
will total 11.5 million. This would
change the value of equity dramatically.
With 11.5 million shares outstanding, the current price of $0.13/share
puts equity value at $1.5 million.
Assuming a sale of the Bank at $9 million, the value leftover for
equity—after $6.7 in liabilities—would be $2.3 million or $0.20/share. This unadjusted return is 53.85%. At a sale price of $8.5 million, the value
leftover for equity—after the $6.7 in liabilities—would be $1.8 million or $.1565/share. This unadjusted return is 20.40%.
Compressed Valuation
I’ve used a
50/50 chance of a $8.5 or $9 million sale price. I’ve also used a 50/50 chance of the Company
recovering the shares issued to Abrams and his associates. This results in an expected return of over
20%.
(all $’s in millions)
Sale
scenarios
|
|
|
Sale price
|
|
$8.75
|
Liabilities
|
|
$6.70
|
Equity sale value
|
|
$2.05
|
|
|
|
No
share recovery
|
|
|
Shares outstanding
|
|
15.00
|
Current share price
|
|
$0.13
|
Current equity value
|
|
$1.95
|
|
|
|
Unadjusted return
|
|
5.13%
|
|
|
|
Share
recovery
|
|
|
Shares outstanding
|
|
11.50
|
Current share price
|
|
$0.13
|
Current equity value
|
|
$1.50
|
|
|
|
Unadjusted return
|
|
37.12%
|
|
|
|
Expected
return
|
|
|
No recovery
|
|
50%
|
Share recovery
|
|
50%
|
|
|
|
Expected unadjusted return
|
|
21.13%
|
A couple of other ‘share recovery’ scenarios give attractive
returns as well.
Expected
return
|
|
|
No recovery
|
|
65%
|
Share recovery
|
|
35%
|
|
|
|
Expected unadjusted return
|
|
16.33%
|
Expected
return
|
|
|
No recovery
|
|
75%
|
Share recovery
|
|
25%
|
|
|
|
Expected unadjusted return
|
|
13.13%
|
Actual IRR
could be less, though likely not substantially less, as the bankruptcy process
might take over a year towards 18 months.
Catalyst
Liquidation leading to shareholder distribution
Upon a sale of the Bank, the Company plans to liquidate. According to bankruptcy filings, “[t]he purposes of the bankruptcy are: 1) to give the [Company] a breathing spell form the debenture holders’ lawsuit; 2) to provide an orderly, transparent process for the sale of the Bank to the higher qualified bidder; and 3) to obtain confirmation of a liquidation plan of reorganization, which should pay creditors in full and return a meaningful distribution to shareholders.” (emphasis added)