Description
Short Seaboard
Corp
Originally written up by Mark778 in August 2005 (which I highly recommend reading as well ), Seaboard
Corp owns a wide variety of businesses including pork production/processing in
the US, container shipping in Latin America, commodity milling and trading in
Africa, sugar and citrus production in Argentina, electric power in the
Dominican Republic, and jalapeno peppers in Honduras. While the variety businesses looks
intimidating from an analytical perpective, pork and marine are the critical
divisions to understand as together they comprise 82% of the 2006 EBIT and their
strong results have been the major drivers of the company’s recent
outperformance. For the last 3 years, margins in both the pork
and marine business have been far above the trend for the rest of the last
decade. If one believed that current
results were sustainable, then SEB would probably be fairly valued at 8x
current EBITDA. However, I believe it is
likely that both pork and marine margins are unsustainable. Furthermore, I believe that pork margins will
decline significantly in 2007, driven by rapidly increasing feed costs
(corn). This pork margin decline should
lead to a drop in overall earnings, removing the earnings momentum from the
stock and driving it to a more appropriate valuation, even if marine earnings
stay strong. Assuming only my expected
decline in pork profitability and continued strong marine performance, I would
argue that the stock is worth no more than $1,850 at 12x EPS, a 28% decline
from today. However, if the marine
business also reverts back towards normal profitability, then I would argue
that SEB is worth $1,390, a 46% decline from the current share price.
Short Positives
-
Major businesses are extremely cyclical
commodity businesses that have recently operated well above historical
norms. Normalization should bring
significant margin downside
o Pork
and marine division operating margins far above historical norms during last 3
years.
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
Pork OPM
|
7.2%
|
-0.2%
|
6.6%
|
8.7%
|
8.9%
|
-2.2%
|
3.0%
|
15.3%
|
17.8%
|
13.8%
|
Marine OPM
|
8.8%
|
5.6%
|
-0.6%
|
4.0%
|
6.2%
|
4.3%
|
1.4%
|
12.8%
|
14.2%
|
14.3%
|
-
Pork outperformance has been driven by
abnormally strong margins in more volatile pork production segment which is
very exposed to rising corn prices.
o Hog
production division at competitors expected to see significant margin decline
in 2007 due to rising corn prices
-
Questionable corporate governance with a history
of related party transactions
-
Valuation ludicrous on previous margin achievements. If margins normalize, downside could be
significant.
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
P/E
|
125.7x
|
122.3x
|
-282.9x
|
389.4x
|
73.9x
|
275.4x
|
111.9x
|
18.8x
|
12.2x
|
13.2x
|
EV/EBITDA
|
39.7x
|
43.5x
|
52.8x
|
30.7x
|
18.0x
|
30.6x
|
23.0x
|
9.7x
|
7.9x
|
8.3x
|
BUSINESS
DESCRIPTIONS
Pork
Seaboard’s pork division is a vertically integrated pork
producer (=raise) and processor (=kill).
The company produces and sells fresh, frozen, and processed pork
products to further processors, foodservice operators, retail outlets, and
distributors throughout the US and internationally. SEB owns hog breeding and production
facilities in OK, KS, TX and CO and can produce approximately 3.8mln hogs
annually, internally supplying 80% of the company’s processing needs. For processing SEB can process 16k hogs in
its core Guymon, OK facility and owns two bacon processing
plants in UT and MT. SEB also markets
related pork products for Triumph Foods LLC for a per head fee.
Competition
Seaboard is the #3 pork producer and #7 pork processor in
the nation with ~4% mkt share in each segment.
Pork production is a very fragmented industry with the top ten producers
controlling only 1/3 of the market. This
fragmentation (combined with the high fertility rate of hogs) has led to
significant pricing volatility and cyclicality in this industry. Pork processing is a more stable and
concentrated market (although lower margin) with the top ten processors
handling over 90% of pork in the US.
Smithfield Foods is the mkt leader in both pork production and
processing and has widened its mkt lead by buying competitor Premium Standard
recently.
Outlook
The pork business has been extremely strong during 2004-6,
driven by a booming export market.
According to the US Meat export federation (www.usmef.org), US pork
exports have increased at an 67% from 2003-6, driven by strong demand from
Mexico, (28% of exports, up 62% 2003-06) South Korea (9% of exports, up 378%)
and Japan (27% of exports, up 25%) as those countries dramatically decreased
their beef consumption (US beef exports down 49% 2003-6) following the outbreak
of mad cow disease in the US. In 2007,
Japanese and Korean export demand for US pork has remained strong. However, in recent weeks, both Japan and Korea
have begun to take steps towards easing their restrictions on US beef,
suggesting that the continued substitution of pork for beef may have less of an
impact on exports going forward. Furthermore,
pork export tons fell 2.4% in February 2007, only the second month to be below
the year earlier since August 2003, suggesting that previous surges in pork
exports may not continue.
More importantly, the pork business
faces a significant threat from the recent large, ethanol-driven increase in
corn prices. As corn equals ~50% of the
total costs of raising a hog (feed costs= ~75% and corn is 66% of feed costs),
the almost doubling of corn prices in early 2007 should dramatically pressure
prices. This theory has been supported
by agricultural economists who worry that rising corn prices will dramatically
hurt pork producer profitability. (
http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/marketing/livestockoutlook/html/041007/041007.html)
SEB will gain some relief from
increasing hog prices, but according to the USDA, live hog prices have only
increased 8% in Q1 07 vs. Q1 06, not enough to offset the dramatic increase in
corn prices. Furthermore, hog producers
continue to increase production (USDA expects pork production to increase 2% in
2007, limiting pricing gains.
While SEB does not break out hog production
and hog processing separately, by looking at competitor Smithfield’s breakdown,
it becomes quite apparent that a large driver of pork division margin outperformance
over the last few years is due to the hog production division (SFD hog production has generated OPMs from
the high teens to the low 20s over the last 10 quarters while processing
margins have been low to mid single digits).
However, hog production margins should decline significantly due to the
significant increase in raising costs driven by dramatic increases in corn
prices. Competitor Premium Standard
Foods (recently acquired by Smithfield), said that hog production operating
margins declined from 12.2% to 3.9% for Dec qtr 06 vs. Dec 05, primarily due to
a 31.5% increase in the cost of corn. Smithfield’s margins
declined to 1.1% in the Jan 07 qtr vs. 14.9% in the Jan qtr 2006 and management
commented on the most recent CC that high corn prices were going to pressure future
margins. During Q1 07, SEB’s pork margins declined from
12.3% to 8.7%, with the company blaming high corn prices for the drop in
margins. I believe that this margin decline will
continue throughout 2007.
Pork
Segment
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
Sales
|
532
|
500
|
571
|
725
|
772
|
646
|
736
|
962
|
1,024
|
1,003
|
% Growth
|
|
-5.9%
|
14.1%
|
26.9%
|
6.6%
|
-16.4%
|
13.9%
|
30.7%
|
6.5%
|
-2.1%
|
Operating Income
|
38
|
(1)
|
38
|
63
|
69
|
(14)
|
22
|
147
|
183
|
138
|
Operating Margin
|
7.2%
|
-0.2%
|
6.6%
|
8.7%
|
8.9%
|
-2.2%
|
3.0%
|
15.3%
|
17.8%
|
13.8%
|
Marine
SEB’s marine division provides containerized shipping
between 25 countries in the US,
Caribbean, and Central and South America. The company’s fleet consists of 11 owned and
28 chartered vessels. The segment time
charters or the majority of its fleet and is profitability is impacted by
containership rates, charter hire rates and fuel costs, among other things.
While
not much information exists about the company’s marine segment Mgmt has
commented on the likely unsustainable profitability in the Marine segment:
“Although
management cannot predict changes in future
cargo
rates, fuel related costs, charter hire expenses or to what
extent
changes in competition and economic conditions will impact
net
sales or operating income, it does expect this segment to
remain
profitable in 2007 although lower than 2006.”
Furthermore,
given the expected 15% increase in containership capacity for 2007, it is quite
possible that container shipping rates will weaken going forward. However, I have not assumed any significant
weakness in marine margins going forward as I do not believe I have enough
information to forecast a margin decline in this business.
Marine
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
Sales
|
309
|
311
|
308
|
365
|
385
|
383
|
409
|
499
|
638
|
742
|
%
Growth
|
#DIV/0!
|
0.5%
|
-1.0%
|
18.6%
|
5.5%
|
-0.4%
|
6.7%
|
21.9%
|
28.0%
|
16.2%
|
Operating
Income
|
27
|
17
|
(2)
|
15
|
24
|
17
|
6
|
64
|
91
|
106
|
Operating
Margin
|
8.8%
|
5.6%
|
-0.6%
|
4.0%
|
6.2%
|
4.3%
|
1.4%
|
12.8%
|
14.2%
|
14.3%
|
Commodity Milling
SEB markets grain and oilseed products mainly in Africa,
South America, and the Caribbean with
locations in 15 countries. The division
sources, transports and markets over 3mln tons of wheat, corn, soybean meal,
and other related commodities for use as food and animal feed. SEB also owns 25 grain processing locations
capable of producing 1.5mln tons of finished product/yr.
As segment sales are significantly affected by fluctuating
prices for various commodities including wheat, corn and soybean meal, a
dramatic increase in the price of grains could hurt the company’s sales and or
margins as the company attempts to pass on these higher input costs. Thus, I would argue that rising grain prices
could lead to lower 2007 operating profit in the commodity milling division.
Commodity
Milling
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
Sales
|
314
|
306
|
260
|
359
|
476
|
652
|
668
|
1,067
|
836
|
736
|
%
Growth
|
|
-2.4%
|
-15.3%
|
38.3%
|
32.6%
|
36.9%
|
2.4%
|
59.7%
|
-21.6%
|
-12.0%
|
Operating
Income
|
10
|
11
|
3
|
(4)
|
13
|
18
|
16
|
35
|
28
|
31
|
Operating
Margin
|
3.0%
|
3.4%
|
1.0%
|
-1.0%
|
2.8%
|
2.8%
|
2.4%
|
3.3%
|
3.4%
|
4.2%
|
Other Businesses
Sugar and Citrus-SEB is also involved in the
production and refining of sugar and the production and processing of citrus
products in Argentina and markets these products mainly locally with some
exports to the US, South America, and Europe.
SEB’s mill currently has processing capacity of 200k metric tons of
sugar and 4mln gallongs of alcohol per year. The company also owns 50k acres of
sugar cane and 3k acres used for orange trees.
During 2006, SEB benefited from rising global sugar prices, which more
than offset the loss making citrus operations.
This division is significantly impacted by local and global sugar
prices. I expect continued strong
performance out of this division as sugar prices are likely to remain high
driven by ethanol demand.
Electric Power-SEB owns two floating electric diesel
power generating facilities in the Dominican Republic with 112
megawatts of rated capacity. The company
operates as an IPP sells electricity with 50% under contract to large
commercial users under LT contracts and on the spot market to 3 govt controlled
distribution companies as well as other customers. During 2006, SEB’s power production was
restricted by the DR regulatory authorities, which schedule power production
based on the amt of funds available to pay for the power produced and the costs
of that power. SEB is also part of a
consortium to build two coal-fired 305mw electricity generating plants in the
DR. SEB has a less than 50% interest and
expects to spend between 25 and 75mln.
Others- SEB produces jalapeno peppers in Honduras
and has a equity investment in a Bulgarian wine business. These businesses are not that meaningful for
overall results.
Other
Revenues
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
2006
|
Sales
|
119
|
122
|
94
|
99
|
171
|
148
|
169
|
157
|
191
|
228
|
%
Growth
|
|
2.4%
|
-22.6%
|
5.4%
|
72.5%
|
-13.6%
|
14.1%
|
-6.8%
|
21.5%
|
19.1%
|
Operating
Income
|
2
|
2
|
(26)
|
(18)
|
12
|
31
|
28
|
20
|
24
|
29
|
Operating
Margin
|
1.6%
|
1.5%
|
-27.8%
|
-18.4%
|
7.2%
|
21.2%
|
16.5%
|
12.6%
|
12.6%
|
12.8%
|
Negatives/ Risks
-
Volatility of commodity divisions allows
potential for significant upside surprises if pork prices dramatically increase
or corn prices significantly fall
-
No analyst coverage means that there is no own
to talk sanity into these people
-
Poor disclosure makes analysis difficult
-
Insiders own 70% of the company.
Mgmt
SEB is controlled by the secretive Bresky family through
their private Seaboard Flour company.
The family makes ever effort who make every attempt to avoid publicity. However, a 1998 Time article (also noted by
Mark) suggests that their level of ethics is not the highest. Most notable from
the article, is the information about a 1990 lawsuit by shareholder Alfred Kahn,
which alleges a high level of self dealing between Seaboard Corp and privately
traded Seaboard Flour. “Robohm was
subpoenaed in the Kahn lawsuit, and he recited a litany of business dealings in
which, he said, Bresky had interests in companies that profited from inflated
contracts with Seaboard Corp. According to his deposition, kickbacks were paid
to officials in foreign governments; contracts were padded, with the excess
money diverted to Swiss bank accounts; management fees were inflated; brokerage
commissions ran 2 1/2 to five times the usual rate. And in the case of one
Seaboard subsidiary, "there was a great deal of cash that
was...unaccounted for." The Breskys
settled the Kahn lawsuit for $10.8mln without admitting any wrongdoing.
[i]
Conclusion
I think its best to give the CEO of SEB the last word about
the cyclicality of the company’s operations:
“Since
2004, we have cautioned that these operating results are
extraordinary,
and that going forward, we expect to return to
normalized
levels of profitability which are more in line with
our commodity-driven businesses.”
“We have
had a remarkable run over the last three years…since the beginning of 2004, our
combined operating income has exceed our previous 25 years combined… and our
stock price has appreciated over 500%.
It would be nice to consider these highlights as reflecting a trend,
but, realistically, it is more likely that they reflect a spike within a trend.”
[ii]
Negatives/ Risks
-
Volatility of commodity divisions allows
potential for significant upside surprises if pork prices dramatically increase
or corn prices significantly fall
-
No analyst coverage means that there is no own
to talk sanity into these people
-
Poor disclosure makes analysis difficult
-
Insiders own 70% of the company.
Catalyst
Continued decline in Pork division profitability pressures earnings