2016 | 2017 | ||||||
Price: | 0.80 | EPS | -0.27 | -0.13 | |||
Shares Out. (in M): | 56 | P/E | 0 | 0 | |||
Market Cap (in $M): | 45 | P/FCF | 0 | 0 | |||
Net Debt (in $M): | 0 | EBIT | -15 | -7 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 0 | TEV/EBIT | 0 | 0 |
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Summary: Support.com (SPRT) is a $44 mil. market cap company with more than $50 mil. in cash, no long-term debt, and nearly $200 mil. in federal and state tax loss carryforwards. The stock price is $0.80 and the stock trades about 100K shares / day. In June, 2016, activist investors replaced the prior management team in a successful proxy battle. The new management will probably take the company private or sell all or part of it to an outside buyer.
Introduction: Support.com (SPRT) provides tech support personnel and software for Comcast, Office Depot, and other companies. The company has been struggling with declining revenues and costs associated with the development of a new software product. The stock trades near its all-time low due to uncertainty over the strategic direction. More information on the new management’s plans should be revealed over the next few months. The risk / reward of this investment appears to be very favorable.
History
Support.com (SPRT) was founded in 1997 and completed its IPO at the tail end of the dotcom bubble in July, 2000. Mark Pincus (of Zynga fame) was one of its co-founders. The company’s stock price more than doubled on its first day of trading and the company briefly boasted a market cap of more than $1 billion. It has been mostly all downhill ever since. The company changed its name to SupportSoft in 2002 as the dotcom craze ended. Its main business at the time was licensing automated tech support software to internet service providers. This business had decent growth and profitability until the mid-2000s, but then began to decline precipitously. SupportSoft hired a new CEO named Joshua Pickus in 2006. Soon after, he created a new division to provide tech support services to consumers. Pickus sold the legacy enterprise software business in 2009 for only $20 mil. and changed the name of the company back to Support.com. Tech support services now generate about 90% of Support.com’s revenue.
Support.com has changed its business focus a couple of times. The company’s publications and websites highlight lots of Silicon Valley buzzwords: Cloud, internet of things (IoT), software as a service (SaaS), etc. The reality is, however, that Support.com is little more than a call center. It provides white label tech support for several large corporations, including Office Depot (since 2007) and Comcast (since 2010). Support.com has struggled mightily as it has only had one profitable year (2013) in the past decade. Its stock price has fallen nearly 90% since mid-2013. Pickus stepped down as CEO in 2014 and was replaced by a former Citrix VP named Elizabeth Cholawsky. Cholawsky had experience with the SaaS business model at Citrix, but had not previously served as a CEO. She was hired to develop and market a SaaS product which is now called Support.com Cloud. Sales of this program have been slow. Cholawsky resigned as CEO in October, 2016, after she and other members of the board of directors lost a proxy battle to institutional investors (explained later). One of the new board members currently serves as CEO on an interim basis.
http://fortune.com/2007/10/12/supportsoft-working-with-dell-and-betting-its-future-on-pc-problems/
http://fortune.com/2009/11/17/where-social-medias-it-boy-cut-his-teeth/
https://www.support.com/about-us/investor-relations/
Business Overview
Support.com provides tech support personnel that handle customers of other companies. It is a “virtual” call center that employs approximately 1,400 agents who answer phones and chats for Comcast, Office Depot, Staples, and other firms. Most of Support.com’s competitors are private companies like PlumChoice, Radial Point, and Alorica. Two of its publicly-traded competitors are TeleTech and Teleperformance. Support.com’s agents help consumers do things like download security software, setup wifi, install alarm systems, and diagnose computer security problems. The agents, who are only paid about $10.50 - $13.50 / hour, are not tech experts. They use software that is provided by Support.com but work out of their own homes and use their own computers. All of them are based in the U.S. as Support.com does not offer offshore support. Most of the agents provide Tier II and Tier III tech support for Comcast subscribers. They also act as vendors for Comcast’s wireless gateway and connected home products. Comcast accounted for 60% of Support.com’s Q3 2016 revenues. Office Depot is Support.com’s second-largest client. Office Depot offers a service called Tech Depot in which consumers pay $50 - $200 for various remote or in-store tech support services. Support.com provides personnel and software for these services. The firm is paid by its corporate customers on an hourly or per call basis.
Support.com has introduced a tech support software system. This program was originally known as Nexus but has recently been renamed Support.com Cloud. The program was released in 2014 and has generated immaterial revenues but significant costs. Support.com Cloud is a SaaS program that can be used by either support agents or consumers. It provides step-by-step guidance that allow users to resolve tech problems. It can be integrated with CRM software from Zendesk, Salesforce, and NetSuite. Competitors of Support.com Cloud include LogMeIn, Bomgar, and Five9. Support.com developed a cloud program to monetize its existing technology and diversify its revenue stream. The tech support market is changing from labor- intensive / one-time support to online self-service. The current annual recurring revenue from Support.com Cloud is less than $1.5 million. The good news, though, is that the company recently launched its first enterprise customer and signed up a second. The current number of Support.com Cloud seats is approximately 4,500. The future of this product is unknown as Support.com’s management is currently evaluating its strategic importance and potential.
https://www.support.com/cloud/
http://suiteapp.com/Support-com-Cloud-for-NetSuite
The Business Today
Support.com is highly dependent on its two largest customers, Comcast and Office Depot. Revenues from these two firms represent three-quarters of its revenues. The contracts renew automatically on an annual basis. In 2014, Support.com’s contract with Comcast was changed from a subscription model to a productive hour model. This change has had a negative impact as Comcast has taken steps to cut the number of tech support calls (and billable hours). On Comcast’s Q1 ’16 conference call, VP Neil Smit said that, “Concerning customer experience, we are focusing on a few things. One is making the experience all digital…We had the lowest agent call-in rate in years and we took out 11 million calls…” Support.com was reporting $15+ mil. revenue / quarter from Comcast as recently as Q1 ‘15. The current revenue levels, though, appear to have stabilized around $8.5 - $10 mil. / quarter. The actual amounts vary based on product releases from Comcast and changes to work orders. Revenues from Office Depot have declined slightly from $11.6 mil. in 2015 to approximately $10 mil. this year.
Support.com has had limited success in attracting new tech support clients. In Q2, the company announced that it successfully launched new services programs with Sears and Target. It is doubtful that either client will be large enough to have a big impact in the near-term. Support.com has a history of announcing partnerships that do not grow into anything significant. It is possible that some of Support.com’s smaller clients could be licensees of the Support.com Cloud product. The company has a number of relatively small services clients that could be potential software customers. Its smaller clients include Staples and Carbonite.
https://www.support.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/SPRT-Roadshow-2016-Full-IR-Deck-09-06-16.pdf
https://www.support.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SPRT-Deck-Jun16-Final.pdf
Balance Sheet and NOLs
Support.com has significant cash on its balance sheet. Investors, apparently, believe that Support.com’s operating business is worth less than nothing. The stock currently trades at a negative EV as the company has significant cash and zero long-term debt. It is one of the rare “net net” stocks. Support.com will exit 2016 with approximately $52 mil. ($0.94 / share) in cash. The stock price is currently around $0.80. While Support.com has been burning cash, the burn is abating. The company forecasted $47 - $50 mil. in cash ($0.85 - $0.90 / share) at year-end 2017 and non-GAAP profitability for 2018. These forecasts appear achievable as the company intends to cut costs. It is probable that Support.com’s call center business would be cash flow positive on a stand-alone basis. The company generated positive operating cash flow as recently as 2014.
Support.com has huge net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs). The company’s unfortunate history of losses means that any future profits will be shielded from federal and state income taxes. At 12/31/15, Support.com reported federal NOLs of $126.2 mil. and state NOLs of $69.4 million. These amounts will likely increase when the 2016 10-K is filed. Investors cannot realistically ascribe any value to the NOLs as the company cannot presently use them. It is difficult to say when or if the company might be profitable again. The existence of the NOLs suggests that Support.com may not be sold as a whole. NOLs are not be transferable in a change of ownership, so investors would lose their value in a sale. The management could sell the company’s assets but preserve the existing corporate structure to maintain the NOLs. It could then acquire a profitable business to benefit from the NOLs.
The Proxy Fight
Activist investors took hostile action against Support.com’s former management. The company’s stock price fell about 75% from mid-2013 to mid-2015. The plummeting stock price and large cash balance attracted the interest of activist investors Eric Singer, Bradley Radoff, and Joshua Schechter. Singer manages a $150 mil. AUM hedge fund in NYC called VIEX Capital. Radoff manages a $200+ mil. AUM firm in Houston called Fondren Capital. Radoff was previously employed as a Sr. Portfolio Manager at Third Point, Dan Loeb’s activist firm. Schechter is a private investor. The activists filed several 13D forms in late-2015 & early-2016 which disclosed that they had bought nearly 15% of Support.com. They also released several letters that they had sent to the board of directors.
The activist group demanded big changes at Support.com. Its letters claimed that it and other institutional shareholders had approached the board but had been ignored. The activists wanted two board seats and the resignations of top management. The board of directors (none of whom owned much stock) responded with aggressive opposition. It refused the demands for seats, amended its bylaws, and adopted a poison pill which prohibited the activists from buying more than 15% of the company. Later, in early-2016, the company adopted a Section 382 Plan which prohibited new investors from buying more than 4.9% of the shares. It also attempted to mollify investors by replacing three longtime board members with new people. The activists, in response, launched a full-scale proxy fight.
Activists staged a proxy battle to seize control of Support.com. In March, 2016, the dissident shareholders announced that they would nominate five new board members (including themselves) at the June annual meeting. Support.com’s management, unsurprisingly, opposed all of the nominees. Over the next three months, both sides lobbied shareholders with conflicting public statements and slideshows. The activists argued that Support.com Cloud was a flop and that, “…significant change is necessary given the long-term shareholder value destruction and flawed long-term strategy.” They also claimed that Cholawsky, “Appears to lack fundamental aptitude in areas such as capital allocation, finance, IR, and corporate governance.” Support.com’s management countered by claiming that the activists have, “… not provided any substantive and viable ideas for enhancing shareholder value…” The management also claimed that the Support.com Cloud strategy would work and that the company was on its way to profitability. Investors, though, were not impressed by the management’s arguments.
The dissident shareholders took control of Support.com. Prior to the vote, proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis supported the activists. Other institutional shareholders supported them as well. The result was that all five of the outside nominees won seats by large margins. Schechter was elected chairman. Cholawsky was voted off the board and resigned as CEO in October. She was replaced on an interim basis by one of the new board members, Richard Bloom. Bloom has significant corporate management experience and has served on several boards. He held several executive positions at a privately-held supplier of hotel amenities called Marietta Corporation from 1996-2007. He served as CEO of Marietta from 2004 until he left the company in 2007 to join a publicly-traded SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) called Renaissance Acquisition as president. Renaissance attempted to make one acquisition, but the deal fell through and the SPAC was dissolved in 2009. Bloom has been involved in several other businesses since that time. He has not said if a permanent CEO search is underway.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-bloom-5845aa7
Support.com’s new board members have had some success in past activist situations. Singer has served on the boards of at least eight companies. One of the these was an integrated circuit company company called PLX Technology. Singer (then working for Potomac Capital) launched an activist campaign against PLX in early-2013. Potomac paid around $4 for its PLX stake. In late-2013, his group won three board seats in a proxy contest. PLX was sold to Avago for $6.50 / share a few months later. Singer had less success in an activist campaign against WLAN provider Meru Networks in 2014-5. While Singer was able to join the board and force a sale, he apparently took a loss on the deal as Meru was eventually sold for a fire sale price. Radoff was involved in several activist situations at Third Point. In 2006, for example, Third Point launched an activist campaign against oil and gas producer Pogo Producing Co. Both Loeb and Radoff joined Pogo’s board in early-2007. Pogo was sold to Plains Exploration for $3.6 bil. just a few months later. Radoff and Singer are currently involved in several activist situations apart from Support.com.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1104855/000092189516004870/ex10tdfan14a10114013_060716.pdf
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/UV-PLX-Potomac.pdf
http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Plains-to-buy-Pogo-in-3-6-billion-deal-1661313.php
The Road Ahead
Support.com’s new management has not revealed its strategy. Prior to the proxy vote, the activists indicated that they would monetize Support.com’s operating assets and distribute cash to shareholders. It is unclear when, or if, this might happen. The company has held two earnings calls since the annual meeting and neither of them were particularly informative. The most recent one was held just a few days after Bloom was named interim CEO. Support.com did file an 8-K on December 8, 2016, in which it announced a “cost reduction plan” that included the dismissal of 43 employees. The activists discussed several plans prior to the Annual Meeting in June. These plans included:
It appears that these initiatives are taking longer than anticipated. The activists had suggested that some of their plans would be realized by the end of Q3 ‘16. So far, though, the new management has not disclosed any major plans or announced the hiring of a financial advisor. One likely issue is that Cholawsky (surprisingly) remained as CEO for four months after being voted off the board. She eventually walked away with $370K and other benefits. At any rate, my expectation is that announcements will be coming shortly as promises were made to shareholders prior to the proxy vote. I do not believe that Support.com will exist in its current form for much longer. There are several possibilities:
Support.com may be sold as a whole. The activists may look for a 3rd party buyer for the company. While this possibility would be profitable for shareholders, it has a major downside as the NOLs would likely be lost in a change of control. An acquirer would probably not pay anything for them. I think, therefore, that an outright sale to a 3rd party is unlikely. If the company is sold, my guess is that a potential acquirer might pay about $30 mil. (0.5x sales) for the business.
The operating business of Support.com could be sold. The management could attempt to sell the call center business. This business should have some value as Support.com has two longstanding contracts and some technology. The benefit of this strategy is that the NOLs would be maintained. Support.com could be turned into a shell company or SPAC that could acquire a profitable business.
The management of Support.com might take the company private. The activists have never publicly discussed this possibility. I think, though, that it is being considered. One significant issue is that a management takeover would likely constitute a change of control and eliminate the NOLs. The board would have to think of something creative to save them. Still, the new managers have more information on the value of Support.com’s business than they did as outside shareholders. They might want to try turn it around themselves. They also might want to use Support.com to acquire other companies.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1104855/000092189516004870/ex10tdfan14a10114013_060716.pdf
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFWN1E30QU
Guidance and Expectations
Support.com has provided limited financial guidance. In September, 2016, the company forecasted 2016 non-GAAP revenues of $60 - $64 mil., EPS of ($0.23) – ($.0.27), and an end of the year cash balance of $52 - $54 million. It also forecasted an end of 2017 cash balance of $47 – $50 mil. and non-GAAP profitability for 2018. It is likely that the 2017 and 2018 guidance is no longer relevant due to the management changes. Support.com forecasted Q4 2016 revenues of $14.5 – 15.0 mil. and EPS of ($0.04) – ($0.06) when it reported Q3.
Craig-Hallum is the only sell-side firm with current earnings expectations. The firm forecasts revenues of $61.9 mil. for 2016 and $60.4 mil. for 2017. It forecasts EPS losses of ($0.22) for 2016 and ($0.15) for 2017. Craig-Hallum has made no effort to promote the stock since the proxy vote. Its July, 2016, report stated that, “The real focus now will turn to what (if any) operational or strategic changed are implemented by the new BoD members and how well they are executed.” Its November, 2016, report stated that, “…it’s too early to identify if there’s a new strategy or focus at the firm – and if there is, how effective it will prove to be.” I believe that Craig-Hallum is being overly cautious as the new board has promised a new strategy. There was no reason to fight a proxy battle to just maintain the status quo. Craig-Hallum currently rates SPRT as a “HOLD” and lists of price target of just $1.00. Craig-Hallum listed a price target of $2.75 for SPRT as recently as early-2015.
Earnings Model
The likely strategy changes reduce the usefulness of earnings forecasts. It is possible that the company will not even exist in its current form for much longer. It is probable that the new management will cut expenses, so operating expenses should decline next year. The company has suggested that it will generate positive cash flow in 2018. It is also likely that there will be restructuring charges. Support.com has already announced a restructuring charge of $706K ($0.01 / share) for Q4 ’16 due to the aforementioned layoffs.
SPRT Model (in $1000s) |
|||||||||
Q1 '16 |
Q2 '16 |
Q3 '16 |
Q4 '16E |
2016E |
2017E |
||||
Revenue: |
|||||||||
Services |
$15,283 |
$13,609 |
$14,163 |
$13,500 |
90.6% |
$56,558 |
91.3% |
$57,000 |
89.8% |
Software & other |
1,314 |
1,320 |
1,364 |
1,400 |
9.4% |
5,398 |
8.7% |
6,500 |
10.2% |
Total revenue |
16,597 |
14,929 |
15,527 |
14,900 |
100.0% |
61,956 |
100.0% |
63,500 |
100.0% |
Cost revenue: |
|||||||||
Cost of services |
13,860 |
12,696 |
11,847 |
12,043 |
89.2% |
50,449 |
89.2% |
48,450 |
76.3% |
Cost of software & other |
119 |
138 |
120 |
132 |
9.4% |
509 |
9.4% |
520 |
0.8% |
Total cost of revenue |
13,979 |
12,834 |
11,967 |
12,175 |
81.7% |
50,958 |
82.2% |
48,970 |
77.1% |
Gross profit |
2,618 |
2,095 |
3,560 |
2,725 |
18.3% |
10,998 |
17.8% |
14,530 |
22.9% |
Operating expenses: |
|||||||||
Research & development |
1,708 |
1,420 |
1,336 |
1,300 |
8.7% |
5,764 |
9.3% |
5,000 |
7.9% |
Sales & marketing |
2,072 |
1,866 |
1,463 |
1,400 |
9.4% |
6,801 |
11.0% |
6,000 |
9.4% |
General & administrative |
3,248 |
4,235 |
2,703 |
2,700 |
18.1% |
12,887 |
20.8% |
10,000 |
15.7% |
Amortization |
267 |
267 |
267 |
267 |
1.8% |
1,068 |
1.7% |
1,000 |
1.6% |
Restructuring charge |
- |
423.00 |
- |
(706) |
-4.7% |
(283) |
-0.5% |
0 |
0.0% |
Total operating expenses |
7,295 |
8,211 |
5,769 |
4,961 |
33.3% |
26,237 |
42.3% |
22,000 |
34.6% |
Loss from operations |
(4,677) |
(6,116) |
(2,209) |
(2,236) |
-15.0% |
(15,239) |
-24.6% |
(7,470) |
-11.8% |
Int. income and other, net |
133 |
126 |
124 |
124 |
0.8% |
507 |
0.8% |
600 |
0.9% |
Pretax loss |
(4,544) |
(5,990) |
(2,085) |
(2,112) |
-14.2% |
(14,732) |
-23.8% |
(6,870) |
-10.8% |
Taxes |
52 |
36 |
44 |
50 |
0.3% |
182 |
0.3% |
200 |
0.3% |
Inc. from discontinued |
284 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0.0% |
284 |
0.5% |
0 |
0.0% |
Net loss |
(4,312) |
(6,026) |
(2,129) |
(2,162) |
-14.5% |
(14,630) |
-23.6% |
(7,070) |
-11.1% |
Loss per share |
$(0.08) |
$(0.11) |
$(0.04) |
$(0.04) |
$(0.27) |
$(0.13) |
|||
Shares outstanding |
54,886 |
55,120 |
55,337 |
55,600 |
55,236 |
56,000 |
Valuation
It is difficult to value Support.com. While the company is losing money, profitability may not be as far away as it appears. Ex-CEO Cholawsky claimed at a May, 2016, investment conference that, “All of our programs that we do on services are gross profit positive and throw off cash.” Well, one would hope so. The problem for investors is that costs associated with the cloud product affect cost of services and operating expenses. Support.com used to report much higher services gross margins. The company reported a 41.5% services gross margin for 2013. Now, though, gross margins are more like 10 – 15%. The services gross margins have dropped due to changes in the Comcast contract and the inclusion of Support.com Cloud. This product probably has gross margins of zero or less. The company has not disclosed cost of goods sold or operating expenses related to Support.com Cloud. It is possible that Support.com would be close to profitable if it was discontinued. The firm has forecasted gross margins above 30% by the end of 2018.
A couple of publicly-traded competitors of Support.com trade at much higher valuation multiples that it does. Colorado-based TeleTech (TTEC) has an EV of approximately $1.5 billion. The company’s stock trades at 1.2x EV / Rev., 3.7x P / B, and a forward P / E of about 18x. Teletech has been reporting gross margins in the 25 – 30% range over the past few years. Teleperformance, based in France, reports annual revenues of about 3.5 bil. euros. Its stock trades at 1.7x EV / Rev., 3.2x P / B, and a forward P/E of about 16x. Its EBITDA margin is around 13%. It is true that both TeleTech and Teleperformance are larger than Support.com and profitable. Still, it is notable that Support.com would trade above $2.00 / share if it traded at similar multiples to them.
The operating business of Support.com might be worth $20 - $30 mil. to a buyer. The company recognizes about $45 mil. / year in services revenues from Comcast and Office Depot and another $5 mil. or so from consumer software sales. The company recognizes another $10 mil. or so in revenues from small services clients and Support.com Cloud licenses. My guess is that Support.com could report a few million dollars of net profit if it eliminated Support.com Cloud and cut operating expenses across the board. A buyer might be willing to pay 0.5x sales for this business. If that is accurate, then a sale would bring in about $0.45 / share in cash. Support.com should be able to hang to at least $0.85 / share in cash at the end of 2017. So, the stock could be worth $1.30 / share ($0.45 / share for the business + $0.85 / share 2017 ending cash). I value the NOLs at $0 since it is impossible to know when or if they will be used.
https://www.support.com/press-release/support-com-reports-third-quarter-2016-financial-results/
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/sprt/call-transcripts
Controversies / Challenges
Support.com (SPRT) could be delisted if its stock price remains below $1.00. The stock currently trades on Nasdaq Capital Market, but is out of compliance with this exchange’s minimum bid price of $1.00. It is in compliance with the other standards. In August, 2016, Support.com was given a 180-day grace period to regain stock price compliance. The company has not announced its plan to resolve this issue. It may execute a reverse stock split to push the stock price above $1.00. The company has received shareholder approval for a reverse stock split in the range of 1:3 to 1:7. If SPRT is delisted, it would likely trade on OTCQX.
Support.com has been accused of a shady business practice known as “scareware”. In 2013, Support.com and AOL paid $8.5 mil. to settle a lawsuit related to a Support.com software program called Advanced Registry Optimizer (ARO). ARO was a free scan that AOL users could run to check their health of their PCs. The lawsuit alleged that, “…Support.com intentionally designed ARO to artificially inflate errors and the overall system and security status of a user’s PC. Moreover, the software cannot and does not actually perform the beneficial tasks as represented by Supprt.com.” ARO, in other words, was designed to fool people into thinking that it was identifying and fixing problems that did not actually exist. Support.com charged $29 for the full version of ARO and AOL charged $4.99 / month. ARO was discontinued after the controversy.
Support.com was recently accused of a second “scareware” scheme. In November, 2016, a Seattle TV station aired an expose of Office Depot’s PC Health Check service. This free service allowed customers to bring in their computers to be scanned for viruses and other malware. Support.com was mentioned in the TV report because it provides the testing software and other services to Office Depot. In the report, an undercover reporter (acting on a tip) brought brand-new laptops to six Office Depot stores for PC Health Checks. Office Depot employees at four of the six stores claimed that the clean PCs were infected with malware and needed $180 remediation services. Further investigation showed that the testing software is designed to always find malware and suggest remediation. In the aftermath, Office Depot suspended the PC Health Checks program.
These “scareware” cases cast Support.com in a negative light. Support.com, as explained, is more of a call center than a software company. Still, one has to question the value of its technology. One also has to worry about the relationship between Support.com and its 2nd largest customer, Office Depot. It appears, though, that Support.com does not bear full responsibility. The TV report suggested that Office Depot managers had known for years that the PC Health Check was a something of a scam. Current and former Office Depot employees told the reporter that managers called it a “selling strategy” and that sales quotas were very aggressive. The TV report said that Office Depot performed 6,000 PC Health Checks per week. I am not aware that any lawsuits have been filed.
Support.com’s labor force is likely unstable and unhappy. There are hundreds of complaints about the business on Glassdoor and other websites. About 90% of Support.com’s staff consists of overstressed home-based call center workers who barely make more than minimum wage. These types of jobs have very high turnover. The hours are long and the abuse is constant. Recall that most of these folks handle tech support for Comcast, a.k.a. America’s most hated company. The online complaints suggest that Support.com’s staff is poorly managed and that work conditions have worsened. Support.com is under constant pressure from Comcast to increase customer satisfaction, reduce call volumes, and reduce tech support costs. Support.com may need to manage its people better to keep both them and Comcast happy.
http://jessejones.com/story/jesse-investigation-prompts-office-depot-to-take-action/
https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/Support-com-Reviews-E343358.htm
Risks
Support.com is a money-losing microcap stock with lots of risks. Here are some of them:
· The company loses one or both of its major clients
· Revenues from its two major clients fall
· The company makes no major changes and continues to burn its cash
· The stock is delisted and shareholders flee
· Support.com Cloud fails to gain market acceptance
· No buyer can found for the company or its operating businesses
· The new management acts in its own interest and fails to use the company’s cash to benefit all shareholders
· The company makes a poor acquisition
· A change of control eliminates the NOLs
· Staffing problems due to low wages and difficult working conditions
· Reduction in U.S.-based tech support demand due to automation and offshoring
Support.com is not in financial distress. The company should be able hang on for years. This investment does, however, require some faith in the new management.
Conclusion
Support.com (SPRT) is managed by activist investors who have pledged to make major changes. The stock trades below the value of its cash because their plans have not been yet been revealed. The new board members will probably attempt to sell the company or take it private. Longtime shareholders who bought this stock at $1.50 or above may end up disappointed. I think, though, that investors at current prices will eventually do well. I expect that something will happen over the next few months that will generate value for shareholders. My 12-month price target is $1.30.
Legal Disclaimer: This research report expresses my research opinions, which I have based upon certain facts, all of which are based upon publicly available information. Any investment involves substantial risks, including complete loss of capital. Any forecasts or estimates are for illustrative purpose only and should not be taken as limitations of the maximum possible loss or gain. Any information contained in this report may include forward-looking statements, expectations, and projections. You should assume these types of statements, expectations, and projections may turn out to be incorrect. This is not investment advice nor should it be construed as such. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. The author has a position in this stock and may trade this stock.
sale of the company or its assets, activist investors have taken control
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