Description

Business Overview and Summary Points

Quest is an asset-light waste and recycling services provider that is benefitting from increased interest in diverting waste away from the landfill because of external regulatory drivers and internal ESG mandates. Customers like John Deere, Bridgestone Tire, Good Year, JP Morgan, Archer Daniels Midland (“ADM”), Kroger, Mister Car Wash, and Buffalo Wild Wings contract with Quest nationally to manage many waste streams (i.e., scrap metal, used motor oil, hazardous waste, and food waste). Quest works with independent waste haulers in every zip code to service its customers’ waste and recycling needs. Quest provides data and reporting to customers to meet internal ESG reporting or external regulatory reporting requirements.

Quest has a significant amount of pass-through costs in COGS (i.e., commodity costs and some waste hauler service costs); therefore, Gross Profit is a more effective measure of Quest’s business because commodity price fluctuations and some waste hauler cost changes can affect revenue but should not materially affect Gross Profit. I consider Quest’s Gross Profit more like net revenue similar to how other companies with large passthrough costs in COGS refer to net revenue. Quest’s financial leverage is powerful; 50%+ of incremental Gross Profit converts to EBITDA and approximately 50% of EBITDA converts to FCF. On Quest’s 1Q’23 earnings call, management guided to increasing Gross Profit double digits percent for “several years”. This was the first time that management guided to Gross Profit growth over multiple years. I wish I could find more companies with this profile: expecting to grow Gross Profit (aka net revenue) double digit percent for 3+ years (even through a recession) on the back of multi-year contracts (with high renewal rates and attractive net dollar retention) with 50%+ of incremental net revenue contributing to EBITDA while trading at 8.5x current year EBITDA and ~6x two-year out EBITDA while private peers (with no public company costs) are getting acquired by PE for 14x EBITDA. Quest is a platform that can scale relatively easily and companies with similar business models trade for more than a 100% premium to Quest.

History

CEO Ray Hatch joined Quest in 2016 and inherited a poorly run company. Prior management grew revenues for the sake of revenue growth with no focus on margins. Quest literally had tens of millions of dollars of negative gross margin revenue. CEO Hatch eliminated negative gross margin revenue over a several year period. Quest’s revenue shrank from $183 million in 2016 to $99 million in 2020, but Quest’s gross profit increased from $14.4 million to $19.1 million, and its EBITDA increased from -$1.6 million to $4.5 million over the same time. I cannot remember another company that reduced revenue by 45%, grew gross profit 30%, and grew EBITDA dollars more than gross profit dollars while becoming profitable. The chart below shows a pretty amazing transformation.

Quest grew organically for the first time in Q4’2020 before mid-20% organic growth in 2021 and 2022, which was driven by existing customer expansions and several large new customer wins. Two large acquisitions at the end of 2021 contributed to growth in 2022.

Chairman Dan Friedberg joined Quest in March 2019 and bought $3.5m of stock at a 33% premium to the last trade when he joined the board. He introduced a more aggressive acquisition strategy that resulted in Quest investing approximately $60m in 3 larger acquisitions (Green Remedies, InStream, and RWS) in addition to ~$10m invested in several smaller tuck ins.

Quest’s first material acquisition was Green Remedies for 5.78x TTM EBITDA in October 2020. The Green Remedies transaction displays management’s acumen when making acquisitions. Quest paid 66.9% in cash at closing, financed 16.5% with a five-year seller note bearing 3% interest, and the remaining 16.5% was structured to be paid in cash or stock (at Quest’s option) in equal amounts at the 1st and 2nd anniversary of the acquisition. Therefore, Quest was able to use Green Remedies cash flow and EBITDA to help pay for the acquisition of Green Remedies. QRHC closed at $1.96/share the day before Quest announced the Green Remedies acquisition, and Quest was able to issue Green Remedies stock at $6.14/share and $8.06/share on the 1^st and 2^nd anniversaries of the acquisition to satisfy the deferred seller consideration. Many small cap companies would have raised additional equity at some discount to $1.96/share to acquire Green Remedies. Investors in QRHC are investing in an astute management team that is extremely literate in deal structuring relative to other ~$100 million market cap companies.

The InStream and RWS acquisitions were announced concurrently in December 2021. Plainly, RWS caused lumpiness in reporting in 2022. Quest found that RWS was not properly billing some customers and found a large cash benefit in Q2’22 before running into non-cash issues in Q3’22 and Q4’22 that caused QRHC’s stock to decline ~33%. Management hired external accountants and made process and employee changes at RWS to ensure that there would not be any additional accounting or operating issues. I’ve done extensive work on the issues that arose in Q3’22 and Q4’22, and I believe these are resolved. These issues created the opportunity for new investors to buy stock at a heavily discounted valuation compared to two private equity transactions that occurred in January and June 2023.

Important Drivers

Internal Data Systems Driving Better Execution

Quest’s internal data and reporting initiative is the most underappreciated aspect of this investment opportunity. Quest recently discussed that it made a significant investment in its data, reporting, and technology to increase its scalability. CEO Hatch said “we will be able to drop in a whole lot more revenue with little-to-no additional SG&A. Right now, we have a pretty significant project going to continue to grow and enhance EBITDA margin and leverage our cost structure to enable us to be even more competitive.” In my opinion, Quest has invested in business intelligence to better equip its client service managers and specialists to drive productivity, efficiency, and scalability. In my humble opinion, investments Quest made in internal data and reporting systems will enable Quest to do three things: 1) operate more efficiently, 2) scale more easily, and 3) potentially become the lowest cost (not necessarily lowest price) provider.

Operate more efficiently. Quest employed 113 administrative and customer service personnel and 74 accounting and finance personnel on December 31, 2022. Many of these 191 employees process invoices, review contracts, and ensure customers receive adequate service levels. Let’s use a recently disclosed Fortune 50 customer as an example. Quest recently disclosed that it services all a Fortune 50 company’s locations nationally and services 8,000 lines of services. Imagine that a small team of other client service personnel were responsible for monitoring customer service levels, profitability by location, and all contracting terms with potentially hundreds of waste haulers without access to centralized data and reporting. That would be a cumbersome job across 16 waste streams per location picked up 2-3 times per week. That’s approximately 1 million datapoints (500 locations * 16 waste streams = 8,000 lines of service * 2.5 services/week * 52 weeks) to monitor per year for just ONE customer, and we believe that Quest has more than 100 customers.

Quest’s client service team has done an exceptional job ensuring its customers’ needs are met. This is evidenced by Quest’s high customer retention. Quest’s recent internal reporting investments could enable client services personnel to manage waste haulers more easily and efficiently. Consider the Fortune 50 customer example above. A customer with 500 locations and 16 waste streams per location could reasonably be serviced by hundreds and maybe more than a thousand waste haulers. Two locations only one hour apart may be serviced by different waste haulers, and different waste haulers could charge Quest different amounts for like-for-like service. Quest could keep more Gross Profit dollars by changing waste hauler partners or asking for better pricing from the existing service provider if a less expensive option exists. I believe that Quest’s internal reporting investment could allow for better visibility into its waste hauler costs (which have been more volatile post COVID) by consolidating and digitizing information into a centralized platform which would enable Quest’s client service specialists to optimize waste hauler partners more actively. Further, Quest could upsell additional services more easily and respond to national RFPs faster if this internal technology investment provides geographic service costs more clearly and faster. Ultimately, I believe Quest guided to double-digit percent Gross Profit growth for several years largely because these technology investments will help Quest operate better and win business more easily.

Scale more easily. Quest could leverage its existing customer service personnel by assigning them more clients. Customer service personnel could spend less time searching for information (because it would be readily available) and spend more time on action items (i.e., finding a less expensive waste hauler for a specific location).

Become the lowest cost provider. This is what I’m most excited about. Quest may be able to optimize its service cost because of this internal data and reporting investment. That would allow Quest to either bid on new business more aggressively, keep more of the incremental Gross Profit that it generates, or some combination of both. Companies with a cost advantage often win. Quest could bid more aggressively for new business because it will have an even greater understanding of service costs in every zip code in the United States. As a result, Quest could be on the front end of potentially winning profitable business more easily than at any other time in its history.

External Regulation and ESG Adoption

Federal and state legislation is driving demand for Quest’s services. The US Environmental Protection Agency aims to reduce food waste and loss by 50% by 2030. The Department of Energy says the Inflation Reduction Act’s Advanced Industrial Facilities Deployment Program plays a significant role in supporting emissions abatement at industrial facilities among other incentives that could drive business to Quest. The pursuit of a Closed-Loop recycling system, a system in which waste is repurposed into a future product, is receiving major federal support through the IRA, and this focus could drive more demand for service providers like Quest that can help customers understand their waste streams and how to pursue closed-loop recycling.

States continue to legislate new regulations like California’s organic waste regulation SB 1383. California SB 1383 (click “final regulations text” and see Article 6.3 on page 27, Article 4 on page 39, and tier 1 and 2 implementation on page 58) requires that businesses must maintain records of type, frequency, and pounds of food recovered each month. Tier 2 generators need to be in compliance with California SB 1383 by January 1, 2024 and include hotels, hospitals, large event venues, and restaurants larger than 5,000 square feet. Marriott (5,700 locations), Hilton (5,500 locations), major restaurant chains, and hospitals managing hazardous waste are exciting opportunities. Marriott filed its SERVE 360 report in September 2021 and highlighted goals to reduce waste to landfill by 45% and reduce food waste by 50% by 2025. Hilton wants to cut waste by 50% by 2030. Marriott and Hilton are primarily franchises, so a company wide deployment might be complicated, but corporate could still designate Quest as the preferred service provider to franchisees. California’s food waste regulation is forcing businesses to evaluate food waste to landfill. I speculate that customers like Marriott will also look for service providers to manage additional waste streams that help Marriott reach its published ESG goals nationally, not just in California, as a part of its organic waste landfill diversion evaluation. Many other states (I’ve discovered 16 total states) have introduced food waste landfill diversion legislation or tax incentives including: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and many prominent cities or counties. Quest has an opportunity to win business with large customers that could drive a massive acceleration in revenue. Simply put, QRHC is a clear beneficiary of legislation forcing landfill diversion.

New Service Offerings (i.e., Quest Proganics)

Quest is the one stop shop for large national companies managing recycling waste streams. We believe that Quest has the broadest portfolio of managed waste streams (page 3 of the investor presentation) in the asset-light waste services industry. Importantly, more complicated waste streams like hazardous waste generate higher margins for Quest and have higher competitive barriers. Imagine that you are a Fortune 500 company submitting an RFP for 10 different waste streams, and only one or two of the bidders can support all 10 waste streams. A Fortune 500 company does not want to have to deal with many service providers managing its waste and recycling services. Ideally, the Fortune 500 company would be able to identify one recycling services provider that can handle every waste stream and be the “one throat to choke” to simplify management of a relatively small operating line item. Quest can meet that need and has experience handling all that large company’s diverse waste streams. The breadth of recycling services offered is an important factor that should not be overlooked.

We have noticed that Quest’s breadth of services seems to increase every year. A Tegus interview with the former Director of Purchasing at Buffalo Wild Wings (“BWLD”) provided context that Quest provides grease trap cleaning. This was a service that BWLD included on its RFP, but Quest may not have previously offered to customers. Quest was able to build out a nationwide network of service providers to conduct grease trap cleaning services for BWLD nationally.

Quest talked about a new scrap metal program for a retail customer in the 3Q’23 earnings call and subsequently discussed introducing new services to its customers on the 4Q’23 earnings call. Quest is constantly building out the breadth of services and solutions provided to customers which makes Quest more like a trusted partner. Quest's customer base is incredibly sticky, and many of Quest's largest customers have been customers for 5+ years.

Quest’s most differentiated service is Quest Proganics. Quest Proganics provides a single process to handle all organic material that includes packaged food, non-packaged food, floral, cardboard, all paper products, plastic and waxed cardboard used in food packaging. Proganics differentiates itself by providing a single collection process for packaged AND unpackaged food waste, recycling all non-organic waste, and turning organic materials into compost, biofuel, or animal feed. Quest Proganics has been adopted by Dillons, a Kroger subsidiary with 65 stores, to take organic waste and turn it into compost to give to patrons at its annual Earth Day celebration. Quest filed a patent application for its Quest Proganics service offering. Broader adoption of Proganics could be a company-maker because 1) it has the potential to generate higher margin revenue, and 2) is a true closed loop food waste solution, which turns food waste into compost/fertilizer to make food again. Proganics could drive significant investor excitement, and we are hopeful that Quest can drive more customer adoption.

Client Data and Reporting

Quest provides differentiated value-add data and reporting. After picking up waste materials, Quest’s data warehouse reflects when waste was collected, what waste was collected, how much waste was collected, and where the waste was sent. Quest collects this data, compiles it into comprehensive reports for customers to use for internal analysis (i.e., waste volume trends), internal ESG reporting, or external regulatory reporting. Quest’s reports allow customers to search as granularly as an individual location level or at the national level.

Most companies have a decentralized waste management solution, and therefore they do not have any visibility into their waste spend or waste streams. Quest centralizes waste service management for its customers. For example, a company with 1,000 stores nationally may have hundreds of disparate decision makers managing waste for each store. Therefore, this company is not taking advantage of its scale to drive costs down. Under Quest’s management, this customer could get:  1) cost savings by leveraging its scale, 2) benchmarkable data on each store’s waste spend, 3) visibility into what waste streams are coming out of each store, and 4) detail on how much of each waste stream is produced. Quest puts this information in its data portal and enables its customers to have visibility into each store’s waste spend by waste stream. Customers use this data to ask questions on how to optimize store operations. Maybe one store is ordering too much inventory or maybe a grocery refrigerator is running too hot and causing faster spoilage.

Importantly, Quest is uniquely positioned to give its customers visibility into their waste streams. Quest is collecting data from waste hauler partners for every waste stream a customer produces, but other waste service companies may only manage 3-4 waste streams, and therefore will only give visibility into those 3-4 waste streams assuming they have any reporting capability. Additionally, a company with 1,000 stores probably has at least ten full time employees (“FTEs”) devoted to the complexity created by decentralized waste management. This customer could reduce headcount or redeploy FTEs to other roles. And, lastly, Quest performs quarterly business reviews with each client to go over Quest’s generated waste and recycling reports. Quest’s data and reporting is more like a business intelligence and analytics platform that could potentially be worth Quest’s current market cap over time. Quest previously provided this service for free to create stickiness, but Quest is starting to generate some revenue from this product. Quest could follow what SP Plus Corporation did and productize its technology offering to monetize its external business intelligence tool more effectively.

Catalysts

Recent Transactions

Private equity has been aggressively acquiring Quest’s competitors. Keter was acquired by TPG Growth in November 2021. My diligence resulted in an estimate that Keter was acquired for approximately 12x EBITDA. Ridgemont Equity Partners bought Northstar in January 2023 at my estimate of 14x EBITDA. On June 16, 2023, TPG Growth bought Waste Harmonics for approximately 14x EBITDA.  I believe Northstar is slightly smaller than Quest, and I think Waste Harmonics might be slightly larger than Quest. Most importantly, the 2023 acquisitions took place in a 5% Fed Fund Rate world at an estimated 14x EBITDA. Quest is currently trading for 8.5x 2023 EBITDA. Normally, private equity doesn’t pay the highest clearing price for companies. Most good companies trade above the PE clearing price. Private equity understands the quality of these businesses and is acquiring at relatively big multiples (for PE) in a high interest rate environment. I think QRHC is going to get a bigger multiple than the PE clearing multiple in the public market as Quest continues to expand its customer base and prove the value of its platform. I still think QRHC will earn a 15-20x EBITDA multiple.

Assume QRHC’s pubco costs are an estimated $5 million. I think Quest is at least worth 14x to PE. $20m 2023 EBITDA + $5m pubco costs = $25m proforma EBITDA * 14x = $350 Enterprise Value - $55m net debt by year end 2023 / 22m fully diluted shares = $13.50 price target. I think QRHC is worth more than 14x based on its Proganics IP and technology investments that could enable QRHC to be the lowest cost provider.

Deleveraging

Quest had $69.5m of book value debt and $9.8m of cash on March 31, 2023. $60.9m of Quest’s debt is floating term debt paying 11.67% interest. Quest used $5m of cash after March 31, 2023 to pay down 11.67% debt. The $5m debt paydown will add $0.03 in annual EPS, and we believe Quest will continue to pay down debt with FCF as the year progresses. This facility was clearly more attractive when the FFR was zero, and I believe that management is focused on driving free cash flow to pay down debt.

Quest was more than 4x levered on net debt to EBITDA after completing the InStream and RWS acquisitions in December 2021. We estimate that Quest will be approximately 2.75x levered in December 2023 and could be 2x levered by December 2024 if Quest continues to use free cash flow to pay down debt. At that point, Quest could be in a good position to refinance its debt at more attractive terms.

Discovery

I think of investing as concentric circles. Investing in micro-cap companies is like living in the smallest concentric circle; very few investors can buy micro-cap companies due to restrictive investment mandates. The universe of investors that can invest in a company has step function increases as a company reaches different milestones (i.e., size, profitability, share price, leverage). I have found $20 million of EBITDA to be a level of profitability that investors feel comfortable underwriting on EBITDA. A $10/share stock price, $250 million market cap, and less than 3x net debt to EBITDA leverage are other levels that dramatically increase the number of potential investors that can own a stock. I believe that Quest will generate $20 million of EBITDA in 2023, grow EBITDA double digit percent in 2024, and investors will begin to appreciate the durability of Quest’s model leading to multiple expansion that allows QRHC to surpass $10/share and $250 million market cap in 2024.

Quest could pursue strategic alternatives if shareholders continue to fail to appreciate Quest’s value. Private equity has valued several similarly sized peers at approximately 2x Quest’s current stock price.

New Customer Wins

Quest has talked about the quality of its pipeline and how excited management is about some of the customers that it expects to sign. Quest has not announced any material customer wins over the last 6 months but has commented that nothing has fallen out of its pipeline. I think some investors have heard management talk about some slowing in pipeline conversion and viewed this negatively. I understand why someone could take that stance, but I’d also argue that there could be several projects waiting on final signatures. We speculate that Quest could have multiple 8-figure revenue customers that could close over the balance of the year. New customer wins could drive investor excitement; this would be especially true if Quest wins a new Proganics customer.

Competition

The waste and recycling market is enormous, and the North American market is headlined by Waste Management (NYSE: WM), Republic Services (NYSE: RSG), and Waste Connections (NYSE: WCN). WM, RSG, and WCN are commonly referred to as the “Big 3.” The Big 3 collectively generate $40 billion of annual revenue, and Allied Market Research estimates that non-Big-3 haulers in North American generate $177 billion annually. It is fair to say that this is a fragmented industry.

The Big 3 own and operate landfills. Landfill owners get compensated by volume taken to the landfill, and incremental margins on volumes taken to the landfill are extremely high (65%+ EBITDA margins). The Big 3 all have recycling services, but they are generally subject to the prisoner’s dilemma in that the landfill is drastically more profitable than recycling. From an economic perspective, the Big 3 are negatively incented to divert waste away from the landfill.

A recent expert network interview with a former District Manager at Waste Management that has 30 years of experience in the waste industry touched on an interesting point. His opinion on the waste practices at Waste Management and other landfill owners is a highly informed opinion. The former District Manager at Waste Management said:  1) landfill is the most profitable business line, 2) volume drives profitability, and 3) many commodities pass through a MRF (materials recovery facility) but ultimately go to the landfill to optimize profit. A ton of waste in a landfill generates 45-70% EBITDA margins vs paying a $95/ton tipping fee at a MRF that reduces the amount of waste going to landfill. The basic implication is that landfill operators want to push as much waste to the landfill as possible.

Waste Management recently disclosed that 90% of its emissions come from its landfills at a Feb 24, 2022 ESG conference. WM is investing in gas collection infrastructure and renewable natural gas infrastructure, and using natural gas produced by its landfills to power its fleet of compressed natural gas vehicles. Waste Management seems rightly focused (from an economic perspective) on continuing to drive waste to the landfill and reducing emissions from its landfill. This solution is not addressing corporate America’s desire to divert waste away from the landfill.

Quest benefits from landfill owners increasing tipping fees. Tipping fees are paid by anyone who disposes of waste in a landfill and are usually paid per ton of waste. Tipping fees generate most of a landfill’s revenue, and WM says the fee varies on “several factors, including our cost to construct, maintain and close the landfill, the distance to an alternative disposal facility, the type and weight or volume of solid waste deposited and competition.” Increasing tipping fees makes it easier for Quest to offer an alternative solution at no additional cost to customers disposing of waste in the landfill. “Landfill parity” is the goal for Quest. Quest has a very good chance of winning a new customer if Quest can find a way to offer a customer a recycling/landfill diversion solution at parity to landfill cost.

VIC member maggie1002’s CWST recommendation highlights the “NIMBY” (aka “not in my backyard”) response to new landfills, transfer stations, recycling centers or composting facilities which makes growth by facility expansion more challenging. This community response to landfills should generally benefit landfill owners’ ability to continue to increase tipping fees over time. Increasing tipping fees should sound like music to Quest shareholders’ ears.

Rubicon is the only public asset-light peer. Rubicon’s founder and CEO quit after the SPAC merger and before his first earnings call. To say that Rubicon was run poorly is an understatement. That’s reflected in Rubicon’s ~5.4% GAAP Gross Margin and negative $100 million in net working capital on March 31, 2023. Rubicon’s new management seems drastically more capable, but it’s still burning cash and has negative covenants associated with its new debt (announced on June 14, 2023) that may cause some investor angst until Rubicon builds credibility and sheds the SPAC stigma. Many private companies also serve the waste and recycling market including Keter, Roadrunner, RTS, Denali, and Waste Harmonics. There is plenty of market share for each of these companies to grow for years before they begin to materially impact the Big 3.

Valuation

I value Quest against two groups: waste service companies and value-added enterprise-level business solution companies.

Waste Service companies on average trade between a 60% and 150% premium to Quest based on 2023 Gross Profit (aka net revenue in QRHC’s case), EBITDA, and EPS. Waste Management and Quest’s business models are drastically different, and I prefer to compare similar business models rather than limiting myself to companies in the same industry. ECOL and SMED were acquired for 12.8x and 44x forward EBITDA estimates. I estimate that private companies Northstar, Keter, and Waste Harmonics were acquired for 12-14x EBITDA in the last 18 months. If Quest got the same multiple that private equity has paid for recent transactions, then I estimate Quest would trade for $11.25 to $13.50/share (proforma for shutting off public company costs).

Value-added enterprise-level business solution companies on average trade between a 175% and 237% premium to Quest based on 2023 Gross Profit, EBITDA, and EPS. These businesses all make an enterprise level sale (like Quest), are generally service companies, and are generally not SaaS businesses. Although Quest’s net revenue metrics and contracting looks a lot like a SaaS company, I think SaaS is fundamentally valued too differently. I included SP, PCYG, INVE, PGNY, TCS-CA, HQY, SLP, CERT, MEG, EXPO, CYRX, OPRX, and SSTI in my comp set. I do not consider OPRX or SSTI to be SaaS companies. OPRX is a usage based model, and SSTI has big churn risk with new political leadership (i.e., Chicago’s new mayor).

Some investors will look at my comp list and argue that comps must be in the same industry, and I respect that criticism. I would push back that I have always attempted to comp businesses by most similar business model, and then I’ve applied a premium or discount based on the industry. We are adopting a $15 price target which is a blend of recent private equity transactions and a 20% discount to similar business model multiples on Gross Profit, EBITDA, and EPS.

Conclusion

Quest is attractively positioned as a sustainability and ESG pure play investment opportunity. Management shed unprofitable revenue, positioned the company to grow from a healthy base, and made strategic investments that will allow Quest to drive significantly higher operating leverage than Quest has experienced over the last 2 years. Quest’s financial metrics offer a rare combination of growth and value that should appeal to a broad set of investors. Finally, we love asset light businesses because they have the potential to generate a ton of cash, and Quest could generate 20% of its market cap in free cash flow over the next two years. I want to own Quest as the stock goes through discovery, and QRHC is better appreciated.

Disclosure

Our firm currently holds a long position in this security which can currently be considered a long-term holding. Our research is completely independent and based on public information, our proprietary research, and our analysis of that information. While Author has tried to present facts it believes are accurate, Author makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of any information contained in this note. The reader agrees not to invest based on this note, and to perform his or her own due diligence and research before taking a position in QRHC. Reader agrees to hold harmless and hereby waives any causes of action against author related to the note above. As with all investments, caveat emptor.

Catalyst

• Implementation of a 1.5-2 year internal reporting investment that will drive higher incremental margins and ROIC than experienced in QRHC's history.
• Recent Private Equity transactions, including an acquisition announced 1 week ago for a very similar company at 2x Quest's current stock price.
• Deleveraging from >3x levered to <3x levered by the end of 2023.
• Investor discovery driven by execution and potential new research coverage.
• New customer wins that could collectively be material and sign/close by the end of 2023.