Porsche is an automaker holding that controls 100% of Porsche AG and officially 31% of Volkswagen ordinary shares (BBG: VOW GY), or 23% of total capital.
We believe that Porsche offers a unique opportunity of buying a premium, niche company (Porsche AG) that resembles a “luxury goods company” and a successful turnaround story (Volkswagen) at a very attractive valuation.
We built our conviction on an extensive due-diligence over the past 18 months, including meetings with the company’s top management, industry experts and investors.
Porsche has already secured a larger stake at VW through cash-settled options. Our finding is that Porsche has at least an additional 20% of VOW through options at a strike price of € 80-100/share, well below current market prices of €150. This assumption is based on the recently reported €3.6 bn extraordinary profit booked for VW options gain as explained by Porsche’s management. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation is depicted below:
Porsche Stake in VW Ords |
31% |
41% |
51% |
61% |
Add. Share (FY06 vs FY07) |
10% |
20% |
30% |
40% |
A) # of Shares |
28.5 |
57 |
85.5 |
114 |
B) Price as of 07/31/07 |
122 |
122 |
122 |
122 |
C) Implied Price |
-4.0 |
59.0 |
80.0 |
90.5 |
Option Gain Reported EUR MM => A x (B - C) |
3,590 |
3,590 |
3,590 |
3,590 |
Source: Pollux Capital
With the stock down 38% since its recent high in Nov/07, the opportunity exists because of (i) over-blown market fears of the impact of a recessionary environment, (ii) Porsche’s lack of disclosure on its exact stake in VW, leading to an under-valuation of that stake, and (iii) the fact that the market is not appropriately valuing Porsche’s new product cycle based on the Panamera Project, a 4-door premium sports sedan. As happened in the past with the Cayenne SUV, this product can increase Porsche’s unit volume by more than 50% from the current 100k cars/year level.
Business Overview
Porsche used to be a “one product company” relying on the legendary 911 model, and focused on Western Europe (mainly Germany and UK) and the US. However, in the mid 90’s under the current management Porsche started to implement a growth strategy increasing the product line (Boxter in 1997 and the Cayenne SUV in 2002), and also expanding geographically into Emerging Markets (Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe). The result of that is that the company almost doubled the number of cars sold from FY02 to FY07 to 98k from 20/30k units in early 90’s, while at the same time posting the highest operating margins in the industry.
|
FY02 |
FY03 |
FY04 |
FY05 |
FY06 |
FY07 |
Cars Sold |
54,234 |
66,803 |
76,827 |
88,379 |
96,794 |
97,515 |
Revenue (EUR) |
4,857 |
5,582 |
6,148 |
6,574 |
7,123 |
7,368 |
Adj. EBIT (Core) |
790 |
903 |
1,121 |
1,219 |
1,407 |
1,400 |
% Margin |
16.3% |
16.2% |
18.2% |
18.5% |
19.8% |
19.0% |
Net Profit (EUR) |
462 |
565 |
694 |
783 |
1,393 |
4,242 |
Source: Company Reports; Pollux Capital
Valuation
Core Business
We value its core business (ex-Panamera) at € 650/share assuming 13x unlevered 08 earnings based on an assumption of 18% Ebit margin, which compared to historical standards is very conservative. We are also assuming that revenue growth for this FY will be only 3% despite clear indications that could be much more (revenue for the 1H08 is up 16% on a YoY basis).
|
FY07 |
FY08 |
Revenue (EUR) |
7,368 |
7,904 |
Adj. EBIT (Core) |
1,400 |
1,406 |
% Margin |
19% |
18% |
Net Profit |
|
871 |
# Shares |
|
17.5 |
EPS |
|
50 |
Multiple |
|
13 |
Tgt Price |
|
647 |
Source: Company Reports; Pollux Capital
Panamera
We think that the Panamera will be positioned as Premium Sedan and only the top version (Turbo) will compete with Maseratti Quattroporte, Bentley and Mercedes CLS. The entry level version (V6) will be able to compete with more “regular” cars such as BMW 5 series, similar to what happened to the Cayenne. We assume price range between € 50k and € 100 k and 45k units/year (15% market share). For gross margins we adopted margins between the 911 and Cayenne (range: 33% - 48%). We arrive at an NPV of € 350/ share for this project.
Volkswagen Stake
As we mention at the beginning our analysis indicates that Porsche has already secured at least 51% of VW’s ordinary shares. At current market value of € 150/share of VOW, Porsche’s stake is worth € 1,020/share VOW at an acquisition price of €80/share for the undisclosed stake. Alternatively, the Porsche stub is trading at € 200/share or 4x our core business EPS of € 50 for 08 (and that does not include any volume for Panamera).
However the full upside can be much higher, as we believe that there is also upside for Volkswagen. Quite interesting, we suspect the Porsche opportunity exists in part because many players do not fully understand how VOW has even further upside potential – stock is up 72% over the last 12 months vs -5% for the DJ Euro Stoxx Automobile Index. Some investors do not realize that the VOW investment case is no longer dependent on further market share gains in the zero-sum-game European market, but rather on the emerging and U.S. markets. Our target price for VOW (€ 200/share) is based on a DCF valuation, and the key assumption is the achievement of low double digit ROIC by 2010, as guided by the management which implies an EBIT of € 8.5 bn. We think this is feasible given the current operational momentum, the new management initiatives under Porsche administration, the Emerging Markets (Eastern Europe and BRICs) potential and a breakeven US operation. Under Porsche leadership, VOW management seems to have finally understood that its product offering in the U.S. must be adjusted to the American taste, potentially leading the company to get back closer to its 5% market share achieved back in the mid 90`s vs the current 2%.
VW’s returns are already improving due to cost cut programs and also sales growth, as evidenced in the following charts:
VW Returns
VOW Return on Investment (RoI)- Automotive Division |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
~2008 |
LT Tgt |
RoI |
2.5% |
5.8% |
Around Cost of Capital (~7.5%) |
9% |
Double-Digit Returns |
Source: Company 3Q07 Reports
VW Sales Growth
Volkswagen Group - Deliveries to Costumer by Market (9 M - January to September) – Thousand Units |
|
2007 |
2006 |
Increase(Decrease) |
Europe/RoW |
2,816 |
2,747 |
2.5% |
North America |
395 |
395 |
0.2% |
South America/South Africa |
613 |
496 |
23.5% |
Asia Pacific |
790 |
627 |
25.9% |
Volkswagen Group |
4,615 |
4,265 |
8.2% |
Source: Company 3Q07 Reports
Valuation Summary
Considering VOW at market price we reach a fair value of €1,665 (41% upside). Alternatively, the Porsche stub is trading at € 200/share or 4x our core business EPS of € 50 for 08 (that does not include any volume for Panamera).
POR3 Valuation Stub
|
Criteria |
Value/Share |
Porsche Core Business |
13x Unl. Core EPS 08 |
650 |
VW Stake |
Market Price => EUR 150/Share |
1240 |
Net Debt (Pos VW Stake Acq.) |
Price of Acq. of EUR 80/Share |
-220 |
Value Pre-Panamera |
|
1670 |
Panamera |
DCF => 45k units/year |
345 |
Value Pre-Discount |
|
2015 |
Discount Pref |
Assuming Pref = 0.7 x Ord |
-350 |
Target Price |
|
1665 |
Mkt Price |
|
1180 |
Upside |
|
41% |
If one were to use our target price of €200, Porsche’s fair value would be €1,995, an impressive 68% potential upside.
POR3 Valuation Full Upside
|
Criteria |
Value/Share |
Porsche Core Business |
13x Unl. Core EPS 08 |
650 |
VW Stake |
DCF Based => EUR 200/Share |
1640 |
Net Debt (Pos VW Stake Acq.) |
Price of Acq. of EUR 80/Share |
-220 |
Value Pre-Panamera |
|
2070 |
Panamera |
DCF => 45k units/year |
345 |
Value Pre-Discount |
|
2415 |
Discount Pref |
Assuming Pref = 0.7 x Ord |
-430 |
Target Price |
|
1985 |
Mkt Price |
|
1180 |
Upside |
|
68% |
Risks
The most important risk associated with the global auto sector is the impact of a more pronounced global slowdown. We believe this risk is mitigated not only by Porsche’s niche market strategy but also because both Porsche and VW have their investment cases backed by a solid emerging market opportunity – Porsche itself already derives 40% of its unit sales outside its traditional mature markets (Germany, US, and UK). Another risk is new CO2 emission regulation that is on discussion in the EU.
For those concerned about the impact of an economic slowdown on Porsche, we believe this risk is easily mitigated by shorting a global basket of well diversified auto-makers and auto-suppliers.
We expect Porsche to disclose its majority control of VW in the very short term. We believe that there is an agreement between Porsche and the Lower Saxony state – VW’s other major shareholder with a 20% stake – celebrated when Porsche took control of VW’s supervisory board. The reason Porsche has not yet disclosed the extent of its commitment to VW is mainly political, as it would prematurely increase noise with VW employees – given the potential for lay-offs – as well as could have influenced the results of the elections at Lower Saxony that happened in January 27. Moreover if Porsche wants to use its full voting power (51%+) in the next VW’s AGM (April, 24th) Porsche will need to exercise the options by late March. Other catalysts include VW’s 4Q’s results at the beginning of March – we count on solid results backed by 8% growth in unit volume.