Description
Pacific Sunwear
of California, Inc.
NASDAQ: PSUN
Date: 7/28/06
Price per share: $17.00
f/d shares outstanding: 76.3mm
f/d market cap: $1,215mm
Net cash: $108mm
***Thesis***
Pacific Sunwear of California (PSUN) is
one of the cheapest specialty retailers in the market, trading at 4.3 LTM
EBITDA and 7.7x after-tax free cash flow.
As merchandising gets fixed and growth initiatives take hold, we think
the shares are likely to more than double over the next three years, with
minimal downside risk. Management
realizes the shares are a bargain and PSUN has been buying back stock at an
accelerating pace. In fiscal 2005, PSUN
bought back 2.8mm shares for $66mm, and has repurchased 2.7mm shares for $59mm year-to-date. Approximately $90mm remains on their current
repurchase authorization, over 7% of the fully-diluted shares outstanding.
***Business Description***
PSUN is a specialty retailer of
everyday casual apparel, accessories and footwear designed for active teens and
young adults. PSUN operates three nationwide,
primarily mall-based chains: Pacific Sunwear (PacSun), Pacific Sunwear Outlet
(Outlet), and d.e.m.o. PacSun and Outlet
specialize in board-sport inspired products while d.e.m.o specializes in
hip-hop inspired products. PSUN recently
launched a fourth concept, One Thousand Steps, which will feature a wide selection
of shoes and accessories targeted at young adults. Management believes the One Thousand Steps
concept can reach 600-800 stores in the future.
Current stores and potential stores for each concept are listed below.
Stores Potential
PacSun & Outlet 920 1,000
d.e.m.o. 201 400
One Thousand Steps 9 700
Total 1,130 2,100
Unlike its competitors, PSUN offers a
selection of popular name brands supplemented by proprietary brands. Name brands make up close to 70% of sales and
include Quiksilver, Billabong, Hurley, Ecko, Phat Farm, and Sean John, among
others. We think this is an important competitive
advantage, allowing the company to actively manage merchandise trends by
identifying and stocking emerging brand names.
Once identified, PSUN can capitalize on brand fashion trends by
developing higher margin proprietary products.
Historical financial results are
presented below:
$ millions 2003 2004 2005 LTM
Net Sales $1,041 $1,230 $1,391 $1,411
EBIT $128 $175 $199 $191
EBITDA $173 $227 $262 $255
Maintenance CapX -$2 -$13 -$22 -$22
Pre-Tax FCF $171 $214 $240 $233
After-tax FCF (1) $106 $132 $149 $145
EBIT Margin 12% 14% 14% 13%
EBITDA Margin 17% 18% 19% 18%
After-tax FCF Margin 10% 11% 11% 10%
After-tax ROIC (2) 30% 34% 32% 18%
Avg Sales/ Sq Ft $363 $374 $371 $374
Gross Sq Ft 2,997 3,448 3,931 4,004
***The Opportunity***
After several years of impressive
growth, PSUN’s recent sales and earnings trends have been disappointing. For the first 22 weeks of fiscal 2006,
same-store sales declined by about 2% for the PacSun and d.e.m.o.
concepts. A weak overall market combined
with Wall Street’s obsession with same-store sales has not been kind to the
share price, now at a 52-week low. We
believe the recent weakness in the shares presents a compelling long-term
investment opportunity.
Near-term business challenges
include: sneakers (especially PacSun) and girl’s tees and denim. Excluding the sneaker drag on same-store
sales, PacSun comps would have been positive.
Given the high margins in footwear, the impact on profits is
significant. In tees, the stores got
over-penetrated in novelty tees and colors, and under-penetrated in core colors
like white and black. Denim SKUs were all
stretch and over-dependent on a single silhouette. Management is taking steps to address these problems
with new product assortments. While we
cannot predict exactly when PSUN will emerge from its current merchandising
issues, we are confident that the problems will be fixed.
In brief, the flagship PSUN concept
is maturing, d.e.m.o. is currently faltering, and One Thousand Steps is just
getting started. For long-term
investors, now is the time to buy!
First, these are great
operators. The CEO, Seth Johnson, has
been running the company for the past two years but more importantly spent the
prior 12 years at ANF. We believe that
his experience at ANF is very valuable as he was present for the almost three
years of same-store sales declines they experienced, all the while doing a
great job managing their margins and brand.
Moreover, as evidenced by the impressive detail in PSUN’s public
filings, we believe management has a strong handle on operations.
Second, these are sharp and
disciplined capital allocators. Normalized
after-tax returns on invested capital are very high at around 30%. PSUN has no debt, plenty of borrowing
capacity, and the ability to fund growth from cash flow from operations. Excess cash is being returned to shareholders
through share buybacks.
Finally, the shares are fundamentally
very cheap. At $17, PSUN is trading at under
4.3x LTM EBITDA and 7.7x after-tax free cash flow. This is well below historical ranges. To quote Piper Jaffray’s recent downgrade:
“On both a P/E and EV/ EBITDA basis, PSUN shares are trading near historical
trough levels, we believe supporting potential private equity
consideration. Shares are trading below
10x FY08 EPS of $1.80, a 50% discount to the company’s 10-year mean P/E.”
***Valuation***
PSUN is a well-run specialty retailer
with normalized EBIT margins in the 13-14% range and after-tax free cash flow
margins in the 10-11% range. We believe
sales will grow from $1.5bn this year to approximately $1.8bn in three
years. After-tax free cash flow will be
approaching $200mm. Applying a
conservative 12x multiple, the enterprise value will be $2.4bn, more than
double the current $1.1bn enterprise value.
This ignores One Thousand Steps, which could become very valuable in the
future.
***Notes***
(1) After-tax free cash flow =
(EBITDA-Maintenance CapX)(1-T)
(2) After-tax ROIC is defined as
After-tax free cash flow / Average Invested Capital. Invested Capital is Total Assets – Excess
Cash & Investments – Goodwill – Non-Interest Bearing Current
Liabilities.
***Risks***
- Failure to identify fashion trends
and emerging brands.
- Weak consumer spending.
- Ill-conceived acquisition.
Catalyst
- Turnaround in same-store sales.
- Share repurchase.
- Potential private equity target.