Few things confound buyers like political risk. It's as if
the same markets that effortlessly discount the sort of promotional nonsense
that will likely ooze from the planned Fox Business Channel find themselves
paralyzed and reduced to fits by the content of the existing Fox News Channel.
hkup881 submitted a masterful write-up of Apex Silver last summer showing how
this squeamishness can lead to one-foot hurdles being priced as if they were in
fact seven-footers. The upside is not as great here, and it's far easier to
psych yourself out contemplating this one. Still, I think Harvest Natural
Resources (HNR) merits a look.
VALUATION AND
NON-CHAVEZ RISK
Shares O/S: 37311
Market Cap: $370,871
Unrestricted Cash: Approx
$150,000
Debt: $39,070
(borrowings on a Venezuelan bank)
EV: $256,341
A word on their proposed structure going forward is needed
before we can talk numbers. The history is involved and we'll return to it
below. For now we'll move swiftly and gloss over a lot. HNR had been operating
in Venezuela on an Operating Service Agreement
(OSA) under which it produced oil which it delivered to Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA). HNR in turn received an operating fee and consideration for CapEx. The
Venezuelan operations were conducted through Harvest Vinccler, of which HNR
owns 80% and a local engineering and construction firm owns the balance. At the
tail end of 2004 the Venezuelans began a long series of moves which, resorting
to euphemism, scared the piss out of everybody: production levels were cut,
drilling permits were withheld, shockingly large bills for back taxes were
assessed and the OSAs were declared illegal. Vintage 2001 laws stipulating that
all production must be carried out by companies majority-owned by Venezuela were applied retroactively.
Existing companies wishing to continue transacting such business have to
reorganize as mixed companies.
The conversion process is taking entirely too long to
effect. When it's done (I would not be writing if I thought it would not get
done), HNR will have contributed its 80% interest in Harvest Vinccler to
Empresa Mixta Petrodelta, a mixed company that will be 60% owned by a PDVSA
affiliate. So HNR will have a 32% interest in the new company. It will also pay
taxes at a rate of 50% and will be subject to a 33% royalty. That is the bad
part (or at least the part of the bad part not relating to Chavez and threats
of total expropriation). To go a ways in preserving HNR's asset value, the
Venezuelans are extending the term the mixed company/HNR will have development
rights (until 2026 vs 2012 under the OSA) and are adding three new fields which
have similar geology and reservoirs to HNR's current South Monagas Unit (SMU)
fields. A Ryder Scott study appended to
the
10/30 proxy shows that while proved MMBOE net to Harvest drops from 72 to
45 ($3.36/barrel on an enterprise basis), they gain a combined 105 probable and
possible MMBOE.
The
12/06 proxy recounts what HNR has been able to wrench out of its HNR
property. If those results tranlate, the probable and possible are in the bag
and then some.
Okay, so the conversion to a mixed company has not yet been
completed and blessed by the legislature. When it is, HNR will account for Venezuela under the equity method. But until
the reorganization is completed, HNR cannot recognize any of its Venezuela revenue and earnings. While it
reports losses ($1.35 YTD through September '06), operations in Venezuela continue. Keyword searching
"NOTE 6 - VENEZUELA" in the
September
10-Q will provide data to show they made better than $0.25/share from their
Venezuelan operation. It's important to note that that was achieved despite HNR
having suspended its drilling program (some workovers excepted) at the start of
2005. In 2004, the last year they actually drilled, the Venezuela segment contributed $54.47 million
in net income. Erosion of that earning power is likely to be overcome as the
additional fields are developed.
The Ryder Scott report on the mixed company's reserves
provides the following unrisked discounted net income for HNR’s post-royalty
interest in the proposed mixed company’s properties. The per-share figure is
mine, and it incorporates a 50% federal tax rate. I don’t want to get too hung
up on the numbers primarily because I am very far from an authority on such
matters and because even quite large changes in the assumptions don’t change
the story much.
|
10% Discount Rate
|
15% Discount
Rate
|
20% Discount Rate
|
Proved
|
616866
|
597540
|
477456
|
Probable
|
317095
|
279437
|
204329
|
Possible
|
792364
|
660036
|
459732
|
Per Share
|
23.13
|
20.60
|
15.30
|
Assigning risk to the above and choosing the appropriate
discount rate is really up to you. As this is a single-asset company whose
single asset lies where it does, I wouldn’t err on the side of optimism. I believe
haircutting the 20% figure by an arbitrary and uniform 50% (to $7.65/share) incorporates
a great deal of pessimism, implying that there is a good deal more geological
risk than the SMU results would suggest as well as no small amount of
“Chavez risk.” I deal with the Chavez
risk below. Briefly, I think it is overblown, and that Chavez is better seen as
an opportunist and rent-seeker with big bills coming due (that can only be paid
with oil money generated by an already stressed state-owned oil enterprise) than
an arbitrary tyrant bent on provoking the US.
In a back-of-the-envelope manner, unrestricted cash of
$4.11/share and the above $7.65 get us to a sunshine-and-puppy-dog $11.76. Our
rainstorm-and-kidney-stone scenario is total appropriation resulting in HNR
being worth just the $4.11 in unrestricted cash. You might say that these guys
would just hang on to their jobs if their Venezuelan assets were seized,
frittering the cash pile away. I would refer you to the earlier VIC write-up of
HNR (then called Becton Oil) which gives an impression of how great these guys
have performed operationally. I personally would have little problem with them
holding the money for a while as they scout for deals. So we’ll double count
some Chavez risk and say the respective probabilities are 75/25 in favor of
sunshine. That gets you to about the current quote. At 50/50 odds, you lose
about $2. Personally, I think that the odds are more along the lines of 99/1
and that the $11.76 is extremely light to begin with, but I won’t challenge
anyone disagreeing.
There’s no shortage of investments with visibility out there
where little things like the rule of law can be assumed, and preference for
such situations is totally understandable. You can stop reading, rate this a quick
‘2’ and skip the below bush league sociological treatise.
If you’re still interested, there are a couple free options
to be considered in the form of simple exploration success, further
compensation from PDVSA, and an offshore lease in China. As to the latter, the region that
lease is in has been the subject of a China-Viet Nam border dispute, but there
has been some thawing of late in the form of joint exploration activity. I
would add that the “bullish” case also bakes in a huge dollop of conservatism.
While the new fields will not be the ATM machines SMU is (they are
marginal/abandoned and will require significant CapEx), resolution – any kind
of resolution – should finally afford HNR operational and financial latitude.
They have effectively been unable to borrow against their Venezuelan assets and
have rightfully refused to issue equity at these depressed levels. They will
hopefully be able to diversify their portfolio quickly, with that
diversification combining with clarification of their Venezuelan prospects resulting
in multiple expansion. I can’t provide an estimate for intrinsic value and I’ll
resist a price target, but there seems to be significant upside here.
CHAVEZ RISK
Some background is very much in order, and the history of Venezuela's oil industry is lengthy enough
that we're going to have to skip over a lot. By the 1920s they were, after the US, the second largest oil producer in
the world. Foreign (mainly American) companies have been involved in Venezuelan
production at least as long. That changed when Venezuela nationalized its hydrocarbon
industry in 1976. By the 80s there was something of a return by foreign
concerns, but this better read as an effort by PDVSA to internationalize and
secure international downstream access. HNR, then Benton Oil, was about the
first to return in 1992 when Venezuela readmitted foreign firms to assist
in boosting production. The foreigners were basically contractors to PDVSA,
developing marginal properties. They were notionally subject to a 16.67%
royalty and taxes at 34%. In reality the royalties were often far less - as
little as 1% - to provide incentives and help the foreigners clear their IRR
hurdles. But that is all in the past.
The US today imports 65% of its oil, and
11% of those imports come from Venezuela. What production of Venezuela's that doesn't go to domestic
consumption is sent mainly to the US. Reasons for this are demand,
proximity (just a few days to ship to the Gulf Coast versus weeks to China or other developing countries) and Venezuela's ownership of significant refining
capacity in the US specifically optimized to accept
heavier and more sulphuric Venezuelan crude. Data from the Venezuelan American
Chamber of Commerce and quoted by the BBC show 90% of Venezuela’s exports are
in the form of oil, that half of Venezuela’s exports are to the US, and that as
of December 2006 the value of annual oil shipments to the US was $39 billion
per year. Other sources give PDVSA as representing a full third of Venezuelan
GDP and one half of all government revenue. PDVSA is Venezuela. Venezuela needs America, and America needs Venezuela. The two countries are
uncomfortably hardwired together, and the costs of unplugging one from the
other can be hinted at.
A summer
GAO
report reckoned the costs to both the US and Venezuela of a sustained disruption of or
embargo on Venezuelan oil. Under one simulation, a $23 billion hit to US GDP
(of $13 trillion) resulted. That’s not a huge hit, but the authors noted that
this was actually optimistic as it relied on 2002’s global 5.6 million
barrel/day surplus capacity whereas, as Katrina revealed, contemporary surplus
capacity worldwide is far lower. The study estimated the same embargo would
harm Venezuela to the tune of $3-4 billion/year,
but this again seems optimistic. The study was designed to resemble the
disruption caused by the 2002-2003 strike in Venezuela described below. Subsequent studies
found that the strike resulted in the loss of almost $9 billion in revenue to
the government of Venezuela - saying nothing of the broader
loss of life and livelihood. These are catastrophe scenarios to be sure, but it
is clear that there are powerful reasons for maintaining existing
relationships.
That speaks to the need of one country for another. But why
in particular does PDVSA need HNR? Keys can be found in PDVSA’s meaning to Venezuela, Chavez’s posture toward PDVSA, and
HNR’s position in Venezuela. This is going to get a bit
elliptical, so I apologize in advance. The points to keep in mind are: that
Chavez’s moves are intelligible if not intelligent, and generally have
Venezuelan precedent; that an increasing number of bills are coming due and
there’s but a single coffer to pay them from; that current rents may well be
inflated, so there is incentive to collect them at present; that there is a
willing and ready collections department of which HNR comprises a part; and
that switching costs for collections agents are high, and untested substitutes
from sympathetic developing countries are not likely a good bet; and lastly
that economic and geopolitical calculus likely favors a continued buying from
known agents versus building.
Moving probably too quickly, PDVSA is an oddity as far as
state-owned enterprises go. It is essentially a shorthand for Venezuelan export
as the above Chamber of Commerce figures show. As such, it has in the past used
its size to essentially wag the dog, nearly dictating national policy. This was
starkly visible at the dawn of the 1990s when Venezuela was petitioning for a
reduction of its debt by an amount roughly equal to what PDVSA was then paying
for the 50% of Citgo it did not already own. Creditors balked, and the
Venezuelan government did not get the favorable treatment it expected. Episodes
such as this require periodic realignment of PDVSAs aims as a business with the
national interest. Chavez’s moves – wresting managerial authority for Venezuela’s oil from PDVSA and placing it
with the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum – is an iteration of this, though a
greatly amplified one.
As conventional sources tell us, all is not well in Venezuela. Seizures of large ranches and
foreign agribusiness enterprises have resulted in what the government believes
are temporary shortages of basic foodstuffs. Narcotics remain a problem, and
street crime is spiking. Armed groups of questionable allegiance are
consolidating in the capital and around the country. There is widespread
discontent among Chavez’s own electoral majority, with inflation and corruption
charges fanning the flames. Goods and services are being supplied from abroad
to help alleviate this, paid for by oil. This is often reported as Chavez
buying the allegiance of Latin American neighbors, but it’s more a series of
cash transactions. Argentina experiences oil supply shortages.
PDVSA helps. Venezuela gets farm equipment and assistance
in maintaining and building out its merchant fleet. Cuba thirsts continually for crude. Venezuela is grateful for the tens of
thousands of doctors, teachers and security personnel Cuba sends in exchange.
The presence of the Cuban doctors and teachers gets us
closer to the heart of the matter. Call it consolidating the revolution at home
or call it buying off your people. The result is pacification. Achieving it is
costly. In addition to the royalty
and tax money collected by the government, Venezuela’s hydrocarbon laws obligated the
government to directly spend $5 billion on social programs in 2005. The New
York Times said that PDVSA itself was
on track to spend $1.7 billion on social programs in 2004. This is predicted to
rise. As PDVSA is today almost coterminous with the Venezuelan government, you
can imagine where that money comes from and it means for productive capital
plans. So Venezuela is anticipating increased
expenditures, the payment of which degrades its ability to make the necessary
investment required to meet future obligations. Unless, that is, it enlists
help. Here is retired HNR president and CEO Peter Hill’s pithy take from the Q1
2005 conference call:
Today we're in a very rapidly
changing world where $50 oil causes, amongst other things, producing nations to
seek more rent. They seem to be [inaudible] companies. We see also that there
is global demand that is ever increasing. And we see that supply is stretched.
Governments have got shareholders, too. And I think perhaps Venezuela is one of
the first to seek better terms and to get further rent from the vast reserves
it has available to it. Other nations are surely going to follow to take
advantage of the environment and to ensure that their shareholders receive
their share of this rent.
One last bit before we can weave HNR into this web of
obligation. Venezuela endured a 63-day general strike in
2002-2003. We need not get into the history too deeply, but it is important to
spell out the effects on PDVSA. It was triggered when Chavez made political
appointments to PDVSA management, which had hitherto been controlled by members
of the opposition elite. A strike at PDVSA turned into a general strike which
turned into a coup which collapsed in just a couple days (but not before the US issued a blessing). The company was
left gutted. Anti-Chavez employees committed acts of sabotage on their way out
the door, and 40% or more of PDVSA’s 40,000 workforce were forced out or
declined to return in the aftermath. The impact on production was profound. In
2001, the year before the strike, crude production averaged 3.1 million barrels
per day. The GAO’s 2005 figures showed it at 2.6 million, though the
Venezuelans dispute this. Whatever drop there was didn’t dissuade Venezuela from issuing promises to expand
productive capacity to 5.8 million barrels per day by 2012. They will need help
getting there.
Putting it together, HNR is in place and waiting. They have
been operating in Venezuela for 15 years now, and what little I
have been able to find suggests they are not poorly regarded. Their long-term
debt is in the form of borrowings from Venezuelan banks collateralized by money
in the US. While the sums are not great, it
is comforting knowing the bankers will be keeping an eye on matters. HNR also
apparently milked SMU for far more than anyone thought possible, and they now
have the chance to work similar magic on additional marginal fields. Those
fields will presumably be fairly capital intensive, and having HNR around to
pay is handy. Again, hydrocarbon reserves have long been the legal property of
the people of Venezuela, and even under the old OSA HNR was
obligated to pay for all investments related to oil recovery with the resulting
infrastructure becoming the immediate property of PDVSA. There isn’t much else
for the Venezuelans to take. By setting HNR back to work, they can efficiently
capture a large revenue stream via taxes and royalties while retaining a fig
leaf’s worth of regard for contractual and property rights which would be
sacrificed if an untested Chinese or Russian firm were instead awarded the
work. This has the added benefit of not further infuriating the US, its vital consumer, or totally
putting off the foreign investors Chavez’s development plans so require.
This glosses over too much and forces a number of square
pegs into round holes. Sorry about that. I’ve gone on too long already but will
briefly catalog a few of the risks in what I imagine is an increasing order of
probability. I don’t think total seizure will happen. There is a risk that
US-Venezuelan invective meant for domestic consumption spirals out of control,
damaging a mutually beneficial commercial relationship. The mixed company could
be put to work on projects benefiting PDVSA solely – the conversion contracts
stipulates reimbursement for expense, but this is clearly sub-optimal. Small
tax and royalty adjustments can be levied. PDVSA can use the mixed company as a
patronage vehicle, freighting it with any number of worthless melonheads. This
list is of course not conclusive.