2008 | 2009 | ||||||
Price: | 9.32 | EPS | |||||
Shares Out. (in M): | 0 | P/E | |||||
Market Cap (in $M): | 327 | P/FCF | |||||
Net Debt (in $M): | 0 | EBIT | 0 | 0 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 0 | TEV/EBIT |
Sign up for free guest access to view investment idea with a 45 days delay.
Harvest Natural Resources represents a compelling opportunity to invest in an asset and cash rich company that can easily double in the course of the next year and potentially even triple within a couple of years. Amazingly, these types of outcomes are quite achievable even though an investment in Harvest has the significant downside protection afforded by the fact that the company will soon have a net cash balance exceeding 50% of its market capitalization.
How can such an attractive risk/reward skew exist? Well, the company’s largest asset resides in
I will go into more detail below, but first I will provide a quick summary of the current situation. Harvest has been operating with a strong track record in
This period of uncertainty caused Harvest’s stock to fall from a high of $18 in late 2004 to a low of around $9, before drifting back up to the low teens. Despite finalizing the conversion and removing this uncertainty, Harvest’s stock has come all the way back to around $9 recently (which is particularly surprising given the fact that oil prices have roughly doubled over that time and the company’s assets have soared in value). The primary reason for the recent decline has been a change in sentiment as
Today, Harvest’s assets consist of its cash at corporate, a receivable from Petrodelta to account for the cash that has built up there during the past two years, its interest in Petrodelta and a smaller exploration portfolio around the world that could produce relatively large upside potential over time (Gabon, Indonesia, US Gulf Coast and China). As of March 31, Harvest had $3.33 per share of net cash at corporate (note the small debt shown on the balance sheet resides at Harvest Vinccler and is collateralized by restricted cash). In the next 30 to 60 days, the company will receive around $40 million from Petrodelta, which will amount to another $1.13 per share in cash. On top of that, I estimate Harvest has a share of around another $0.51 of cash that is sitting at Petrodelta that may be distributed in the near future.
The estimated assets of the company are listed below in a variety of scenarios. I think the low to high cases show a reasonable range of trading outcomes for Harvest, but I also showed a downside and upside to show the tails. The downside presumes the worst case scenario of an expropriation by
The dividend receivable is not disclosed in the public financials, but management discussed it on the recent conference call – $30 to $50 million paid to them in 30 to 60 days (I used $40 million). Next, I estimated the company’s share of the undistributed cash at Petrodelta. This is based on looking back at the operating cash flow over the past two years which I estimate to be around $180 million at Petrodelta of which Harvest owns 32% or around $58 million. This $58 million will be reduced by the dividend received of around $40 million, leaving $18 million or $0.51 per share. In the extreme downside case, I have assumed that Harvest would never see this cash.
Next, I looked at Petrodelta’s reserve value. Simply put, Petrodelta has a tremendous amount of asset value. I would suspect that Harvest will ultimately produce at least the proved and probables (2P) and history would tell us that they may be able to recover more than the proved, probables and possibles (3P). This is supported by the fact that Harvest has recovered 27% of the oil in place from the SMU from 1992 to 2006. The current reserve estimates include very conservative assessments of a recovery factor of 12% on the current asset base since Harvest has only recently received the new fields. However, the geology of these new fields is virtually identical to the SMU and it would not be inconceivable to see recovery rates closer to those enjoyed over the past 15 years. As you can see below, I have provided various haircuts to the proved, probable and possible reserves to show a range of reasonable outcomes. As I just mentioned, it is important to note that taking the recovery factor up only a few points can add tremendous value here. The values I have used are based on an independent report from Ryder Scott, adjusted for my estimates of the recent tax changes and forward oil prices (the net effect is around 10% lower than the numbers in the report). I have severely discounted them to account for the uncertainty of operating in
Finally, the company’s exploration projects in other regions of the world have the potential to be significant, but there is no way to value these with any precision. I have assumed about $0.50 per share in the Base Case, zero in a Low Case, and in the High and Upside Cases, I assumed they can be worth multiples of the Base Case. In reality, they could yield significantly more value, but again, it is impossible to quantify.
|
|
Downside |
Low |
Base |
High |
Upside |
Corporate Cash |
$3.33 |
$3.33 |
$3.33 |
$3.33 |
$3.33 | |
Dividend Receivable |
$1.13 |
$1.13 |
$1.13 |
$1.13 |
$1.13 | |
Share of Petrodelta Cash |
$0.00 |
$0.51 |
$0.51 |
$0.51 |
$0.51 | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Petrodelta |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Value of Proved Reserves at Petrodelta |
$0.00 |
$10.03 |
$13.37 |
$13.37 |
$13.37 | |
Haircut |
|
100.0% |
25.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
Value of Probable Reserves at Petrodelta |
$0.00 |
$0.00 |
$5.03 |
$6.70 |
$6.70 | |
Haircut |
|
100.0% |
100.0% |
25.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
Value of Possible Reserves |
$0.00 |
$0.00 |
$4.36 |
$8.72 |
$17.44 | |
Haircut |
|
100.0% |
100.0% |
75.0% |
50.0% |
0.0% |
Value of Increasing to Recovery Factor to 15% |
$0.00 |
$0.00 |
$0.00 |
$2.34 |
$9.38 | |
Haircut |
|
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
75.0% |
0.0% |
Total Petrodelta Value Pre- VZ Haircut |
$0.00 |
$10.03 |
$22.76 |
$31.13 |
$46.89 | |
Additional |
100.0% |
30.0% |
25.0% |
20.0% |
0.0% | |
Total Petrodelta Value Post- VZ Haircut |
$0.00 |
$7.02 |
$17.07 |
$24.91 |
$46.89 | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Value of Exploratory Projects |
$0.00 |
$0.00 |
$0.50 |
$1.50 |
$3.00 | |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Harvest Value |
$4.46 |
$11.99 |
$22.54 |
$31.38 |
$54.86 | |
Current Price |
$9.32 |
$9.32 |
$9.32 |
$9.32 |
$9.32 | |
% Return from Current Price |
(52%) |
29% |
142% |
237% |
489% |
In summary, I believe a reasonable trading range for Harvest is between $12 and $31, with the most reasonable estimate being in the low-20s or over double the current price.
I think there are significant catalysts that are unfolding that should cause the stock to more appropriately reflect its intrinsic value:
1) Petrofalcon/Anadarko Transaction. My estimated valuation of Harvest’s interest in Petrodelta is supported by a very recent transaction. In April 2008, Petrofalcon (PFC CN) acquired 100% of Anadarko
2) Ramp up of Production and GAAP Earnings. While the conversion process was taking place, the production out of the SMU declined from 30k barrels per day to around 15k barrels per day as new drilling ceased. Now that the conversion is complete, drilling on the SMU and the new fields should take production up to closer to 40k barrels within a couple of years. This should produce GAAP earnings of around $1.30 per share by 2010. By then, Harvest should also have over $6 per share of cash. Deducting the cash plus $0.50 for the exploratory assets results in a net P/E that will be under 3x at that time if Harvest’s price does not appreciate. Given that production should go even higher from there (based on August 21, 2006 release the company stated production could grow to 75k BOE or more by 2011), I think this valuation highlights how dramatically undervalued Harvest is. Also, during the conversion process, the company was not able to recognize the earnings or assets from Petrodelta under GAAP until the final outcome was certain. In 2007, the conversion process was completed and only recently has Harvest actually started recording income from this asset, which should bring attention back to the earnings power of the company.
3) Increasing Proved Reserves. Harvest will be drilling extensively over the coming year to prove up probable reserves. Given the rich geology of these fields and Harvest’s track record, this should lead to a significant increase in proved reserves over the coming years, which should increase Harvest’s valuation.
4) Possible
Background
Harvest Natural Resources has operated in
The conversion was approved in June of 2007 and finalized in the fall of 2007. During the process, Harvest was unable to report its interest in Petrodelta for GAAP purposes. With the most recent 10K, the company has once again started recording this asset and related income. Based on a recent Ryder Scott report conducted in December 2007 when WTI was $91.50, Harvest has a net interest of 44 million BOE of proved reserves (1P) with an after-tax present value (PV10) of $523 million, 75 million of proved and probable reserves (2P) with an after-tax present value of $790 million, and 147 million proved, probable and possible reserves (3P) with an after-tax present value of $1,483 million. In total, these reserves represent $42 per share of 3P value from these fields. However, the story is even more interesting since the 3P value assumes a recovery rate of the total oil in place of only 12% which is dramatically below the 27% recovery rate that Harvest has experienced at the SMU. As the company commences its drilling program over the coming months, I would expect the 1P, 2P and 3P values all to increase.
It is important to point out some of the attractive attributes of these assets. At around $5 per barrel, the operating costs in these fields are among the lowest in the world, which provides a nice high margin income stream even at substantially lower oil prices. Second, most of the costs are fixed, so as Harvest ramps up production, its operating cost per barrel should fall meaningfully. Finally, replacement costs are only around $4 per barrel which will provide for extremely high incremental returns on capital.
Recently,
At the end of March 2008, Harvest had $117 million in net cash or $3.33 per share. Additionally, Harvest expects to receive $30 to $50 million in dividends related to Petrodelta’s 2006 and 2007 operations, which will amount to around $1.13 per share in cash. Finally, I estimate that Harvest should also have an interest in Petrodelta’s cash balance that amounts to around $0.51 per share. In total, in the coming months, Harvest’s cash balance should be around $4.97 per share, representing over 50% of its current market price.
In addition to the cash and Petrodelta assets, Harvest has exploration assets in
Thoughts on
The obvious issue one has to assess when considering an investment in Harvest is what is the risk associated with
Also, while I believe this fact makes severe government action highly unlikely, in prior cases (for example, the mixed company conversions for the oil industry, the privatization of CANTV in 2006 and the privatization of utility EDC in 2006), the government gave meaningful consideration for any change in economics or privatization. While political risk is inherently difficult to assess, I think even in the worst case of a privatization, any proceeds that Harvest would receive as compensation for its stake would likely exceed its stock price (not because Venezeula is so generous, but because Harvest’s stock price is so low).
While uncertainty will always remain with regard to Chavez’s next moves, I believe after the changes imposed over the past few years, he is in a position now where the government gets the value it needs out of the oil assets to fund its social projects.
Finally, the Petrofalcon transaction provides a meaningful private market benchmark for how to discount the
Petrofalcon Transaction
In April 2008, Petrofalcon (PFC CN) acquired 100% of Anadarko
show sort by |
# | AUTHOR DATE SUBJECT |
---|---|
37 | |
Net cash per share is $4.50. The stock is $7. The valuation is clearly ridiculous at these levels and I agree with your suggestion that the downside is extremely low and the upside is large. Also given that windfall taxes fall dramatically as oil went through $100 and approaches $70, the sensitivity to declining oil prices in our valuation is much lower than would otherwise be the case. | |
36 | |
hawkeye, Seems HNR is now trading at about $3 net cash per share. It appears that there isn't much downside given the possible upside. Anything changed your view of this company? Thanks. | |
34 | |
Thanks for your questions. I think the Q2 earnings show that things are on track. The company has almost $5 in cash for a $9.25 stock. My asset values in the write-up have not changed and in fact the recent change in the windfall tax to a lower reference price than WTI actually helps this valuation. The production ramp is very encouraging. I have no real issues with management. I think they are being fairly aggressive on the buyback and doing a fine job getting the Venezuela assets up and running. I definitely think some sort of sale of the company or assets would make a lot of sense since the discount here is fairly absurd and I imagine they can at least double shareholder value in a transaction. I will not be at the conference but I will try to do a webcast if possible. In summary, the stock has more than 50% of its market cap in cash and production will be ramping dramatically over the next 12 months. The company has numerous upside levers through new fields in Venezuela and the other exploratory projects. The risk/reward here is unusually attractive in my opinion. | |
33 | |
Hawkeye, Any comments on Q2 earnings? Any changes in your assessment of valuation? Are you comfortable that these are the right guys to run this business? Should mgmt sell the company (or take it private) given the incredible Venezuela discount that could be diversified away to some degree by a larger company? Do you plan to attend the EnerCom Oil & Gas Conference in Denver next week? Thanks. | |
32 | |
Answers to you questions: 1) I agree that SG&A is too high for this company, but I don't believe it is going to fall anytime soon. They are spending on some of the exploratory projects. Hopefully, they get a great return on that spend, but only time will tell. 2) I think the 40k b/d estimate is very reasonable. For a frame of reference, the CEO estimated 75k b/d by 2011 per an Aug 21, 2006 press release. Given the sheer size of their reserve base, production levels are merely a function of capital and logistics. I have assumed in my capital plan (after conversations with the company) 36 wells per yr drilled, which would get us safely to the 40k b/d estimate. Of course, they could spend more or less, but it shouldn't dramatically alter the asset value of the company. Keep in mind they are ramping from extremely depressed levels now. Production was 36k b/d in 2005 and now they have more reserves. 3) Operating expenses per BOE have gone up due to fixed cost deleveraging and cost inflation. I think cost inflation will continue, but they should get significant fixed cost leverage from increased production. I assume the expenses per BOE come down from the current levels, but never get back to the levels of the past. 4) I have no reason to believe the production mix should change much. If anything, it will slant to more oil given their reserve base has a higher % of oil vs. gas than current production levels imply. 5) A summary of the report from 2006 was filed at the end of the proxy. Here is a link: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/845289/000095012906009424/0000950129-06-009424-index.htm | |
30 | |
Thanks for the questions. 1) From $70 to $100 WTI oil, HNR pays a windfall tax of 50% of WTI less $70. So if WTI is $100, HNR owes $15 per barrel tax. They sell their oil around 85% of WTI. So they net $70 instead of $85 when oil is $100. They can in turn deduct this tax from their ordinary 50% tax, so the easiest way to think about it is that they simply realize less revenue per barrel, which of course lowers their taxable income. At $120 oil, they would have to pay 60% of $120 - $100, or $12 tax. So, if oil is $120 and they can sell it for 85% of WTI, they will sell oil for $102 (85% of $120) less $15 tax (from $70 to $100) less an additional $12 (from $100 to $120) = $85 net of the tax (but before the ordinary 50% tax on income). Rising oil prices are good for Harvest. As you can see, at $120 oil, they make $85 net revenue per barrel instead of $70 when oil is $100. 2) I have not been counting on the protection of the netherlands for my HNR thesis. I suppose the protection is marginally helpful, but unlikely to matter one way or another in my view. As I discussed in the writeup, I believe there is a mutually beneficial relationship and I don't see any real prospect of this ending with a legal dispute. If nationalization is the ultimate route, I don't believe the courts would make much of a difference in the outcome anyway. | |
28 | |
Harvest received the petrodelta dividend this morning. This is great news as it was much higher than I expected - $58mm vs. $40mm. The company now has almost 50% of its market cap in cash. | |
26 | |
There was another insider buy at Harvest. This time by the general counsel. This marks the 4th insider buy in a week. | |
25 | |
Fatman, Unfortunately, I don't have any particularly useful insights on Amoruso or the Bartells. If I learn anything, I will post it. | |
23 | |
The CEO and a director just bought $200k of stock each. | |
22 | |
Petrofalcon paid Anadarko $200 million. Anadarko had 2P reserves of 35.8mm barrels. However, 1/3 of those reserves go to the government in the the form of royalties. So, they really have 24mm net 2P reserves. Taking the $171 million purchase price divided by 24mm net 2P reserves, get to $8.33 per BOE. Petrofalcon also received a voucher, so depending how you value that you could get closer to $7 per BOE. When Harvest quotes 2P reserves of 75mm BOE of 2P, that is after already deducting 1/3 of their reserves for the Royalty. Multiplying $8 per BOE times 75mm of 2P reserves gives you a value for Harvest's interest of $600mm or $17 per share (consistent with my base case valuation). According to mgmt, Harvest's fields have even more probable reserves and oil in place, so HNR is potentially even more valuable. | |
21 | |
The Petrofalcon deal went for 4-6 dollars per BOE before royalties. In the conference call and in your writeup you are talking about 6-8 per BOE after royalties. Could you explain the distinction and what is the discount factor for HNR's oil in the ground to account for royalties? | |
20 | |
Jim, Thanks for the question. Petrodelta is not only self-funding, but it should generate excess cash (perhaps a considerable amount). The exact amount is unknown because it will depend on how much drilling they do. I suspect they will be aggressive here to get 2P and 3P into 1P and to increase production (which is, of course, a good thing). I estimate a free cash flow number to be around $200mm (or higher if oil prices stay up here) from 2008-2009 based on a ramp toward 30k barrels per day. We have estimated that they will have 3 rigs running in the field drilling 1 well per month, which is 36 wells per year. Each well should cost no more than $2.5mm, which would be capex of $90mm. The $200mm Petrodelta FCF would result in net cash of $65mm to Harvest. I don't suspect they will pay out all the cash in dividends, but I believe it should at a minimum cause cash at the corporate level to increase and not decrease. | |
19 | |
I see from the Q that after 1Q they spent $4MM to acquire Gabon asset and they are talking about Indonesia and Gulf Coast U.S. being $20 million investments over time. Is the Venezuela buildup self funding or are they going to be pumping money into that too? I like it but want to make sure that cash is not there to be spent on assets you are counting in your valuation. That would be double counting the cash and would mean there msy be more downside here than it appears. For $4.50 to be the "low" that cash of course has to still BE there the day Venezuela blows us up. What do you think cash flow at the HNR level looks like the next year or two? And how much do you think will be hiding at the non-consolidated Venezuela level? Thanks for a very interesting and well written idea. An oil company at a low... | |
18 | |
Steve is retiring. He is not going anywhere else. There is nothing at all that gives me concern here. There is no aspect of the accounting that I can even think of that I would worry about given they have not even been recognizing any revenues until recently. For what it's worth, the departing controller bought some shares yesterday. | |
17 | |
Heffer - Management has a very impressive exploration and recovery track record in Venezuela which hopefully tells us something about their abilities. But importantly, the VP of Ops has worked in senior roles at major oil companies in many different regions of the world including Indonesia (where a major Harvest project is). I believe Harvest has been very disciplined in acquiring assets outside of Venezuela. The company has averaged around $150mm of cash over the past five years and has spent only a minimal amount of it. They have emphasized deals where they put only small amounts of capital at risk. In fact, there are few energy companies I could think of that have exercised such discipline (most can't spend money quick enough and have significant leverage). | |
16 | |
Thanks for your question. I believe the Crystallex situation is very different from Harvest's. My understanding is that Crystallex was denied a permit, supposedly for environmental reasons. In contrast, Harvest is effectively in partnership with the government through their ownership in Petrodelta. I think the relationship is mutually beneficial as Venezuela gets considerable cash flow from royalties, taxes and through their 60% ownership. If you want to consider an expropration, I think there are several examples to look to and it would imply Harvest would get substantial consideration - which would be well above the current price in my view. While I share your concern and appreciate how difficult it is to precisely quantify or discount such risks, I would like to point out a few points that support my conclusions" 1) If Harvest owned an asset of this quality in any other region, I think the stock would easily be in the high 20s (given the conservatism of their reserves and the likelihood of 2P and 3P becoming proved). 2) Harvest has 50% of its market cap in cash + other assets outside of Venezuela. 3) Harvest was given considerable compensation when the structure of the relationship was changed 4) A windfall tax is not unique to Venezuela. In fact, the US imposed an oil profits windfall tax from 1980-1988. Hope that helps | |
15 | |
any thoughts on the cfo's resignation? | |
14 | |
does management have a good track record of finding/developing acreage outside of venezuela? if not, why aren't you worried that they will burn through all their cash developing these assets, which may have been hastily acquired/ overpaid for in their desire to diversify away from venezuela? | |
12 | |
Very interesting -- Kurt Nelson's purchase of 5,000 shares today seems to be the first open market purchase by management in more than two years (the most recent prior purchase seems to be James Edmiston buying some shares on March 10, 2006). | |
11 | |
For what it's worth, the former controller bought some shares today in the open market. With regard to management's ownership - while I believe on an absolute basis, their ownership does not seem huge, I believe they have a very material amount of their net worth in the company (judging by their cash comp). I also think the buyback program reinforces their view of how cheap the stock is. | |
10 | |
1. The dividend will be declared in the coming weeks by the board of Petrodelta. The exact amount is not determined, but clearly Harvest has an estimate of how much cash they plan to distribute. Because the intent is to leave some working capital at Petrodelta, 100% of the cash will not be distributed, so it remains an estimate at this time. 2. Through Q3 2007, the conversion process was not finalized and Harvest did not have a contractual means to recognize the ownership, so in accordance with GAAP, the company could not recognize the income or costs from Petrodelta. Page 7 of the 9/30/07 10Q discusses this. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/845289/000095012907005207/h50588e10vq.htm 3. The other 20% is owned by Vinccler Construction, a Venezuelan construction company. | |
8 | |
hawkeye, thanks for the writeup 1) why is the dividend payable between $30-50m? if it's a payable that means the dividend has been declared, so how could there be such a wide range? shouldnt they know what they're owed? 2) can you provide some more background on why petrodelta - a company that HNR owns 32% of - doesnt show up anywhere on HNR's financials? this just seems totally bizarre 3) who owns the other 20% of harvest vinccler? thanks | |
7 | |
The lack of insider buying IS a disconnect. But it's not enough to destroy the thesis, in my view. If insiders were selling, that would be different. Also, the fact that the company has bought back stock offsets somewhat the lack of mgmt buying. Still, I would love to know why mgmt isn't more greedy, or better yet, I'd love to see them file some Form 4s. | |
6 | |
Thanks for your question. I agree the Raymond James analysis was terribly poor. Harvest is owed money from Petrodelta for operations from 2006-today. Petrodelta has been operating and building up cash. Now that the conversion is finalized, Petrodelta will pay out dividends to Harvest and PDVSA. This issue has been discussed on prior conference calls (and I have discussed it directly with management as well). On the most recent call, they gave clarity as to amount and timing - $30mm to $50mm in 30-60 days. This number makes sense to me since it represents most of the cash that I estimate Harvest has in Petrodelta (ie, the $58mm). Hope that helps. | |
5 | |
if mgmt is frustrated by how cheap the stock is, why do they own so little of the company (~1%) and not buy on the open market? | |
4 | |
For those interested in doing more research, here are a couple of things I found helpful in getting my arms around this situation: 1) Harvest's April 8th presentation at IPAA Oil & Gas Symposium in New York: The CEO gave a bullish presentation when stock was in mid-$12 range, pointing out that operating catalysts were underway right now. One slide showed Harvest's production, with the clear implication that production would take off quickly now that the Venezuelan relationship has been restructured. 2) Q1 earnings call: I have never before heard HNR management address the stock price as emphatically as they did on that call. They are clearly frustrated by the recent slide as oil prices have hit new highs. The Q&A showed quite clearly that the Street keeps missing the forest for the trees. One analyst focused on ROI hurdles for the recently announced U.S. Gulf Coast exploration. This would be a relevant question if the stock were at $30. At $10, the Gulf exploration is irrelevant to any rational investment case. Like to above resources: http://www.shareholder.com/harvestnr/medialist.cfm | |
3 | |
Hawkeye, interesting post. The investment thesis seems to have changed over the past few years, but I tend to agree with your major points. The recent Raymond James analysis was frankly a little baffling as far as numbers estimates go. My main question has to do with your statement that they will receive the $40M payment in the next 30-60 days. What are you basing that on? I've been passively interested in this name for a while, but haven't come across that info. Can you elaborate a bit more? | |
2 | |
THanks for your questions. On the first question, I do not think expropriation makes any sense because it would likely lead to severe production declines in the fields, which is not in Venezuela's interest. Like most regions of the world, they have decided that taxes and royalties are the most effective way to get value out of the country's resources. As I mentioned in the write-up, Harvest has signficantly increased the productivity of the fields, and it is therefore, self-serving to Venezuela to keep companies like Harvest operating there. Also, to be clear, there is big difference between expropriation without any compensation and expropriation with "fair" compensation. While I do not believe there is any meaningful chance of expropriation at all (because it would cripple their oil industrY - which Chavez cannot allow), I think even if it were to occur, Harvest would receive reasonable compensation. Prior cases such as CANTV and EDC demonstrate this. Even a conservative valuation of the fields would result in payment to Harvest that would be meaningfully above the current price. On the second question, there was a large tax liability from a few years back that was paid by Harvest. There is no liability outstanding anymore. | |
1 | |
I looked at this a few years ago: 1.) Given Chavez is basically a psycho, dont you think the chance of complete expropriation is much higher than you represent? As their production falls they will probably stop at nothing to extract more money from whereever they can get it. Is there anything in the current "restructuring" that suggests that this is the limit? 2.) I though the govt was going after the company for significant past due (historical) taxes. Is this not an ongoing issue that could result in substantial additional liabilities for past production profits? |
Are you sure you want to close this position Harvest Natural Resources?
By closing position, I’m notifying VIC Members that at today’s market price, I no longer am recommending this position.
Are you sure you want to Flag this idea Harvest Natural Resources for removal?
Flagging an idea indicates that the idea does not meet the standards of the club and you believe it should be removed from the site. Once a threshold has been reached the idea will be removed.
You currently do not have message posting privilages, there are 1 way you can get the privilage.
What is wrong with message, "".