2009 | 2010 | ||||||
Price: | 6.80 | EPS | $0.85 | $1.50 | |||
Shares Out. (in M): | 16 | P/E | 8.0x | 4.5x | |||
Market Cap (in $M): | 106 | P/FCF | 5.9x | 5.0x | |||
Net Debt (in $M): | -68 | EBIT | 18 | 28 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 38 | TEV/EBIT | 2.2x | 1.4x |
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At current levels, HQS trades for less than ~2.0x LTM EBITDA / less than 1.5x normalized EBITDA, has >$4.35 / share of PF cash of the balance sheet (which already factors in >$10MM of capex spend for capacity expansion that is now up / running) and has multiple mis-perceptions around end-market pricing (extrapolating the past 9 mths of -25% pricing deflation into the future which is very different than reality), working capital (embedded >$12.5MM of working capital release in the next couple qtrs) and underlying earnings power (>$1.50 of EPS potential in 10E given pricing, incremental volume on core biz and incremental volume on new capacity), that I think makes this an attractive risk / reward proposition with >80% return potential. While HQS has been written up in the past (reference jon64's write-up from December 2007 and my earlier posting from November 2008), I think the equity is well worth revisiting (currently trading in the $6.80 / share range or ~81% of cash + AR + Inventory + PP&E).
Despite operating in a very volatile environment this past year, HQS management has done an impressive job and has seen 15 - 25% volume growth in its core tilapia business, 5 - 15% volume growth from its marine bio-products division (on the most recent Q3 call, mgmt hinted at further growth driven by additional market penetration in China) as well as future growth from the recently completed capacity expansion (capex spend has been abnormally high at ~$10MM over the past 12 mths) which has resulted in >30% increase in HQS' total capacity and should be fully utilized in the next 12 mths which could have $0.25 - $0.50 of embedded EPS value once fully operational. More notably, since the last posting in November 2008, the (i) balance sheet is cleaner (convertible note overhang has been removed as management issued 950k shares in October), (ii) the balance sheet has been further enhanced (to fund further capital expansion, management opportunistically raised an additional $10.5MM at ~$8.50 / share or 25% above current levels), (iii) core operating performance has shown incremental improvements (gross margins were up +151 bps YoY in Q1 09, +842 bps in Q2 09 and +274 bps in Q3 09 - showing greater stability in the 43 - 45% gross margin range) and yet the (iv) equity currently trades at ~2x LTM EBITDA and less than 1.5x my "normalized" EBITDA figure of $30MM).
I believe the biggest mis-perception around the company / industry is that this is a broken growth story. This belief is being based off of the simplistic view that top-line #'s that have been trending down (+17.7% YoY growth in Q1 09, +10.2% in Q2 09 and -1.4% in Q3 09). The nuance that I think people are missing is the vicious deflationary pricing pressure in the tilapia market (pricing has dropped >25% in the past year). So while volumes were up >15 - 20% YoY in Q3 09, the pricing degradation of -25% clouded the reality that tilapia continues to gain further market acceptance. More pragmatically, the question is how long this pricing pressure can / will remain. Based on comments from management, they are seeing and expect to see price recovery by the end of the Q4 ending December period. Mgmt comments were the following: "Well, I think the -- we're in the tail end of the last part, the last chapter, if you like, of this story of the winter freeze in Mainland China killing off the Tilapia. A large significant amount of market share was lost by the Mainland producers and they're trying to earn it back by artificially keeping prices low and the farmers are resisting so at some point something has to give. Prices have to come back up, which is what we expect will happen in the coming weeks."
While I think the investment merits are more-than-adequate given the absolute valuation levels (less than ~1.5x normalized EBITDA and less than ~4.5x normalized EPS) and the balance sheet (no debt and >$55.5MM of cash), I think there are multiple embedded levers of hidden value that the market is not factoring in. Three levers include: (i) working capital should release over $12.5MM of capital over the next couple quarters (AR was abnormally built up as the company has grown out its bio-marine division + working capital has been built up in advance of its recently implemented plant expansion w/ NO real offsetting earnings power to date - more notably, over the past 19 quarters, working capital has averaged ~25% - 30% as a % of sales as compared to the September 2009 period of ~48.7% based on LTM sales ... assuming this normalizes, this should release over $12.5MM which implies PF cash balance is >$67.5MM), (ii) Q3 earnings were stronger than the initial headline #'s (EBITDA and EPS) - as management took a ~$1.3MM provision for extending longer payable terms to their bio-marine customer base (management noted on the call that they will receive these and that the provision was driven by an accounting requirement driven by aging of AR).
Regarding valuation, total shares outstanding (PF for the recently issued shares from the convertible note) is ~15.6MM which equates to a PF market capitalization of ~$106MM. Based on the September 2009 cash balance of ~$55.5MM + $12.5MM from working capital release = $67.5MM of net cash which results in a PF TEV of ~$38.1MM, which implies a ~2.0x TEV / EBITDA multiple (based on LTM EBITDA of $19MM) and ~2.2x TEV / EBIT (D&A is minimal). Given the large cash balance, HQS currently trades at ~1.6x PF cash (which includes the working capital release); and approximately ~81% of cash + AR + Inventory + PP&E. Given HQS' strong balance sheet, I think earnings power is effectively being given away for close to "free". On that note (as it relates to earnings power), HQS has generated >$12MM of EBITDA and >53 cents of EPS in the YTD period ending September 2009 (I would anticipate an additional $6MM of EBITDA and 30 - 35 cents of EPS in Q4 09E which gets to around $18MM of EBITDA and ~85 cents of EPS for 09E). Even if we IGNORE the (i) $67.5MM of PF cash on the balance sheet, (ii) future growth given the completion of an additional >30% increase in capacity and (iii) potential for pricing power inflection, HQS equity trades for ~8x 09E EPS of 85 cents (6.80 / 0.85) - which seems like a decent margin of safety with multiple ways to win: (i) global economic improvement and pick-up in tilapia expenditures, (ii) volume pick-up on 30% additional capacity, (iii) tilapia pricing starts to inflect up (mgmt noted on the call that pricing is starting to move up given inputs are also creeping up and competitors are acting less irrational - which could be a significant boon to their business)
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LTM |
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2007 |
2008 |
Sep-09 |
NORM |
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PF EBITDA |
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$16.0 |
$17.5 |
$19.1 |
$30.0 |
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Cash |
55.5 |
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Total Debt |
0.0 |
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Total Net Debt |
(55.5) |
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PF Shares |
15.6 |
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Price / Share |
$6.80 |
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Mkt Cap |
106.1 |
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TEV |
50.6 |
3.2x |
2.9x |
2.6x |
1.7x |
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Working Capital Release |
12.5 |
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PF TEV (post w.c. release) |
38.1 |
2.4x |
2.2x |
2.0x |
1.3x |
Overall, HQ Sustainable Maritime presents a compelling risk / reward proposition, with total return potential of >80%. Given the cash balance (still over $55MM and additional $12.5MM of working capital to be released), I believe you're effectively creating the business for less than 2.0x LTM EBITDA and getting the earnings power of what I believe is >$1.50 / share in 10E (based on incremental volume growth in 10E, new volumes from the >30% capacity expansion that was recently completed and currently up / running and stabilization / incremental improvements in tilapia pricing) as very cheap call option.
UPSIDE / DOWNSIDE:
UPSIDE (25% probability): assuming 10x multiple to 10E EPS of $1.50 / share + $4.35 of PF cash = ~$19 / share (vs current of $6.80 / share or approx 280%+ upside)
BASE (55% probability): assuming 5x multiple to 10E standalone EPS of $1.25 / share + $4.35 of PF cash = $10.60 / share (vs current of $6.80 / share or approx 55% upside)
DOWNSIDE (20% probability): assuming 5x multiple to current 09E EPS of approx $0.85 / share + $4.35 of PF cash on balance sheet = $8.60 / share (vs current $6.80 / share or approx 25% upside)
CATALYSTS:
NEAR-TERM: Street recognizes that tilapia pricing is starting to inflect up and that top-line growth should continue to be in the 10 - 20% range (and perhaps much more than that in 10E - 11E given >30% increase in capacity)
NEAR-TERM: Street recognizes that equity trades (i) at less than 2x PF TEV / EBITDA and (ii) at approximately 90% of cash + AR + Inventory + PP&E (arguably fire-sale price for a growth biz with attractive l-term dynamics)
LONG-TERM: Street recognizes the underlying earnings power of the biz model and applies a "market" multiple to earnings power (upside case assumes ~10x earnings on $1.50 of 10E earnings power + $4.35 / share of cash = approx ~$19 / share vs current $6.80 / share)
NEAR-TERM: Street recognizes that tilapia pricing is starting to inflect up and that top-line growth should continue to be in the 10 - 20% range (and perhaps much more than that in 10E - 11E given >30% increase in capacity)
NEAR-TERM: Street recognizes that equity trades (i) at less than 2x PF TEV / EBITDA and (ii) at approximately 90% of cash + AR + Inventory + PP&E (arguably fire-sale price for a growth biz with attractive l-term dynamics)
LONG-TERM: Street recognizes the underlying earnings power of the biz model and applies a "market" multiple to earnings power (upside case assumes ~10x earnings on $1.50 of 10E earnings power + $4.35 / share of cash = approx ~$19 / share vs current $6.80 / share)
show sort by |
# | AUTHOR DATE SUBJECT |
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25 | |
congrats piggybanker - That was quite a situation.
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23 | |
Daily volume is not a good perspective in this case. The daily trading volume of 6 million shares implies that the company turns over ownership once every 40 days. I don’t think that is the timeframe or mindset of most owners of Safeway stock. If you believe what they say about high frequency traders then 70% of the daily volume is just the same few shares going back and forth between 2 computers in New Jersey. Even those computers are going to start to notice something when 1 out of every 20 shares traded doesn’t come back around. A better perspective is that the scope of this buy back is large enough to buy every share from the top 49 institutional holders of the stock. Maybe some will sell but they’ve held this stinker up until now so why not just go down with the ship. Anyway, that’s what makes a market. It looks good to me but high short interest scares me so I appreciate everyone’s input. I tend to get overly excited about buybacks to my own detriment sometimes. | |
22 | |
I don't see the big problem here with being short through the buyback. If they complete the buyback over a year then they need to buy $2bn over ~252 trading days or $7.9mm per day. At the current share price, that's 326k shs per day vs avg daily volume of 6.1 million shares or about 5% of the daily volume. What's wrong with this perspective? | |
21 | |
If that's all you were getting when you bought SWY stock then those estimates would be relevant (and very alarming!) to the thesis here.
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20 | |
Why do you think what's left of Safeway is a stable business? Here are UBS's estimates for Safeway's US business EBIT from FY08 through FY12 (ex-Blackhawk and Real Estate) -
FY08: $1,507 million
FY09: $934 million
FY10: $790 million
FY11: $633 million
FY12: $551 million
If you prefer US EBITDA, here are CSFB's numbers for Safeway's US EBITDA compared to Kroger's:
FY08: $2.6 billion (KR: $4.1 billion)
FY09: $1.9 billion (KR: $3.8 billion)
FY10: $1.8 billion (KR: $3.8 billion)
FY11: $1.69 billion (KR: 4 billion)
FY12: $1.6 billion (KR: 4.3 billion)
At the very least, these numbers beg the question of what Kroger has done differently (might be helpful to compare KR versus SWY's basket prices) and whether Safeway can stabilize its US business. | |
19 | |
On my 2nd point, sorry I made a discounting mistake (thus proving that pension accounting is tricky and should be thrown in "too difficult pile, move on to the next")...
Undiscounted obligations over next 10 years are $1.54 billion, and undiscounted obligations 10+ years out are $2 billion. So you'd need $1.38 billion earning 2% to meet obligations over next 10 years, and $771 million earning 10% to meet obligations 10+ years out... for a total of $2.1 billion (vs. $1.8 billion plan assets). Still 1/3 the number on the balance sheet.
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18 | |
Point #1: Walmart and Whole Foods are taking market share but SWY’s topline has been stable and their profit margins are solid. On a sales/share basis SWY is a turbocharged growth stock and Whole Foods is a shrinking turd. Regardless of that distraction, the original thesis here was about free cashflow and “how long can Safeway pay their dividend?” and the answer is now “a very, very long time.” My twist on the thesis is you’re going to have $2 billion new buyers of stock and it will be hard to find $2 billion in sellers given who is likely owning SWY stock (coupon clippers)… $1+ billion already short and the whole market cap is only $5.8 billion. Something has to give. Point #2: How much money would you set aside to meet $1.2 billion in obligations spread evenly over the next 10 years and then $1.4 billion in obligations that occur 10+ years out? I’d say put money for the obligations that are 10+ years out in the future into the stock market and hope for 10%. That works out to be $539 million. I’d put the money needed in the next 10 years in fixed income and hope for 2%... that works out to be $1.38 billion. Thus, a reasonable person could argue that $1.9 billion would work. As of the end of the year, Safeway had $1.8 billion set aside to meet their obligations. So, do they really have a pension problem? Most investors do indeed throw companies with large pension obligations into Warren Buffett’s “too difficult for me” pile because of earnings and cashflow distortions – caused by assumptions and smoothing affects about rates of return on plan assets. Investors who are really concerned with the true, long term situation and not just trying to predict earnings should focus on the relationship between the PBO and the pile of assets they have to satisfy that PBO… and to me Safeway looks good in that area. Point #3: I don’t know about the 3rd point about having underinvested in their stores. Seems like a weak thesis. Maybe they should short Berkshire Hathaway as I heard the same thing about them. | |
16 | |
for the record, not involved either way (grocers are way too crowded short but the shorts aren't dumb), but short case goes something like:
1) traditional grocers are losing share to WMT, TGT, discounters on low end and whole foods, wegman's, on high end.
2) large pension expense where the CFOs have played a lot of games with the accounting
3) underinvested in stores/pricing for years so FCF artificially high. need to reinvest in capex and lower pricing to compete, which will reduce NT FCF
just throwing it out there | |
15 | |
Are you guys really quibbling over ebitda multiples as if this was some sort of acquisition candidate?
Take a step back and ponder this:
A profitable, non-cyclical $5.8 billion company with no liquidity or solvency issues is about to get $4+ billion in cash. They promise to buy back $2 billion in stock after having already bought back 1/2 the stock outstanding in the last few years.
Who will they be buying those shares from? Most current owners of Safeway stock own it because it is a friggin grocery store and it pays 3.5% dividend. Those people aren't going to sell. The dividend is more secure now than it has been in ages and it is likely only going up. So, who's going to sell? You can't have $2 billion in buyers without $2 billion in sellers.
Meanwhile, you have all these clever short sellers who shop at whole foods and make the keen observation that traditional grocers are dead. Safeway's topline & margins look pretty stable for a dead business! Those clever short sellers have already sold over $1 billion of the market cap. Are they going to sell more to the company? They're likely the same clever individuals who are paying 2x sales for grocery stores like NGVC vs. (.1x sales for Safeway).
So I'm not exactly sure how you put all this together but you have a $5.8 billion pie and what looks to me like an upcoming supply & demand imbalance between the various buyers and sellers of the stock. | |
9 | |
What do you think its worth post the sale? What do you think the market it missing now? | |
8 | |
Congrats!
Too much cash and a dwindling number of shares to buy back! Not a bad problem to have... | |
7 | |
proceeds used to pay down $2B in debt and buy back stock.
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1 | |
How do you explain the difference in performance over the years between Kroger and Safeway? How do Safeway's price points compare to others in the industry, both in grocery and outside? Thanks. |
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