FIRST QUANTUM MINERALS LTD FM. S
October 23, 2015 - 12:12pm EST by
jriz1021
2015 2016
Price: 8.17 EPS 0 0
Shares Out. (in M): 689 P/E 0 0
Market Cap (in $M): 4,271 P/FCF 0 0
Net Debt (in $M): 5,744 EBIT 0 0
TEV (in $M): 10,016 TEV/EBIT 0 0
Borrow Cost: General Collateral

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Description

Sorry for the poor formatting.  If anyone knows a decent way to upload a PDF that doesn't get maimed in the formatting process, please let me know.  

 Introduction

Before we get started, let’s do a quick checklist to see if a First Quantum short makes sense.

·         Canadian mining company?  Check check check.  I know, I know…it should be two checks but when you put “Canadian” + “Mining” together, there is some real synergy.

·         Promotional management team? Check.  People think they are super awesome because they bought a big, money losing mine in Australia and made it make money (except it loses money now).   

·         Contrarian bet, and in fact loved by long-only community? Check.  The view has been that copper is the “best” commodity (tighter supply/demand, declining asset base) and that First Quantum is the only company delivering growth projects right as supply/demand is at its most strained over the next couple of years. 

·         Assets toward higher end of the cost curve?  Check.  The company’s existing projects are firmly in the 2nd/3rd quartile of the cost curve – and this is acknowledged by the sell-side.  Sentinel (discussed below) is in the 3rd quartile, while the company’s major development mine in Panama (opening in 2018/2019) is potentially 1st quartile (hey, it works on paper).   

·         New Project Development risk? Check.  New project opening as we speak (Sentinel), and another $6 billion development project underway (Cobre Panama). 

·         Levered? Check.  At copper spot in the mid 2s/lbs., let’s say 7x.  That’s a lot. 

·         Covenant issues? Check.  Legitimate chance of breach in early/mid 2016. 

·         Potential liquidity issues? Check.  Covenant issues probably end up exacerbating this issue as the banks tighten the reins.  

·         Bond yield conflicts with equity story? Check.  The bonds yield ~13-14% and trade in the high-70s/low 80s…while there is a C$5billion market cap).  Before some recent market-soothing commentary by management, the bonds were in the 60s.  Somebody is wrong.  You don’t have bond yields of 14%+ and equity caps that big as a % of EV. 

·         Legitimate country risk? Check.  Major assets in such delightful places as Zambia.  There have recently been massive power issues in Zambia that have impacted results at Kansanshi and the expected ramp-up of Sentinel. 

·         Commodity price dependent in midst of a potential global slowdown? Check.  50% of worldwide copper demand is from China.  Enough said. 

Well then!  At current copper prices in the ~$2.40/lbs. range (and certainly anything much below), First Quantum stock has a legitimate chance of being a zero.  That’s what generally happens to over-hyped, over-levered, development-dependent mining stocks at the tail of an economic cycle.  However, let’s just put a price target of C$3.00 to leave ourselves some room.  In any case, I spend the bulk of my analysis below evaluating First Quantum’s base business and its Sentinel project, but even I I’m wrong, there are multiple ways to win on the short side (leverage, execution risk, covenant breaches, etc.). 

First Quantum is a copper mining (some nickel, which doesn’t make money at even the EBITDA level) that owns and operates assets around the world from Zambia to Australia to Panama. 

Here are two keys to the First Quantum short: 

 

Base Business

First, the base business doesn’t generate much free cash flow at current levels.  After cutting through the confusing mix of metrics, run-rate EBITDA-CapEx (at spot) is probably in the ~$300-600 mm range.  This is versus an enterprise value of $10 billion.  In other words, the base business can’t possibly account for where the business trades today.  I would also note that a number of the company’s mines (Las Cruces and Guelb Moghrein being the most meaningful) have mine lives set to end in the 2020 timeframe.  These deserve valuation discounts if you’re using an EBITDA multiple (as one example).   

    Run-Rate Tonnage           EBITDA-CapEx $ Margin
    Low Mid High   Price C1+D&A* Margin   Low Mid High
                         
Kansanshi 245 270 295   2.50 1.90 0.60   322 355 388
Las Cruces 80 80 80   2.50 2.02 0.48   85 85 85
Guelb Moghrein 38 38 38   2.50 1.61 0.89   75 75 75
Ravensthorpe - Nickel 18 18 18   4.75 5.67 (0.92)   (37) (37) (37)
Kevitsa - Nickel 8 8 8   4.75 7.14 (2.39)   (43) (43) (43)
Kevitsa - Copper 19 19 19   2.50 1.89 0.61   25 25 25
Cayeli   28 28 28   2.50 1.95 0.55   35 35 35
Pyhasalmi 14 14 14   2.50 3.13 (0.63)   (19) (19) (19)
Total   451 476 501     Segment EBITDA-CapEx 444 476 509
              SG&A     (185) (185) (185)
              EBITDA-CapEx   259 291 324
*C1 represents all major costs of mining except capex/d&a and royalties.  I've added those in to reflect more of an "all-in" cost basis
*I'm using D&A as a proxy for sustaining capex, which is arguably overly punitive          
*D&A implies ~$600 mm of capex whereas the company would probably argue sustaining is in the ~$300-400 mm range  
*However, even halving my capex estimate only takes EBITDA-CapEx to $600 mm -> this doesn't bridge the valuation gap  
                         
                         
            Copper Price    
          291 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00    
          4.50 (219) 29 277 525 773    
      Nickel Price 4.75 (205) 43 291 539 787    
          5.00 (190) 58 306 554 802    
 
 

This brings us to point two, the company’s development assets: Sentinel (also known as Enterprise or Trident) and Cobre Panama.  Sentinel is being ramped as we speak, and Cobre Panama is a development project that is still in the middle of being built (including the massive capex to come – $1.5-2.0 billion more, and the execution risk that comes along with it).  I focus my analysis on Sentinel because 1) it is being ramped right now and 2) its success (or failure) is big enough to move the stock, 3) the buy/sell-side is focused on it, and 4) there is a reasonable chance it does not make any money at current copper prices.   

In evaluating Sentinel, we should compare it to two other mines in the area.  

 
        Lumwana Kansanshi Avg   Sentinel
Ownership     ABX FM CN     FM CN
Grade       0.58% 0.69% 0.63%   0.51%
Strip Ratio     1.97x 2.17x 2.07x   2.17x
Annual Lbs. Produced   264 544     496

Knowing NOTHING else but looking at the map and these numbers, let’s make some comparative observations:  

·         Mining method? Mining, crushing, leaching

·         Grades?  This is how much good stuff is in the ore body.  Pretty darn similar – if anything, Sentinel’s are worse. 

·         Strip ratio? This is basically the ratio of much waste you have to mine to mine 1 unit of ore.  Pretty similar again

·         Volume? Clearly Kansanshi and Sentinel are bigger than Lumwana, so arguably some benefit of scale? 

·         Location? Sentinel is more or less next door to Lumwana.  From the map (I haven’t been to Zambia), it looks to be about 25 km away. 

 

Given all the similarities, one would probably expect the costs to be similar as well, right?  Well, you’d be wrong. 

        Lumwana Kansanshi Avg   Sentinel
Ownership     ABX FM CN     FM CN
Grade       0.58% 0.69% 0.63%   0.51%
Strip Ratio     1.97x 2.17x 2.07x   2.17x
Annual Lbs. Produced   264 544     496
                 
C1 Costs (Excl. Royalty & Byproduct) 2.01 1.90 1.96   1.57
All-in Costs (Incl. Royalty, Excl. Byproduct) 2.40 2.55 2.48   1.85

 

 Lumwana Analysis 

It is important to be transparent on my methodology in calculating the above.  For Lumwana, I reviewed the publicly filed information and adjusted for projected changes in the royalty rate structure in Zambia.  Zambia’s royalty rate was 6% on copper sales in 2014, and was raised to 20% for Q1 and Q2 2015.  Zambia reduced the rate back downward to 9% on 7/1/2015, which is what I reflect below. 

 

Per 6-K filed on Aug 6 2015 - pg 43   Pro Forma
      Q2 14 Q2 15 Run-Rate
Reported          
Copper Produced   13.0 63.0  
Copper Sold   23.0 66.0  
           
C1 Costs (Excl. Royalty) 2.49 2.01 2.01
C3 Costs     3.21 2.73 2.73
           
Pro Forma for Royalty Change    
C1 Costs (Excl. Royalty) 2.49 2.01 2.01
C1 Costs (Incl. Royalty) 2.77 2.26 2.24
C3 Costs     3.30 2.43 2.40
           
           
Avg. Copper Price   3.09 2.76 2.76
Royalty Rate   6.0% 20.0% 20.0%
Implied Royalty   0.19 0.55 0.55
           
Copper Price   3.09 2.76 2.50
Pro Forma Royalty Rate 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
PF Royalty   0.28 0.25 0.23


Kansanshi Analysis

For Kansanshi, I performed a similar analysis to Lumwana with one important difference.  I have eliminated the revenue/costs associated with mining and selling gold from Kansanshi.  Sentinel and Lumwana don’t have gold, so I’m trying to normalize costs assuming no one gets byproduct credits.  Said another way, Kansanshi reported cash costs would be higher by 23-30 cents/lbs. if the ore body didn’t have gold in it. 

 

Most analysts believe Kansanshi generates a ton of cash, even at current prices, but in my opinion that’s largely as a result of 1) ignoring capex, 2) gold byproduct credits (which are definitely REAL – Sentinel just won’t get any), 3) a stated reduction of costs based on owning a smelter (which does benefit the company, but it isn’t really as a result of the Kansanshi ore body). 

 

Per Q2 Financials, page 24                  
Per Lbs.     Tech. Rep. 2013 2014 1H 2015          
Mining     0.71 0.52 0.64 0.62          
Processing   0.81 0.79 0.86 0.79          
Metal     0.35 0.34 0.33 0.49          
Pro Forma 9% Royalties 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23          
Gold Byproduct   (0.19) (0.34) (0.27) (0.30)          
Site Admin     0.07 0.07 0.07          
Total     1.93 1.61 1.86 1.90          
C1 Excl. Royalties   1.68 1.38 1.63 1.67 Reported in filings, excl. smelter benefit  
Plus: Gold Byproduct 0.19 0.34 0.27 0.30          
Less: Gold Costs   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)          
C1 PF Excl. Gold   1.81 1.65 1.83 1.90          
                       
Reported C3     1.83 2.16 2.58 Has royalties and D&A in it    
Less: Excess Royalties       (0.35) From analysis below    
PF C3           2.23          
Plus: Reverse Out Gold Byproduct     0.30 To reflect costs if no gold in ore body  
Less: Reverse Out Gold Costs       (0.07)          
Plus: Reverse Out Smelter Cost Benefit     0.09 This is a separate asset - eliminate for comparability
PF C3 Incl. Royalties and Excl. Byproduct   2.55          
                       
                       
Pro Forma Royalty Rate Analysis                
        Q1 Q2 1H 15          
PF 9% Royalty Rate Impact   38.0 38.0 76.0 A        
Copper Sales (Tons     53.5 44.3 97.8          
Copper Sales (Lbs)     118.0 97.6 215.6 B        
Per Lbs. Impact     0.32 0.39 0.35 A / B        

 

Upside Risks

·         Copper Goes Way Up – Generally speaking, people are pretty bullish on copper over the medium to long-term.  I’ll let the reader do his own analysis there, but many of these bullish copper analysts were the same guys who said Met coal could never trade under $150 for a long period of time.  In all seriousness though, if copper moves up into the $3.00s, this thing isn’t going to zero, and the price will go up.   

·         Cobre Panama – Although it’s still several years away from production, Cobre Panama is expected to be tier 1 cost curve asset, and it definitely appears valuable.  However, I don’t think it offsets the fact that 1) the base business doesn’t generate much cash and 2) Sentinel may not generate cash at all. 

·         Runway/liability management – Setting aside the potential covenant issues, the company still has a decent market cap and could perhaps do some smart asset sales to keep the dream alive.  The capital markets have been supportive of the company historically.  The company raised C$1.25 billion in July at C$16.25 (ouch for investors, good for company).

 

·         M&A Risk – I haven’t heard anything, but worth mentioning.  

 

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

 

·         Each Earnings Call for Next Year – While I don’t have a view on each and every quarterly earnings call, I think each report carries a big risk of showing that Sentinel isn’t working as well as the company says it will. 

·         Covenants/Liquidity – While the company has been dismissive of covenant issues, there is a serious likelihood of a breach in early/mid 2016.  This could make the company’s stated liquidity of ~$2 billion evaporate if the banks get uneasy.   

·         Asset Sales – If the company has to firesale assets to get cash, it could take down all the paper valuations people have that don’t take into account some of the short mine lives of the company’s assets. 

·         Equity Raise – This could easily happen in the next year if copper stays in the mid 2s range. 

·         Zambia Issues – The situation here has been volatile.  I mentioned power issues before, but there are fiscal issues.  The Zambian Kwacha has gone from 7 to 12 since July. 

 

·         Development/Execution Issues – In my experience, any time you ramp a big mine there are unforeseen issues.  First Quantum has already mentioned in the past few weeks that there are some ore body issues they didn’t originally anticipate at Sentinel.  In the words of Jeb Bush, “stuff happens”.  

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