Costco is the
dominant warehouse club in the world, with 487 stores in the United States and six other
countries. For the year now ending (9/3/06) revenues will approach $59 billion with net income of almost
$1.1 billion. Costco has a highly loyal
membership base and extremely productive stores, with sales per square foot in
excess of $900. The company has never
had a down same-store comp month and only one year of down earnings since the
merger of the two companies in Fiscal 1994.
Over the last 10 years, revenues have compounded at 12% and EPS at 14%
annually. Operating margins are below
levels attained during the late 1990’s and well below management’s long-term
target. The company has an immaculate
balance sheet with roughly $2.5 billion of net cash and owns 75% of its
warehouses outright.
Management is
very focused on the creation of long-term value and delighting its
customers. In fact, many analysts
believe that employees and customers are unduly rewarded to the detriment of
shareholders. This report will argue
that, to the contrary, management’s obsession with delivering the best possible
value and concern for employee loyalty enables Costco, over time, to build a
wider and wider competitive moat. Costco should be able to widen its operating
margins over the next several years driven by several factors detailed below.
Equally as important, management has started to repurchase stock aggressively
over the last year or so. Since initiating
a buyback in the summer of 2005, the company has repurchased $1.69 billion
through mid-July, when the Board authorized an additional $2 billion (for a
total of $2.8 billion) program at an average price of around $50/share. This report will show that Costco can
continue at approximately that rate--repurchasing over between $6-7 billion
more over the next 4 years (about a 16% reduction in FD shares), and still have
no net debt at the end of Fiscal 2010.
The combination of slightly higher margins and a smaller share base
drives earnings growth of 16% annually--more than 2X what I expect S&P
earnings growth to be for a company that, net of cash, sells at a market
multiple on forward earnings. We also will use a real estate valuation approach
that perhaps even more clearly demonstrates why Costco represents a great
long-term opportunity.
History:
Sol Price (a
fantastic name for a merchant) opened the first Price Club 30 years ago
in San Diego. In so doing, he launched a retailing category
that now does well over $100 billion in yearly sales: Membership
only shopping, exceptionally low
margins, limited hours, cash and carry, and a focus on small
businesses. In 1983, Jim Sinegal, a Price Club executive
and now CEO, teamed up with Jeff Brotman, now Chairman, to begin Costco
in Seattle, using much the same
formula as Price. That same year,
following a dinner that Sam Walton had with Sol Price, Wal-Mart opened
the
first Sam’s Club in Oklahoma. Two other competitors, BJ’s
Wholesale, an
offshoot of Zayre’s, and Pace Membership Warehouse, followed soon after.
Costco went
public late in 1985. Over the next few
years, Costco grew more rapidly and consistently than Price Club. As Sol Price told a Fortune reporter a
few years ago, “We [Price Club] were good at innovating, but when it came to
expanding and controlling, we weren’t so good.” By the early 1990’s, the
economics of the sector began to deteriorate as all five competitors were
expanding too rapidly in a fight for market share. Consolidation
came in 1993: Price Club and
Costco merged and Sam’s Club bought some struggling Pace units from K-Mart,
which had bought Pace along the way.
Over the next several years Pace would close down and Wal-Mart acquired
many of its units.
Returns quickly
improved as the number of players was reduced from five to three.
Costco expanded largely on the two coasts and
in Canada and Sam’s in the middle of
the country. By the end of the 1990’s,
though, Costco became more aggressive--both sharply increasing its
number of
new stores and also entering traditional Sam’s markets such as Chicago
and Atlanta. Although this strategy produced somewhat
reduced margins, it was a very important strategic initiative.
While the new markets take longer to reach
maturation in profitability, they are uniformly successful--to the
surprise of
many analysts who believed that more direct competition with Sam’s
would be
suicidal--and will produce a much longer period of profitable gowth for
the
company.
Business
Characteristics:
Costco has 487
locations: 358 in the US and Puerto
Rico, 68 in Canada, 18 in the United Kingdom, 5 in Korea, 5 in Japan, 4 in
Taiwan, and 29 in Mexico (these are part of a JV and unconsolidated in the
financials). The average warehouse is
140,000 square feet and produces annual sales of roughly $130MM. There are over 47MM cardholders and renewal
rates run at 86%/year overall and over 90% for business members. In May Costco raised the US membership fee
for individuals and businesses to $50/year.
Historically, Costco has raised its fees every four years or so. Since 2000, Costco has offered an Executive
Membership card with a fee of $100 with a number of extra benefits, the most
compelling of which is a 2% year-end rebate capped at $500 on most purchases
(excluding tobacco, gas, food courts, and alcohol in most states). Executive Members now represent 20% of the
base and roughly 50% of all purchases, which cumulatively has produced an 80
basis point drag on gross margins: Very
meaningful as operating margins are now under 3%. This program has been an
important contributor to the margin compression in recent years, but clearly
has been a valuable investment for the company in terms of sales growth and
membership loyalty.
Stores typically
carry about 4000 SKUs, or less than 10% of the number handled by a typical
supermarket or discount store. Costco
typically carries only one name brand product per category, giving it
tremendous bargaining power with vendors (imagine the discussions with Duracell
each year when both parties know that Energizer would kill for the
business). Over time, more and more
vendors are willing to sell directly to Costco:
Recent examples include OshKosh, Sony, DeWalt, Henckels, and Fila. Costco also has a very meaningful private
label business (Kirkland Signature--now over 15% of sales and headed to 20%+
over the next five years), which further expands its leverage with
manufacturers, bolsters gross margins, and adds to its customers’ savings (the
goal is at least a 20% savings for comparable quality). Gatorade, for instance, sells at Costco for
$14.99/case while the Kirkland sports drink is $9.99. Inventory turns 12X annually and over 85% of
the inventory investment is covered by merchandise payables. Other than fixed assets, Costco requires
minimal capital.
Management
fervently believes that underlying key to corporate success is what they refer
to as,”Absolute pricing authority.” What
this means in practice is that, no matter how attractive a deal a buyer is able
to negotiate, marking an item up more
than 14% requires a signoff from CEO Jim Sinegal. Customers might be able to get an individual
item for less at another store (although pricing surveys show that this seldom
occurs), but can walk through the store knowing that anything they buy is an excellent
price. Adding to the customer experience
is the treasure hunt atmosphere:
Exceptional deals that are in warehouses for a limited time period to
encourage impulse buying and frequent store visits.
Costco pays
employees very well by retail standards:
The average hourly wage is $17. Over 85% of employees are eligible for
company benefits and, while the company made health benefits slightly less
favorable about 3 years ago, they are still extremely attractive.
As a result,
turnover is very low: 20% overall
and only 6% after one year with the company. Executive cash compensation is
extraordinarily low by current standards:
No employee had current income over $600,000 last year. Option grants have ranged between 8-10MM
shares in recent years, or roughly 2% of shares outstanding. Over 2000 employees received options and
executives named in the proxy garnered just 6% of the total awards.
Almost every
Costco statistic is mind-boggling. To
cite a few: 25 warehouses have annual
sales over $200MM and one does over $300MM.
Last year the company sold 27MM rotisserie chickens in the US, $3 billion in gasoline, 2MM pairs of
prescription glasses, and processed over 1 billion photo prints at its one-hour
photo centers.
Sales
Analysis (Fiscal 2005):
Food 31%
Sundries 29
Hardlines 16
Softlines 12
Other 12
Recent
Developments:
Last week
management preannounced disappointing 4th quarter (8/31) earnings, due mostly
to furniture markdowns and a combination of softer sales and higher returns in
high-end consumer electronics. Note that
Costco has an extremely generous--very arguably too generous--return
policy: Except for computers, customers
can bring back purchases at any time. On
the conference call management noted that SG&A is under good control and
comps actually picked up in August to 7%.
It is clear throughout retailing that high gas prices and somewhat
diminished consumer confidence are having an impact on spending. The recent shortfall should not prove to be
more than a bump in the road and creates an opportunity.
Future
Growth Plans and Outlook:
Management plans
on ramping up the new store opening schedule in Fiscal 2007 and beyond: Over the last four years the new store
average has been slightly more than 20/year (26 net new stores in the year just
ended). For the new fiscal year,
openings should accelerate to the low-mid 30’s and should stay in that range
for several years. Longer term,
management has suggested that Costco can double its store base. As CFO Richard Galanti stated on a recent
conference call, “What we constantly surprise ourselves with is how many more
you can add to an existing market.” For
example, Costco plans to open another 3-4 warehouses in its home Puget Sound
market, where over 60% of households are already members, over the next 2
years. New stores continue to open very
successfully in stronghold markets like LA (42 stores now--ultimate potential
for 10 or 15 more) and Phoenix. The
international potential is also very meaningful. Japan, for instance, turned profitable last
year ahead of schedule and clearly can support more units. Over the next couple of years we would expect
Costco to enter a new country--most likely Australia or China.
New warehouses in
existing markets are targeted to achieve a fully allocated 15% cash on cash ROI
within 3 years while those in new markets are allowed 5 years. Typically infill stores have first year sales
of $70-80MM net of the cannibalization impact on adjacent warehouses, which
averages under a year. With fixtures and
equipment, new warehouses require a capital investment averaging $28MM. Costco seeks wherever possible to own both
the land and buildings. Other capital
spending runs about $250MM annually for depots, remodels, IT, and pure
maintenance.
While the Costco
mantra is to pass on savings and efficiencies to their customers, management
has committed itself to margin improvement going forward. CFO Galanti stated on a recent call, “Our
mission is to lower prices and improve margins a little bit” and Jim Sinegal
reaffirmed this on the call last week. A
number of factors argue more modest margin improvement over the next few
years: SGA leverage that is starting to
take hold, less impact from the Executive Membership 2% rebate, further
maturation of the non-Canadian international business which currently has much
lower margins, more private label penetration, less impact from gasoline, and
the recent membership fee increase which will flow through over the next few
quarters. On the other hand, the more
aggressive store opening schedule will act as an offset.
The model below
assumes 30 basis points of operating margin improvement over the next 4 years
and 6% comp sales growth. It further
assumes that Costco uses its current net cash position (about $2.35 billion)
and all free cash generation through 2010 to repurchase stock--or not quite $6
billion. Note that Costco has been
repurchasing stock at this rate since last summer ($1.69 billion as of
mid-July) and would still have a superb balance sheet. Given these assumptions, EPS growth would be
15% annually using F06 as a base.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Sales 57800
63580 69940 77360
86170
Fees
1195
1345
1505
1680
1870
Revenue
58995 64925 71445
79310
88040
Op.
Man.
0.028 0.0288
0.0295 0.0302
0.031
Op. Inc. 1618
1831
2063
2344
2671
Int. (Net) 130
95
60
30
0
P-T Inc. 1748
1926
2123
2374
2671
Tax
Rate
0.375 0.375
0.375 0.0375
0.0375
Net Inc. 1093
1204
1327
1484
1669
FD
Shrs.
480
456
441
429
419
EPS
2.27
2.64
3.01
3.46
3.98
If Costco can
produce growth along these lines, we believe the total return should
easily
exceed 15% (a $70+ stock, or 17.5X forward earnings, in three
years).
We also examined
Costco more in real estate terms. Given
the high percentage of owned property,
the fact that membership fees account for over half of EBITDA, and the
remarkably steady comp growth this seems like a reasonable exercise. Net cash
flow (subtracting about $250MM in maintenance CapX) in the year just underway
should approximate $3.25/share, or a 7.3% cap rate on a stock of $44
(subtracting net cash). This seems to us
like modest undervaluation compared to high-quality real estate and a 10-year
yield under 5%., Even more importantly, though, it gives Costco no credit at
all for the substantial future value of opening new warehouses. In F07, for example, Costco should open about
35 stores. Looking out five years, these
stores should produce net income of about $85MM. And, of course, this should be able to
continue for many years to come as Costco is clearly far from saturating the US
and Canada, let alone international markets.
All in all, we believe fair value for the stock is in the high $50s or
low $60s. We think management and the
Board (Charlie Munger has been a Director for almost 10 years) sees what we see
and is buying back stock aggressively in response.
Risks:
We think the only
significant risk is a serious consumer recession where comps decline to the
very low single digits and earnings probably go down slightly in one year.