Description
Corvel is a stock where the valuation has become
disconnected from fundamentals, and even after a 15% drop after their earnings
announcement on Thursday (2/8), the stock is overvalued. Absent momentum investors trying to sustain
the 200+% increase over the past 52 weeks, downside to the short is minimal due
to industry factors, and upside is around 30%, potentially in the short run as
momentum investors get out.
Background:
Corvel provides cost
containment services primarily to workers compensation carriers, TPAs, and
self-insured companies. Business
segments include (a) Network Solutions (60% of revenues), which includes
medical bill review, PPO networks (400,000 providers, 80% direct), utilization
review, independent medical exams, and other ancillary medical cost containment
services; and (b) Patient Management Services (40% of revenues; 140 branch
offices), which includes case management, vocational rehabilitation (“back to
work” programs). Founded in 1988, Corvel
has extensive history in the workers comp market. Competitors include Concentra, Crawford,
Coventry Health, PMSI (subsidiary of Amerisource Bergen), Genex (recently-sold
division of UnumProvident), Aetna Workers Comp Access. Clients include Wal-Mart, Firemen’s Fund,
Nationwide, Travelers, St. Paul, Chubb, Utica, Zurich.
Why Corvel is overvalued:
·
Ridiculous valuation: Trading at 13.7x LTM EBITDA
and 14.3x Run-Rate EBITDA. This is for a
business that has only recently begun to turn itself around, and the December
quarter just announced did not reflect a business that’s taken off like the
stock price has over the past 3 months.
($ in
millions; FY ends March)
|
Q106
|
Q206
|
Q306
|
Q406
|
Q107
|
Q207
|
Q307
|
Revenues
|
$71
|
$66
|
$63
|
$66
|
$70
|
$67
|
$67
|
Y/Y Growth
|
-7%
|
-8%
|
-10%
|
-9%
|
-1%
|
1%
|
6%
|
Gross
Margin
|
17%
|
16%
|
16%
|
19%
|
23%
|
24%
|
23%
|
EBITDA
|
$7
|
$6
|
$5
|
$8
|
$10
|
$11
|
$9
|
EBITDA
Margin
|
11%
|
10%
|
8%
|
11%
|
15%
|
16%
|
14%
|
Current
Valuation (including FQ307 results)
|
Price
(mid-day 2/8)
|
$38.23
|
|
Shares
Outstanding
|
14
|
|
Market Cap
|
$545
|
|
less Cash
|
$24
|
|
Enterprise Value
|
$521
|
|
|
|
|
|
EBITDA ($M)
|
Multiple
|
LTM EBITDA
|
$38
|
13.7x
|
Run Rate
Q3 EBITDA
|
$43
|
12.1x
|
Run Rate
Q4 EBITDA
|
$36
|
14.3x
|
The current valuation is partially
based on an…
·
Unrealistic rumor in the market: Valuation
spiked due to an unrealistic rumor that Coventry
might acquire Corvel. While it’s
possible, it’s highly unlikely at these valuations, and Coventry announced today that it has acquired
a big portion of Concentra’s workers comp managed care business. Some perspective on valuations in the workers
comp space:
Coventry/Concentra (announced 2/8/07): 1.2x 2006
Revenues
Coventry/First Health (workers comp PPO network,
closed 1/2005): 7x LTM EBITDA (on $276m
EBITDA!)
Based on these comps, and even being generous with
run-rates and multiples, Corvel should trade closer $22-$28, which would
represent a further drop of 25-40%.
Fair
Valuation
|
|
Reasonable EV/EBITDA Multiple
|
CVH/ First Health EV/EBITDA
Multiple
|
CVH/ Concentra EV/Revenue Multiple
|
Multiple
|
|
9.0x
|
7.0x
|
1.2x
|
Implied EV
(with peak Run-Rate EBITDA/Revenues)
|
|
$387
|
$301
|
$320
|
Implied
Equity Value
|
|
$411
|
$325
|
$344
|
Implied
Price
|
|
$28.84
|
$22.80
|
$24.10
|
|
|
|
|
|
Change
from current price
|
|
-25%
|
-40%
|
-37%
|
So if it’s unlikely that a strategic acquirer will buy
it, will a private equity firm pay up for it?
Unfortunately for Corvel stockholders…
·
Clemons still in control: In
conversations with CEO Gordon Clemons, he gave me the distinct impression that
Corvel was not for sale, especially to a financial buyer. He has disdain for private equity firms and
their financial engineering and he will not let the company be taken
private. Since he and his long-time
venture partner own 42% of the company, he has some say in the matter. He considers the company to be his legacy,
and as evidence of such, his son is the VP of Business Development.
·
Corvel at structural disadvantage; negative industry
trends: The Patient Management services business
consists of 140 branch offices, which are run on a highly decentralized
basis. Lack of central control has
resulted in extremely low gross margins in that business which have only now
IMPROVED to 10%. Corvel is fighting the
trend of fewer and fewer workers comp claims as the US economy moves away from
injury-prone manufacturing. (Although from
the conference calls, Clemons would have you believe that a large portion of
the reduction is related to illegal immigrants who don’t file workers comp
claims).
The Network Solutions business consists largely of
revenues generated by a “percentage of savings”, which is being challenged by other
companies that offer alternative ways for workers comp payors to save money. Corvel claims savings by helping its clients
direct their injured workers to providers in the Corvel network, or it can
reduce out-of-network claims through proprietary bill review and utilization
management information systems.
Out-of-network claims generate higher revenue (and profits) since the
savings are higher, but Corvel’s clients want the patients to go to the
in-network providers, so there’s a constant give-and-take there as network
providers change.
In the phenomenal FQ2, Corvel revealed that their 9%
Network Solutions growth was partially a result of “increase was primarily due
to an increase in the volume of out of network bills reviewed which generate
greater revenue per bill.” Since this
increase is in direct conflict with Corvel’s clients’ goals, it does not
indicate the start of a trend. Some
industry contacts familiar with Corvel have confirmed this dynamic between
Corvel and their clients.
·
Current shareholder base doesn’t know what this
company does: After years
of trading at anemic volumes with consistent top 5 institutional shareholders
(Fidelity, Wellington,
Wasatch, Kestrel, Royce, Atlanta Capital), volumes have taken off, and stock is
now trading over $10m per day!
·
Shareholders who DO know what’s going on are selling: Clemons knows
his stock well, buying around $13 last March, and he was selling through
November and December, alongside his VC partner (Corstar Holdings) and 2
directors, one of whom sold 40% of his stock (worth $1.2m).
Risks:
·
Network Solutions business is scalable: If Corvel can
figure out how to get rid of its Patient Management business, margins could be
enormous due to the scalability of the information systems involved in bill
review. However, the Patient Management
business is often co-located with Network Solutions locations. My view of this risk is tempered by the Q3
gross margin, which has paused at 23%, implying that Corvel’s scalable and
high-margin solutions are not growing as fast as I had feared.
·
Clemons retirement:
Gordon Clemons is in his 60s
and could retire, giving someone else with a different perspective on private
equity firms a chance to run the company.
Given number of initiatives underway and a recent COO hire, I doubt his
retirement will come anytime soon -- and even if he retired tomorrow, it's highly unlikely that any prudent private equity buyer would pay for Corvel at a premium to the current valuation.
·
Opportunities in workers comp are large: Medical cost
containment in workers compensation is about 10-15 years behind that in general
healthcare. Innovative companies can be
very successful and very profitable by helping inefficient workers comp
carriers save money. However, it also
takes workers comp payors a long time to make decisions and change their
processes.
Catalysts:
·
Momentum investors getting out of the stock (already started today)
·
Lack of strategic buyer in the market (occurred today with Coventry purchase of a
portion of Concentra’s business)
Catalyst
Momentum investors getting out of an overvalued stock due to performance and lack of strategic buyer.