CRESTWOOD EQUITY PARTNERS LP CEQP
September 21, 2015 - 12:57pm EST by
gandalf
2015 2016
Price: 2.50 EPS .50 .45
Shares Out. (in M): 757 P/E 5 5.6
Market Cap (in $M): 1,885 P/FCF 5 5.6
Net Debt (in $M): 2,670 EBIT 0 0
TEV (in $M): 4,555 TEV/EBIT 0 0

Sign up for free guest access to view investment idea with a 45 days delay.

  • MLP
  • General Partner Acquisition
  • Basic Materials
  • Oil and Gas

Description

Crestwood Long
I am writing up Crestwood as a timely long based on an awful technical picture, that has made the stock
(actually units) exceedingly cheap. Overall Crestwood is a 90% fee driven midstream MLP, trading at an
insane 22% dividend yield and at 5x distributable cash flow (on a proforma merged basis). Comps tend
to trade at 8-9% yields today. I believe the distribution is sustainable.
 
There are 2 Crestwoods trading today. The parent, Crestwood Equity (ticker CEQP), is merging with its
LP subsidiary Crestwood Midstream (CMLP). At this point it makes little difference which one investors
buy. CEQP will be the surviving entity and will issue 2.75 shares per share of CMLP. The merger should
close by month’s end after unitholder approval (which based on cross holdings and conversations with
the company appears highly likely). IDR’s will be eliminated altogether.
 
 
As of this writing, CEQP is trading at $2.48, and CMLP is at $6.63, meaning CMLP is a little cheaper
($6.63/2.75=$2.41). CMLP got tossed out of the Alerian index (announcement Friday Sept 11), and the
final sale of some 11mm shares happened last Friday. In 2 weeks CMLP fell 13%. This is after falling from
over $22 a year ago.
 
CMLP and CEQP together should produce roughly 50c in Distributable FCF (EBITDA less maint capex less
interest). With a proforma dividend of $0.55, they are slightly overpaying today. In my numbers
however I included stock based comp. The company does and reports 1.05x distribution coverage (for
Q2 at CEQP proforma).
 
In almost any scenario I come up with, the stock appears cheap by 50-100%.
Leverage is not too high for an MLP (around 4.5x), and covenants provide lots of room (5.5x max
leverage). Liquidity is quite good, as the company combined proforma will have $700mm of revolver
capacity going forward. The next major maturity is the 6% bonds of 2020, which trade mid 90s and at a
pretty reasonable 7.5% YTW.
 
If one had bankruptcy concerns, it would be an easy pair against the equity.
 
Summary Financials:
 
 
Combined, Crestwood owns assets in 4 major regions. Over 70% of EBITDA comes from the Bakken
(including a rail loading facility and a gathering system), and the Marcellus.
 
 
Mostly the company owns gathering and processing assets. Volume concerns are an issue in the Barnett
(15% of EBITDA), as it’s a dry gas region with Quicksilver as a major customer. Since their bankruptcy
filing however, and even before, Quicksilver has not missed any payments.
 
The Bakken rail loading facility (the Colt system) has a major contract with Tesoro, and naturally in this
environment investors are worried about volume declines there and new pipelines. I note that the
Tesoro refiners that buy this crude are on the West Coast, where currently there are no major pipelines
either existing or planned. In Q2, volumes grew by 10%.
 
The other Bakken gathering assets are still showing growth in volumes (57MBbls/d in Q2 vs 55.8 in Q2
2014). EIA data also show increased production in the Bakken in the 1-2% range. Their acreage is quite
central and likely will be up a bit. Customers there include WPX, Halcon (a risk but they have liquidity),
QEP (good balance sheet), XTO and WLL. The company estimated that 75-80 new wells will be
connected in 2015 (with 38 through June).
 
In the Marcellus, the company has contracts with Anadarko, Antero and Cabot. Volumes have been firm
in the NE region of the Marcellus (where differentials are ok). In the SE region, Antero has scaled back
production and there are some volume declines. But recently, Antero has moved 3 rigs back to this area
and a new pipeline in Q4 this year should alleviate terrible differentials (pricing well below Henry Hub).
The company also recut a deal with Antero to provide some fee relief too, also providing incentives to
increase drilling.
 
In my downside case, I assumed the low end of guidance this year, then took out all deficiency payments
for MVC’s that are not being met, and reduced volumes by 10% outside of the Bakken/Marcellus. Recall
that 90% of the company’s EBITDA is generated from volume based contracts. The other 10% is NGL
price driven (primarily Butane and Propane, which seasonally hit in the winter).
 
That takes DCF to 43c/unit (of CEQP proforma). If the dividend were cut from 55c to 43c, and using a
10% yield, higher than other comps today, then the stock would trade to $4.30, up 70% before
distributions. The best comps probably are slow growth MLP’s with much of their EBITDA from fees (I
used WPZ, ETP, MWE, SMLP and PAA which are an 8.7% yield).
 
 
In my upside case, I take management for their word that they intend to grow DCF by 10% through
2017. Assuming energy markets stabilized, it seems possible that at a 10% yield, CEQP could trade to
$6.00. That would be upside of 184% in 2 years including 55c in distributions / year.
 
As for management, these are real guys. CEO Bob Phillips spend several years as COO and then as CEO
of Enterprise Products (EPD). First Reserve owns shares in both CEQP and CMLP, and post the merger
will have 16% of the equity combined. In the past, management has overpaid the CMLP distribution in
order to maximize IDR income to CEQP. With the combination, this agency problem goes away. First
Reserve bought this stake in 2010, and I believe will push for a sale of the company in a year or two
when energy markets stabilize.
 
CMLP and CEQP were actually on the block earlier this year, and arbs got long hoping for a sale. When
the company instead announced a merger of the GP/LP and elimination of the IDR’s, arbs bailed.
 
Here are some good slides:
 
Here is the S-4 Proxy:
http://ceqpinvestor.crestwoodlp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=132026&p=irol-
SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJkLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lwYWdlPTEwNDYxMTUz
JkRTRVE9MCZTRVE9MCZTUURFU0M9U0VDVElPTl9FTlRJUkUmc3Vic2lkPTU3
 
 
Risks:
 
There is some contracting risk with Tesoro in 2017, and the Marcellus in 2018. The 2017 Colt rail loading
contracts appear to be fine, and after speaking to management appear likely to be renewed at similar or
better rates in fact.
 
 
 
 
 
NGL pricing.
Missed guidance.
Cut in Distribution.
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

Index selling, merger closing end of September, energy markets normalize

1       show   sort by    
      Back to top