2010 | 2011 | ||||||
Price: | 39.52 | EPS | $2.00 | $3.25 | |||
Shares Out. (in M): | 33 | P/E | 19.8x | 12.2x | |||
Market Cap (in $M): | 1,293 | P/FCF | 13.0x | 8.0x | |||
Net Debt (in $M): | 321 | EBIT | 300 | 400 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 1,614 | TEV/EBIT | 5.4x | 4.0x |
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Coinstar (Ticker: CSTR / $39.52)
Event Type: Value Catalyst / Contrarian
Trade Recommendation:
Movie Gallery Chapter 7 liquidation: October 29
Online strategy announcement: mid/late October
Strong earnings: late October/early November; share repurchase and/or debt paydown
Situation Overview:
Coinstar has two distinct businesses - a coin collecting/cashing business (~ $100m 2010 EBITDA, $60.7m YTD) and Redbox, the dvd kiosk business ( ~ $200m EBITDA 2010, $130m EBITDA YTD). You either love Coinstar or you hate it. Clearly, with 7.8mm shares sold short, there are a lot of haters (per Bloomberg, but chart doesn't show up on VIC).
And for good reason, Redbox, will not exist at some point in the future. If you are short, and can wait it out as the ice cube melts and pay the cost to borrow for the next # of years (only 75bps as of September 15th according to various primer brokers), there is probably $15-25 to make depending on your future borrow cost assumptions. Using a straight-forward death-spiral Redbox valuation (assuming 100% y-o-y kiosk declines + 10% y-o-y reduction in revenue/kiosk), this $15-25/share assumes that the Redbox kiosk business disintegrates to $0 in the next 6 years. To put this sensitivity in context:
Based on the multiple positive catalysts ahead, the IRR on a short doesn't seem compelling at this level. In fact, after further due diligence, CSTR once again, seems like a tremendous long opportunity with limited downside. Please see prior CSTR write-up from Bedrock346 on November 20, 2009, which provided over 100% return at a time of tremendous uncertainty.
Some Background:
Overview of Potential Catalysts:
Value of Coin Business:
The coin business will do $85 -$100m in EBITDA each year without much investment. In addition, only ~ $5m of maintenance capex is required to run the business. It's worth mentioning that this "dying" business has generated in excess of $25m in EBITDA per quarter for the last eighteen quarters.
Coin Business |
|
|
|
|
New Entrants |
Status Quo |
Improvement/Divestiture |
EBITDA |
85.00 |
100.00 |
110.00 |
Multiple |
6.50x |
8.00x |
9.00x |
EV |
552.50 |
800.00 |
990.00 |
Debt |
(321.00) |
(321.00) |
(321.00) |
Equity |
231.50 |
479.00 |
669.00 |
Shares |
32.72 |
32.72 |
32.72 |
Price |
7.08 |
14.64 |
20.45 |
% of Current Equity |
17% |
36% |
50% |
Value of Redbox:
Assumptions: $250 - $300m of EBITDA in 2011 (excluding Blockbuster Chapter 11 store closures, Movie Gallery liquidation and incremental uplift on blueray penetration). Note: all of the debt resides with the coin business.
$250m Redbox EBITDA - conservative case
$300m Redbox EBITDA - likely case
Using a 50% discount to NFLX multiple (50% of 15.9x); $300m of EBITDA = $73/share.
Sum of the Parts:
Range of Values: $31 - $93 per share.
We believe (with the understanding that Redbox is a "melting ice cube" sometime in the next 4-12 years) that today's fair value is $60 - $70 per share. Can the stock price get to $93 or our high end? The answer is yes, as most controversial situations overshoot to the downside and to the upside.
Catalysts to realize $60 - $70 per share:
Move Gallery Chapter 7 Liquidation:
On October 29, 2010, Movie Gallery will finally be put out of its misery.
Quick background: Movie Gallery filed for bankruptcy protection on Feb. 2 for the second time since 2007, saying it planned to close "a significant number" of stores. In May 2010, they decided to file for Chapter 7 liquidation. Before the first bankruptcy Movie Gallery had 3,500 stores. This time they are shutting down 2,415 stores. The confirmation hearing for approval of the plan is set for Oct. 28. We believe a similar scenario holds true for Blockbuster despite the involvement of Carl Icahn. Blockbuster discussion to follow... Below is a simple Movie Gallery market share analysis and the opportunity for Redbox:
Current Margin Case: |
|
|
|
Movie Gallery/HW Video Market Share percentage |
7.7% |
||
Near-term market share opportunity |
580 |
||
Redbox portion 45% |
|
|
261 |
Adj portion for lower rent amt |
|
175 |
|
Assumed margin |
|
|
17.5% |
Redbox incremental EBITDA |
|
31 |
|
Per share value at 6.5x multiple |
|
$6.58 |
Normalized Margin Case: |
|
|
|
Movie Gallery/HW Video Market Share percentage |
7.7% |
||
Near-term market share opportunity |
580 |
||
Redbox portion 45% |
|
|
261 |
Adj portion for lower rent amt |
|
175 |
|
Assumed margin |
|
|
19.0% |
Redbox incremental EBITDA |
|
33 |
|
Per share value at 6.5x multiple |
|
$7.14 |
In summary, the Movie Gallery liquidation should create value of $7 per share.
Blockbuster Chapter 11 Reorganization:
On September 23, 2010, Blockbuster filed for Chapter 11 after reaching an agreement with 80.1% of its senior secured bond holders. Under the plan, the bondholders will convert their holdings into equity; subordinated holders and existing equity holders will receive no proceeds. The plan calls for a $125m in DIP facilities which will be the only debt in the structure post implementation. We assume that Redbox captures 45% of the Blockbuster market share based on an initial 800-1,000 store closures (again, the WSJ has reported there could be more closures).
Current Margin Case: |
|
|
||||
Blockbuster Share Grab |
|
4.5% |
||||
Near-term market share opportunity |
340 |
|||||
Redbox portion |
|
|
153 |
|||
Assumed margin |
|
|
17.5% |
|||
Redbox incremental EBITDA |
|
18 |
||||
Per share value at 6.5x multiple |
|
$3.85 |
||||
Normalized Margin Case: |
|
|
||||
Blockbuster Share Grab |
|
4.5% |
||||
Near-term market share opportunity |
340 |
|
||||
Redbox portion |
|
|
153 |
|
||
Assumed margin |
|
|
19.0% |
|
||
Redbox incremental EBITDA |
|
19 |
|
|||
Per share value at 6.5x multiple |
|
$4.18 |
|
|||
In summary, the Blockbuster Chapter 11 should conservatively create at least $4 of value per share. In total, the Movie Gallery and Blockbuster catalysts should create at least $11 of value ex any margin expansion. I don't think it's necessary to discuss the various levers for margin expansion (pricing, blue ray, online partnerships, etc) as that is all upside option value.
Total Market Share Grab Sensitivity:
Conservatively, Redbox will hold a sustainable >20% market share, and at least 17.5% EBITDA margins (more likely 19%), leading to EBITDA of $268 - $364mm within the next 12-18 months. In total, with the coin business, there is ~ 68% upside assuming de-minimus operating leverage. Note: Piper Jaffray estimates that Redbox will have 27.5% market share in 2012.
|
|
2011 Market Share |
|
||||||||||||
|
|
20.0% |
21.0% |
22.0% |
23.0% |
24.0% |
25.0% |
|
|||||||
|
17.50% |
268 |
282 |
295 |
309 |
322 |
336 |
|
|||||||
|
17.75% |
272 |
286 |
299 |
313 |
327 |
340 |
|
|||||||
|
18.00% |
276 |
290 |
304 |
318 |
331 |
345 |
|
|||||||
|
18.25% |
280 |
294 |
308 |
322 |
336 |
350 |
|
|||||||
|
18.50% |
284 |
298 |
312 |
326 |
341 |
355 |
|
|||||||
EBITDA |
18.75% |
288 |
302 |
316 |
331 |
345 |
360 |
|
|||||||
Margin |
19.00% |
291 |
306 |
321 |
335 |
350 |
364 |
|
|||||||
|
19.25% |
295 |
310 |
325 |
340 |
354 |
369 |
|
|||||||
|
19.50% |
299 |
314 |
329 |
344 |
359 |
374 |
|
|||||||
|
19.75% |
303 |
318 |
333 |
348 |
364 |
379 |
|
|||||||
|
20.00% |
307 |
322 |
337 |
353 |
368 |
383 |
|
|||||||
|
|
2011 Market Share |
|||||||||||||
|
|
20.0% |
21.0% |
22.0% |
23.0% |
24.0% |
25.0% |
||||||||
|
17.50% |
$66.42 |
$69.16 |
$71.91 |
$74.66 |
$77.40 |
$80.15 |
||||||||
|
17.75% |
$67.20 |
$69.99 |
$72.77 |
$75.56 |
$78.34 |
$81.13 |
||||||||
|
18.00% |
$67.99 |
$70.81 |
$73.64 |
$76.46 |
$79.29 |
$82.11 |
||||||||
|
18.25% |
$68.77 |
$71.64 |
$74.50 |
$77.36 |
$80.23 |
$83.09 |
||||||||
|
18.50% |
$69.56 |
$72.46 |
$75.36 |
$78.27 |
$81.17 |
$84.07 |
||||||||
EBITDA |
18.75% |
$70.34 |
$73.28 |
$76.23 |
$79.17 |
$82.11 |
$85.05 |
||||||||
Margin |
19.00% |
$71.13 |
$74.11 |
$77.09 |
$80.07 |
$83.05 |
$86.03 |
||||||||
|
19.25% |
$71.91 |
$74.93 |
$77.95 |
$80.97 |
$83.99 |
$87.01 |
||||||||
|
19.50% |
$72.69 |
$75.76 |
$78.82 |
$81.88 |
$84.94 |
$88.00 |
||||||||
|
19.75% |
$73.48 |
$76.58 |
$79.68 |
$82.78 |
$85.88 |
$88.98 |
||||||||
|
20.00% |
$74.26 |
$77.40 |
$80.54 |
$83.68 |
$86.82 |
$89.96 |
||||||||
Why Redbox Isn't Movie Gallery / Blockbuster:
First, let's take a look at the evolution of the physical DVD market and its competitors. Mom and pop rental chains and supermarkets ceded control of the market to big box players Blockbuster, Movie Gallery and Hollywood Video who garnered significant studio and marketing clout. Blockbuster and Movie Gallery then pursued the smallest of the big three, Hollywood Video, in which Movie Gallery eventually paid over $1.3bn (and levered its balance sheet to pay for it). Blockbuster acquired the divested stores from the Movie Gallery-Hollywood Video transaction and in turn leveraged its balance sheet. Enter Redbox and NFLX. The hunters, now saddled with heavy debt loads, became the hunted. Redbox and NFLX, not hindered by debt and costly lease arrangements, were quickly able to undercut the big box players. A simple table illustrates the slow demise of Blockbuster and Movie Gallery.
|
Coinstar |
Blockbuster |
Movie Gallery |
||||||
|
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2007 |
2008 |
|
Kiosks/ Stores |
13,700 |
22,400 |
30,400 |
7,405 |
6,520 |
5,708 |
3,889 |
3,472 |
|
Sales |
650 |
1,033 |
1,500 |
5,065 |
4,062 |
3,407 |
2,452 |
2,223 |
|
EBITDA |
150 |
197 |
300 |
277 |
158 |
(8) |
300 |
24 |
|
Net Debt |
285 |
408 |
321 |
959 |
775 |
856 |
883.4 |
1,119 |
|
Leverage |
1.90x |
2.07x |
1.07x |
3.46x |
4.91x |
NM |
2.74 |
46.62x |
|
We aren't debating a similar fate for Redbox - eventually, the physical DVD market will give way to streaming/digital/VOD distribution. However, industry estimates still call for ~ 2% p.a. growth in physical DVD markets for the next 5 years, and those estimates don't need to be achieved for this thesis to work. A growing market only expands the Redbox opportunity beyond the natural gain share as Blockbuster pares its store portfolio and as Redbox expands its own kiosk distribution network.
Summary:
In total, applying conservative assumptions to the near term redbox opportunity yields 50-100% upside, with downside protection afforded via highly stable and entrenched coin-business. Excluding the potential upcoming soft catalysts (share repurchase announcements, debt pay-down, online strategy roll-out), the demise of Blockbuster and Movie Gallery yield at a minimum $11/share of upside. Even under the current depressed CSTR multiple the market has given us another asymmetric investment opportunity in Coinstar for value investors. While this is not NFLX (it's not trying to be), it certainly isn't Blockbuster and Movie Gallery either.
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