about a volatile shipping company that is no longer paying most of its income to holders
but retaining capital to try to grow? Reinvesting the cash through a GP who may or not
give the partnership the best deals available is fraught with risk. However, at these
levels unless new ships are purchased at loss making rates, we have a huge margin of
safety.
GP/LP Model Conflicts
IDR’s kick in if quarterly distribution rises above $1.6975
For tax purposes CPLP is structured as a C-Corp with investors receiving a 1099.
However, the GP/LP remains a source of potential conflict for CPLP unit holders.
Historically, the GP, Capital Maritime has sought to create as high a unit price as
possible for CPLP to lower its cost of capital thereby facilitating more liquidity that allows
for more drop downs. This model broke down in 2016 during the MLP collapse. Since
the collapse, CPLP has not issued ANY equity and indeed Capital Maritime bought
shares in the open market in 2018 when units remained depressed and operating profits
improved. Since 2016 the company has not cut distributions to holders despite a high
yield and indeed boosted in January before COVID hit on the back of an accretive 3
ship drop down announced in late 2019. Examining this transaction in terms of fairness
to unit holders highlights the GP’s desire to deal fairly with unit holders while also
getting paid for its work to acquire and secure charters for ships.
The purchase price for three 2011 built Samsung built 10,000 TEU containerships was
$162.6M (Korean ships trade at premiums to Chinese built ships). These ships had a
bit longer than 4 years of charters attached to them with a quality counter party, Hapag
Llloyd at $28,000 per day with 1 year options after at $32,500 per day. The cost to
operate these ships is at most $7,000 per day but the average is closer to $6.400.
CPLP used $47.4M in cash to pay for the ships along with sale leaseback financing for
the remaining $115M with ICBC. The rate for this financing is LIBOR + 260 bps and
includes a 7-year lease with a $77M balloon payment. For simplicity we will assume
similar financing at the end of 7 years. Simple economics of the transaction depends
assumption of the remaining life of these ships. Most containerships have useful lives
of 20 – 25 years. Assuming 20 years and no scrap value (current scrap value of these
ships is about $7M each) in the first 4 years the ships generate $7.6M in EBITDA per
year. If remaining useful life is 11 years we need to amortize each ship at $3.6M per
year. Interest costs at 3% add $1.2M per year. So, each of these ships generates
$2.8M per year of FCF. In 11 years total FCF after all amortization and interest is
$30.8M vs. an equity investment of $15.4M per ship. The IRR here is 8% assuming no
residual value for operating past 20 years and ignoring scrap value. Adding
conservative scrap value of $5M per ship (fair to assume steel prices in 11 years
will be at least at current nominal prices) our IRR is approximately 16.3%. This is
well above the company’s cost of capital given 73% debt financing for these ships at
3%. I believe this drop down, at current rates, is fair for CPLP unit holders who are