BANC OF CALIFORNIA INC BANC
April 14, 2017 - 12:56pm EST by
ATM
2017 2018
Price: 21.05 EPS 1.52 2.00
Shares Out. (in M): 50 P/E 13.8 10.5
Market Cap (in $M): 1,048 P/FCF 0 0
Net Debt (in $M): 0 EBIT 0 0
TEV ($): 0 TEV/EBIT 0 0

Sign up for free guest access to view investment idea with a 45 days delay.

  • Banks
  • Activists involved
  • Short squeeze
  • Deep Value with a catalyst
 

Description

Banc of California, Inc. also known as “BANC”, or the “Company”, is a regional bank exclusively operating in the State of California. As of 4Q16 (pro forma for the mortgage banking divestiture), the Company had assets of approximately $10.6B, deposits of ~$9.1B, and loans held for investment of roughly $6B (mix was 35%, 37%, 26%, & 2% split between residential, CRE & MF,  C&I, and other, respectively). BANC’s pro forma branch footprint consists of 37 locations in Southern California. After pruning its PCI (“purchased credit-impaired”) loan book and divesting its commercial equipment finance unit, credit metrics remain at trough levels with non-performing assets totaling just 16 basis points.

 

BANC’s exclusive focus on California is a key point of differentiation among other mid-sized banks. Most notably, with population growth and household income both ~15% above the national average, along with a robust small business footprint (3.5MM+), we believe future growth opportunities continue to be vast.  Given these underlying demographics, we believe the Company operates in one of the most attractive banking markets in the country.

 

Recent Change Has Laid the Foundation for Higher Profitability:

Banc of California has been on our radar for some time but we never could justify ‘paying up’ for a bank that had such a heavy mortgage banking presence and a polarizing CEO.

 

After an ousting of the CEO, the Company has undergone a fundamental transformation in the span of several months. We believe these changes significantly improve the risk/reward profile and have BANC positioned to potentially deliver sizable upside for investors in the future. Consider the following:

  • The Company announced the resignation of the Chairman & CEO and named a new Chairman of the Board

  • The Board concluded that its independent investigation of allegations made by a short seller found no violation of law (Side note: WilmerHale conducted the investigation and the individual who led the effort  was previously a senior member of SEC’s enforcement division)

  • Activists replaced more than 50% of the Board in a span of ~8 weeks

  • Lastly, the divestiture of its mortgage banking division (Banc Home Loan, “BHL”),  in our opinion, will lead to more predictable results and shift the Company’s strategic focus to the more valuable commercial banking franchise

Ultimately, we believe this substantive change will result in the elimination of the Company’s significant valuation gap to its peers and position BANC to deliver sustainable value creation for shareholders going forward.

 

BANC 2.0: What is the Normalized Earnings Power?

A substantial portion of BANC’s earnings have historically been driven by transaction-related volume tied to its mortgage banking arm and net interest income (“NII”) from its residential loan book.  However, a strategic transformation is underway to shift earnings power of the business away from transaction-related items to more predictable, higher quality spread-based income. As mentioned, this shift was significantly accelerated with the sale of its BHL division in 1Q17. We believe these changes will lead to improved earnings quality, and as a result, a higher multiple ascribed to the Company’s future income. For reference, only 54% of its revenue was derived from NII in 2016. However, pro forma for the sale of BHL, NII will now constitute close to 80% of the Company’s revenue generation in the future.

 

Although the Company lost close to 35% of its revenue base with the sale of BHL, the earnings power of this business has not been fundamentally altered given the expense load associated with mortgage banking. All else being equal, BANC would have earned ~$1.67/share in 2016 (vs. $1.94/share reported) if one were to exclude its BHL division. Going forward, we believe the Company has the ability to fill the remaining gap much sooner than many expect. This is predicated on several factors:

  • First, management’s targeted growth profile of 15%+ results in BANC having sufficient liquidity (and capital) to grow. This dynamic will allow BANC to reconstitute the balance sheet in a more profitable manner in 2017. From a liability perspective, the historical burden to fund growth with high cost deposits is substantially reduced. This will ultimately result in a lower cost of funding as management lets promotional deposits roll off (est. 1-1.25% range). Concurrent with this, the Company will also be able to reengineer the asset side of its balance sheet by reducing the lower yielding securities book and using these proceeds to fund the loan book.

  • Second, BANC’s expense load is being cut significantly. By divesting BHL, the Company will save over $120MM in expenses annually. In addition, management is also targeting another $50MM in annualized expenses. In aggregate, a combined $170MM in annual cost take out will result in the Company achieving an efficiency ratio of sub-60% by 2018.

As a result, BANC has the ability to achieve normalized earnings of ~$2.00/share in 2018. We believe 2017 will be a transition year as the Company repositions the balance sheet. Even so, we suspect the earnings power of this business will really become evident in the back half of the year.

  

*Assumes 25% effective tax rate

 

Valuation:

Comps: Taken together, we believe the market is underestimating the true value of this banking franchise. With peers (CATY, CVBF, EWBC, HOPE, FRC, OPB, PACW, PPBI, SIVB, WABC, WAFD, & WAL) trading around 15x forward earnings, BANC’s 2018 core earnings power of $2/share should result in the Company trading closer to $30/share, or approximately 43% higher than current levels. On a P/TBV basis, peers are trading near 2.5x TBV, which equates to a valuation of $35/share for BANC.  

 

M&A Take-out Earnings w/ Cost Synergies: We also looked at a range of deals in the space and analyzed BANC from a take-out earnings perspective. This method is beneficial because it considers the earnings power of the underlying business but also gives credit to excess capital (not particularly applicable to BANC) and cost synergies that will ultimately be extracted in an M&A scenario. Based on 30 transactions announced since 2012, with deal values greater than $400MM, the median total cost take-out was approximately 30% of total non-interest expense. This resulted in a median pro forma P/E multiple of 11.8x. Applying this methodology to BANC’s normalized earnings (ex-BHL), the Company’s valuation would be close to $35/share.   

 

Highly Strategic Banking Franchise with Multiple Ways to Realize Value for Investors:

Taken together, we believe the ‘new and improved’ Banc of California represents an attractive risk/reward value proposition in the regional banking space—both on an absolute and relative basis. From an operational perspective, the shift in the Company’s earnings mix to higher quality spread income will naturally lead to multiple expansion as the market begins to value BANC more in-line with its peers. From a strategic perspective, BANC now offers potential bidders a commercial lending platform that is of scale and positioned in one of the most attractive markets in the country. As such, we believe BANC being sold is not a matter of ‘if’, but rather a matter of ‘when’. Given the elevated currencies of potential acquirers, one can apply a sizable premium and still have the deal be accretive under most scenarios.

 

In aggregate, investors have multiple ways to win from both an operational and strategic perspective. We believe the underlying dynamics provide a nice set-up for investors and position BANC as a name to own.

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

Catalyst

  • 1Q17 earnings (mainly, there is potential for more detail regarding operational plans/earnings targets for 2017/2018)

  • Appointment of new CEO

  • Tax & regulatory reform

  • M&A

  

    sort by    

    Description

    Banc of California, Inc. also known as “BANC”, or the “Company”, is a regional bank exclusively operating in the State of California. As of 4Q16 (pro forma for the mortgage banking divestiture), the Company had assets of approximately $10.6B, deposits of ~$9.1B, and loans held for investment of roughly $6B (mix was 35%, 37%, 26%, & 2% split between residential, CRE & MF,  C&I, and other, respectively). BANC’s pro forma branch footprint consists of 37 locations in Southern California. After pruning its PCI (“purchased credit-impaired”) loan book and divesting its commercial equipment finance unit, credit metrics remain at trough levels with non-performing assets totaling just 16 basis points.

     

    BANC’s exclusive focus on California is a key point of differentiation among other mid-sized banks. Most notably, with population growth and household income both ~15% above the national average, along with a robust small business footprint (3.5MM+), we believe future growth opportunities continue to be vast.  Given these underlying demographics, we believe the Company operates in one of the most attractive banking markets in the country.

     

    Recent Change Has Laid the Foundation for Higher Profitability:

    Banc of California has been on our radar for some time but we never could justify ‘paying up’ for a bank that had such a heavy mortgage banking presence and a polarizing CEO.

     

    After an ousting of the CEO, the Company has undergone a fundamental transformation in the span of several months. We believe these changes significantly improve the risk/reward profile and have BANC positioned to potentially deliver sizable upside for investors in the future. Consider the following:

    Ultimately, we believe this substantive change will result in the elimination of the Company’s significant valuation gap to its peers and position BANC to deliver sustainable value creation for shareholders going forward.

     

    BANC 2.0: What is the Normalized Earnings Power?

    A substantial portion of BANC’s earnings have historically been driven by transaction-related volume tied to its mortgage banking arm and net interest income (“NII”) from its residential loan book.  However, a strategic transformation is underway to shift earnings power of the business away from transaction-related items to more predictable, higher quality spread-based income. As mentioned, this shift was significantly accelerated with the sale of its BHL division in 1Q17. We believe these changes will lead to improved earnings quality, and as a result, a higher multiple ascribed to the Company’s future income. For reference, only 54% of its revenue was derived from NII in 2016. However, pro forma for the sale of BHL, NII will now constitute close to 80% of the Company’s revenue generation in the future.

     

    Although the Company lost close to 35% of its revenue base with the sale of BHL, the earnings power of this business has not been fundamentally altered given the expense load associated with mortgage banking. All else being equal, BANC would have earned ~$1.67/share in 2016 (vs. $1.94/share reported) if one were to exclude its BHL division. Going forward, we believe the Company has the ability to fill the remaining gap much sooner than many expect. This is predicated on several factors:

    As a result, BANC has the ability to achieve normalized earnings of ~$2.00/share in 2018. We believe 2017 will be a transition year as the Company repositions the balance sheet. Even so, we suspect the earnings power of this business will really become evident in the back half of the year.

      

    *Assumes 25% effective tax rate

     

    Valuation:

    Comps: Taken together, we believe the market is underestimating the true value of this banking franchise. With peers (CATY, CVBF, EWBC, HOPE, FRC, OPB, PACW, PPBI, SIVB, WABC, WAFD, & WAL) trading around 15x forward earnings, BANC’s 2018 core earnings power of $2/share should result in the Company trading closer to $30/share, or approximately 43% higher than current levels. On a P/TBV basis, peers are trading near 2.5x TBV, which equates to a valuation of $35/share for BANC.  

     

    M&A Take-out Earnings w/ Cost Synergies: We also looked at a range of deals in the space and analyzed BANC from a take-out earnings perspective. This method is beneficial because it considers the earnings power of the underlying business but also gives credit to excess capital (not particularly applicable to BANC) and cost synergies that will ultimately be extracted in an M&A scenario. Based on 30 transactions announced since 2012, with deal values greater than $400MM, the median total cost take-out was approximately 30% of total non-interest expense. This resulted in a median pro forma P/E multiple of 11.8x. Applying this methodology to BANC’s normalized earnings (ex-BHL), the Company’s valuation would be close to $35/share.   

     

    Highly Strategic Banking Franchise with Multiple Ways to Realize Value for Investors:

    Taken together, we believe the ‘new and improved’ Banc of California represents an attractive risk/reward value proposition in the regional banking space—both on an absolute and relative basis. From an operational perspective, the shift in the Company’s earnings mix to higher quality spread income will naturally lead to multiple expansion as the market begins to value BANC more in-line with its peers. From a strategic perspective, BANC now offers potential bidders a commercial lending platform that is of scale and positioned in one of the most attractive markets in the country. As such, we believe BANC being sold is not a matter of ‘if’, but rather a matter of ‘when’. Given the elevated currencies of potential acquirers, one can apply a sizable premium and still have the deal be accretive under most scenarios.

     

    In aggregate, investors have multiple ways to win from both an operational and strategic perspective. We believe the underlying dynamics provide a nice set-up for investors and position BANC as a name to own.

    I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
    I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities.

    Catalyst

      

    Messages


    SubjectNormalized EPS Bridge
    Entry04/16/2017 02:10 PM
    Membernha855

    Thank you for posting the idea.  I have several questions regarding the normalized EPS bridge.

    1) During 2016 BANC had $167m in revenue from noninterest income on mortgage banking activity, $5.4m in loan servicing income, $15.1m in mortgage banking interest income, and $160m in costs associated with the BHL division.  That nets to $27.5m or $0.43/share.  You are assuming a $0.27 earnings headwind.  Can you explain the difference?  Also, are the $160m in costs expected to go away immediately?

    2) The $0.75 in additional expense cuts.  Can you provide some insight into what costs they are cutting above the $160m factored in to my $0.43 in question #1?

    3) By my estimate, BANC had $19m in gain on sale of PCI loans and $9m in gain on sale of subsidiaries during 2016 which together would be a $0.45 headwind.  You have the decrease in noninterest income at $0.74.  Are you factoring in a lower gain on sale of securities available for sale?  It was quite high in 2016 at $29.4m ($0.46/share) vs. $3.3m in 2015 and $1.2m in 2014 and probably not sustainable.  

    4) You are assuming additional noninterest expense of $0.49. I know that there is a $0.16 headwind from the March 2017 payment to the Major League Soccer Tournament.  What are the other costs that you are considering?  Are you simply accruing for the $21.2m annual payment due in 2018 or are there other incremental costs?

    5) I don't see the $34m in PCI discount accretion ($0.54/share) addressed in your earnings walk.  Isn't that going away?

    6) The 25% tax rate is tied to tax -advantaged solar investment made by BANC.  Are you concerned that under a Trump administration that this loophole won't remain?

    7) What growth rate are you assuming in the loan book for your $0.88 increase in NIM?

    8) What allowance for loan loss are you assuming in your $0.03 earnings reduction for 2017?  One of my overarching concerns with regard to BANC is the fact that they have grown their loan book at a very aggressive rate while at the same time cutting their allowance significantly, and reserve at a much lower rate relative to its other CA peers.

    Thanks again and I look forward to your answers.

     


    SubjectSeeking Alpha today
    Entry04/17/2017 12:00 PM
    Memberjso1123

    ATM - 

    Thanks for the write-up. Do you have any thoughts on the article below? It was posted to Seeking Alpha today

    https://seekingalpha.com/article/4062728-banc-californias-earnings-show

     

     


    SubjectRe: Re: Normalized EPS Bridge
    Entry04/18/2017 09:13 AM
    Membernha855

    Thanks for the response!  See below in blue.

     

    Thank you for posting the idea.  I have several questions regarding the normalized EPS bridge.

    1) During 2016 BANC had $167m in revenue from noninterest income on mortgage banking activity, $5.4m in loan servicing income, $15.1m in mortgage banking interest income, and $160m in costs associated with the BHL division.  That nets to $27.5m or $0.43/share.  You are assuming a $0.27 earnings headwind.  Can you explain the difference?  Also, are the $160m in costs expected to go away immediately?

    First, as a general comment, this is an earnings bridge that will get us to 2018 figures, so all of this includes changes in 2017 and 2018—we expect the heavy lifting on the cost front to occur in 2017 which is why we labeled 2017 a ‘transition’ year. Looking at the rough math, showing $15.1MM + $172.2MM - $170.1MM (keep in mind, this includes volume-based comp incentives as well as some historical shared services/cost allocations within this figure) = $17.2MM in EBT. Using effective rate of 25% (more on tax rate methodology used below), I come up w/ $12.9MM, or $0.27/share (using weighted avg. shares outstanding at the time). These figures were pulled from the 10-K (there was a filing that is a little more nuanced from an accounting perspective in the BHL closing 8-K). My goal for the earnings bridge was to start from a true commercial banking ‘base’ year from an EPS perspective.   I suspect $140MM of the $170MM will go away by end of 2Q17 (i.e. the direct costs), and remaining $30MM (i.e. shared service costs) will be phased out through 2017.

    2) The $0.75 in additional expense cuts.  Can you provide some insight into what costs they are cutting above the $160m factored in to my $0.43 in question #1?

    There is a lot of fat on this bank—BANC is adamant about getting the efficiency ratio well below 60% by 4Q17. Additional consolidation of corporate leases, reduced headcount via duplicative roles, elimination of roles, etc. Our research suggested that BANC had many overlapping roles within each of their operating ‘silos’ that can be easily cut. Additionally, cut backs on other marketing/sponsorship expenses are included within this figure as well.

    First point, once they exit the mortgage bank, doesn't their efficiency ratio get very close to 60%? (Noninterest expenses of $442.7m - $160m in mortgage bank direct expenses - $31.5m in loss on energy investment)/ ($320.2m in net interest income + $271.9m in noninterest income - mortgage bank income of $187.5m) = 62%.  To get to 60%, they would only need to cut $8m in costs (less than the $10m you factored in to #1).

    Second, these cuts that you are proposing are huge!  BANC had $442.7m in noninterest expenseses during 2016.  I think we need to exclude the $31.5m in loss on investment in alternative energy partnerships as that should be netted with the tax benefit.  So actual expenses are $411.2m.  They are cutting $160m of actual expenses for the mortgage bank.  That gets us to $251m in base costs. You are assuming that they can reduce shared services and cost allocations of $10m in your response to #2. To get $0.75 in additional expense cuts means cutting the bank's overhead by $48m.  Adding the $10m from #2, it would mean cutting $58m from a base of $251m or 23%.  Is that feasible? 

    3) By my estimate, BANC had $19m in gain on sale of PCI loans and $9m in gain on sale of subsidiaries during 2016 which together would be a $0.45 headwind.  You have the decrease in noninterest income at $0.74.  Are you factoring in a lower gain on sale of securities available for sale?  It was quite high in 2016 at $29.4m ($0.46/share) vs. $3.3m in 2015 and $1.2m in 2014 and probably not sustainable.

    Yes, you’re correct. I am factoring in much lower gains coming from both the sale of loans and the securities book—this is really driving my non-interest income figure lower compared to 2016 base year.  Transaction-based P&L will be downsized dramatically, but I still have BANC growing its customer service fees, advisory fees, brokerage income, etc.      

    4) You are assuming additional noninterest expense of $0.49. I know that there is a $0.16 headwind from the March 2017 payment to the Major League Soccer Tournament.  What are the other costs that you are considering?  Are you simply accruing for the $21.2m annual payment due in 2018 or are there other incremental costs?

    I should have netted this out with the ‘expense cut’ line item to make it cleaner. But you’re right, payments related LA Football club deal are flowing through, volume-related incentive comp is added in here, and additional headcount being added under the commercial banking operation (I know BANC is looking to hire relationship managers at its branches to drive core deposit growth in addition to the Company still being fairly aggressive in hiring top tier lending teams in the southern CA area).

    If this is a 2018 #, the LA Football club deal is going to cost them $0.32/share.  So you are assuming $0.17/share in additional costs or $10m.  If we combine the expense cuts with these additional costs, it looks like you are saying that they can cut their expense base by 20% while aggressively growing.  Can you please point me to where the company has publically discussed cuts of this magnitude?  When they talk about getting the efficiency ratio below 60% my understanding that it had been from revenue growth/expense leverage, as opposed to dramatic cost cuts.

    5) I don't see the $34m in PCI discount accretion ($0.54/share) addressed in your earnings walk.  Isn't that going away?

    Yes, it does go away. To save space in the chart, the reduction in accretion is netted out from my total net interest income figure. Besides loan volume growth (gross production of ~$3B in 2017 and $2.4B in 2018) contributing to this figure, the BANC will still have roughly $5MM in accretion of its remaining PCI book flowing through (assumes 4-yr roll-off). Also, do not forget about the $15.1MM in NII being lost from its mortgage banking sale. The funding for the ~$407MM in loans that were held for sale (at ~3.7% rate) has not gone away. So BANC, at worst, will be able to take that funding source and replace the lost NII with CLOs at 3%, or $12MM.Given we are bridging to 2018 normalized earnings, I assume those lower yielding loans are ultimately replaced by higher yield loans held for investment at 4.5%, or $18.3MM (this is really a prime example of how profitable remixing the asset side of the B/S can be for BANC).   

    6) The 25% tax rate is tied to tax -advantaged solar investment made by BANC.  Are you concerned that under a Trump administration that this loophole won't remain?

    There is certainly risk to this tax benefit. However, I was not trying to make a ‘call’ on taxes related to this earnings bridge. I actually think you could see a cut in the corporate tax rate through wide-scale reform and BANC ultimately get rid of the solar investments, leading to a ‘cleaner’ P&L—probably would be a net positive in my opinion.

    7) What growth rate are you assuming in the loan book for your $0.88 increase in NIM?

    Growth is 16%, which I think they will be able to substantially beat, but that’s my assumption as of now.

    Just to confirm, this is 16% annual growth as opposed to growth in 2018 vs. 2016?  How do you reconcile outsized growth with your view that they are conservative lenders?

    8) What allowance for loan loss are you assuming in your $0.03 earnings reduction for 2017?  One of my overarching concerns with regard to BANC is the fact that they have grown their loan book at a very aggressive rate while at the same time cutting their allowance significantly, and reserve at a much lower rate relative to its other CA peers.

    I have the provision increasing to over $7.5MM by 2018 (vs. $5.3MM in 2016 base year). During our due diligence, we drilled down on this topic pretty extensively. We interviewed ex-employees, mid-level employees at competitors, bank auditors, and former regulators. General consensus was that the Company’s underwriting team is very talented and they have a robust underwriting framework within the bank. Outside of that, the equipment leasing business was the worst part of BANC’s book, which I am very glad they sold off. Additionally, BANC’s peers have a median ALLL-to-non-performing assets coverage of 169%. Given the pruning of bad credits off its B/S, BANC is now at ~232%, so pretty good coverage. But even outside of this, we must also consider that this bank was very acquisitive in the past, and should also account for the discount on its purchased/acquired loans as a credit buffer as well. Given the accounting rules, BANC had every incentive to be aggressive in its marks when acquiring these loans (both PCI’s and the performing acquired loans). That being said, I do think provisioning will increase from here given where we are at in the credit cycle, but I do not believe the loan book will blow up.   

    With non-performing loans of $17.4m or 0.25% of total loans, is this metric the most relevant?  I would like to hear your thoughts on the Seeking Alpha commentary -- BANC's commercial & industrial loans grew at a 76% CAGR between 2014 and 2016 yet its allowance decreased from 1.41% to 0.50%.  And during that same time period it's CA peers have been increasingly conservative in their reserving.  

    Thanks again and I look forward to your answers. 


    SubjectRe: Re: Re: Re: Normalized EPS Bridge
    Entry04/19/2017 07:54 AM
    Membernha855

    Can you possibly republish your latest response with the charts in a different format?  They show up as empty boxes.  Thanks.  Also, I did not publish the seeking alpha article.  If I had, I would have stated so at the outset.  And yes, you are correct that I had misinterpreted the language in the 10k as quarterly rather than annually.  But my earnings calculations gets me pretty close to the $0.70 as the seeking alpha article, and my analysis (as well as the analysis in that article) completely ignores the cost of the sponsorshp altogether.

     


    SubjectThoughts on Seabold claims?
    Entry09/07/2017 10:44 AM
    Memberthrive25

    More drama


    SubjectEndreson Suit — Strippers, drugs, sex in the office
    Entry12/09/2017 09:54 AM
    Memberthrive25

    Hi ATM — some pretty shocking allegations. HR and in house counsel did nothing? Any thoughts on veracity of claims and Endreson’s overall credibility?

    https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2017-12-08/fraud-strippers-alleged-at-banc-of-california-by-whistle-blower?__twitter_impression=true

     


    SubjectRe: Re: Endreson Suit — Strippers, drugs, sex in the office
    Entry12/10/2017 03:50 PM
    Memberjso1123

    ATM - 

    Thank you for the ongoing dialog here. 

    I'm curious: how are you so confident that nothing nefarious was going on here that might impair the long-term business? I know there was an "internal investigation" but I can't count the number of times fraudulent companies get clean bills of health on these sorts of things. Some of the public analysis out there (e.g. Aurelius) pretty clearly demonstrates there were a lot of very bad things going on. This is a levered, opaque institution. Not much needs to go wrong with asset quality for there to be a very large problem with the equity. 

    The company's run-rate earnings are <50c/share right now and do not appear to be improving. You wrote that you expected that the underlying earnings power of the business is $2 and that we'd begin to see it in H2 2017. Are you at all worried?

    Maybe another way of asking these same questions: why would BANC "choose" to earn $2 the "hard way" when they could have just as easily earned $2 the "easy way" by doing what you say they now plan to do?

     


    SubjectRe: Re: Re: Re: Endreson Suit — Strippers, drugs, sex in the office
    Entry12/11/2017 10:32 AM
    Memberjso1123

    Thank you.

    So would you expect that the "repositioning" will be done by year end? And then 2018 EPS guidance should be around $2?

     

      Back to top