2009 | 2010 | ||||||
Price: | 15.86 | EPS | $1.45 | $1.86 | |||
Shares Out. (in M): | 27 | P/E | 10.9x | 8.5x | |||
Market Cap (in $M): | 421 | P/FCF | 50.0x | 58.0x | |||
Net Debt (in $M): | 74 | EBIT | 67 | 85 | |||
TEV (in $M): | 495 | TEV/EBIT | 5.9x | 4.9x |
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Description
Arbitron, Inc. provides radio audience measurement and related services to radio stations, advertising agencies, and advertisers in the United States. Arbitron is the only national provider of radio ratings data and is the clear #1 market share leader. The company was founded in 1949 by James Sellers as the American Research Bureau to develop and market a diary-based audience measurement service for broadcasters and it was spun off from Ceridian Corp in 2001. Arbitron is the leading provider of media audience rating services for radio broadcasters, measuring radio audiences in 300 U.S. Markets sold through various reports including its flagship product, the Radio Market Report. Arbitron enters into multi-year contracts with radio stations/networks which contain annual price escalators in the low single digits. Arbitron is essentially the "Nielsen Media" of radio, and has dominated the radio measurement industry. The Company provides audience measurement services for over 50 national network radio programs. Audience rating services accounts for almost all of its revenue. Arbitron also provides qualitative audience data including demographic/socioeconomic profiles, retail shopping patterns and media usage habits for almost 300 Markets.
Arbitron's core audience measurement system is based on diary service, where thousands of participants in each market are paid to provide a journal each day which provides detail regarding their radio listening habits. While there are many inherent flaws in this system (i.e. survey participants wait until the end of the week to complete their diaries, making them subject to memory and obviously less accurate than real time entries), this has been around for decades. Recently, Arbitron has developed a new electronic radio ratings system called PPM or the Portable People Meter that is intended to replace the diary-based ratings in the important markets over the next several years. The PPM is a portable, cell-phone sized device that electronically tracks exposure to radio as consumers wear this device throughout the day. This is a much more accurate system which also enables the company to charge radio stations/networks rates that are 65% higher (with annual price increases of 4%) than with the conventional diary-based system. However, there have been some challenges to the adoption of the PPM by minority (particularly Hispanic) radio stations. We believe that such challenges have limited merit and the full scale adoption to the PPM system is inevitable and will take place within the next few years.
Additionally, in November 2008, Nielsen Media made a surprise announcement that it would enter the radio measurement industry by using a system that would attempt to compete with the diary-based system. While I believe that Nielsen's product will have limited impact on the market or Arbitron's opportunities, Nielsen did win a few small-market contracts, which are immaterial, yet represent the first time Arbitron has experienced any competition in a very long time. Accordingly, the recent competitive threat, along with the rapid slowdown in radio advertisement sales, the delay that Arbitron experienced in getting Clear Channel to enter into a new contract when their existing contract expired, and the challenges surrounding the PPM transition, has contributed to a 67% (1-yr) drop in ARB's stock price. In my opinion, Arbitron's stock now represents excellent value and should appreciate substantially over the next 12-18 months.
Investment Attributes
Investment Considerations/Issues
Thesis
Our main thesis on ARB is that the current concerns regarding the emergence of the PPM and the Nielsen entry as a viable competitor is significantly overblown. This is based on our discussions with the company and our many conversations with people in the radio industry, most of which have no ties to Arbitron. The following are our conclusions based on our due diligence: 1) Nielsen entered the radio ratings market more as a favor to their customers and is not aggressively entering the market; 2) the switch to PPM is inevitable and the current concerns can be overcome with better execution; 3) radio, while struggling, is not a dead medium and that Arbitron will continue to sign highly profitable contracts in the foreseeable future.
1) Nielsen Threat. From our discussions with radio industry experts, we heard that Nielsen did not initially bid on the Cumulus and Clear Channel RFP. Rather, Nielsen did it more as a favor to those customers. In addition, we believe Nielsen's sticker diary system is inferior to Arbitron's diary system, both in terms of quality (sticker system creates bias due to radio placement) and sampling frequency (1-2 times per year vs. ARB's 2-4x). Another point is that historically, there seemed to be a tacit agreement (our opinion) between Nielsen and Arbitron not to enter the other's market. If Nielsen aggressively enters radio, there is a real possibility that Arbitron could enter television with its PPM device. That's not an easy task, but the threat would be a huge blow to Nielsen, whose television business dwarfs any potential opportunities it could generate from an aggressive push into radio. Finally, if you look at the radio market opportunity for Nielsen, it's a very small dollar amount - on the order of $10 million for the two recent deals. Why would a company with annual revenue of ~$5 billion risk their television ratings franchise for such a small amount on the radio side? To us, it makes no sense for Nielsen to go after Arbitron due to the potential for reciprocal competition in their main market.
2) PPM Transition. Again, based on conversations with a wide range of radio industry participants, it has become clear that PPM is inevitable. The technology more objectively measures radio listening patterns and frequency - the panelist is wearing the device and does not have remember and jot down later (often a week later) what s/he has listened to. One drawback is if the panel member chooses not to wear the device. In addition, we hear that advertisers definitely need and would like more objective data as justification to buy advertising, and the overwhelming opinion that we heard is that advertisers want PPM to be rolled out. In terms of better sampling minorities, we think ARB should be able to bridge the gap with increased spending and better execution.
Valuation
From an earnings power perspective, we ran a sensitivity analysis that goes through Revenue, EBIT, EBITDA, EPS and FCF projections for 2011. We chose that timeframe because that is when the initial PPM into 49 major metropolitan cities should occur. We used 2006 as the base year because that was the last year without any PPM revenues. We modeled out the PPM launches by # of cities per year though 2010. The main sensitivity variable is EBITDA margin. Management comments are that they expect ARB to get back to 35% EBITDA margin, which was achieved in the past. We assume a more conservative EBITDA margin, between 24-30%, which corresponds to EPS of 2.29-3.02 in 2011 (vs. consensus at 2.44). See the charts below. Accordingly, we believe that, today, Arbitron is worth $23 to $28 per share; a multiple far less that it received at just about any time in the past.
PPM Revenue Calculation |
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Take 2006 as base Measurement rev |
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253 |
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PPM portion will be 2/3 of this |
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67% |
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PPM revenues (assuming base business pricing) |
169 |
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65% price increase for PPM+ 4% annual increase |
278 |
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Annual Lost revenues to Nielsen |
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10 |
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PPM rev low |
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|
268 |
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% increase over diary only business revenues |
59% |
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Non-PPM Measurement Revenue Calculation |
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Take 2006 as base Measurement rev |
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253 |
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Non-PPM portion is 2/3 of this |
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33% |
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Non-PPM measurement rev |
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84 |
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Assume price compression 10% |
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-10% |
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Non-PPM measurement rev |
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75 |
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Total Measurement Revenues |
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343 |
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Local Mkt Consumer Info Services |
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Take 2008 as base year rev |
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37 |
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Change in rev |
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0% |
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Local Mkt Consumer Info Services Revenues |
37 |
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S/W Apps |
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Take 2008 as base year rev |
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35 |
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Change in rev |
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0% |
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Local Mkt Consumer Info Services Revenues |
35 |
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Total Estimated Revenues |
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415 |
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EBITDA margin normalized past peak |
35% |
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Street |
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27% |
Difference |
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8% |
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In Dollars |
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29 |
Based on our revenue calculations above, we then run Ebitda margin sensitivities to estimate a range for EBITDA, EPS, and Free cash flow and then we calculate EPS again assuming the company executes its full buyback at $23 per share-a level significantly above the current stock price. It should be noted that the company's Ebitda margin has averaged about 35% in the past-we are obviously making very conservative assumptions as the Company spent significant amount of money starting in 2005 developing and rolling out the PPM, which has depressed their margins.
Assumed EBITDA Margin |
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24% |
25% |
26% |
27% |
28% |
29% |
30% |
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EBITDA |
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100 |
104 |
108 |
112 |
116 |
120 |
125 |
D&A |
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21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
EBIT |
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79 |
83 |
87 |
91 |
95 |
99 |
104 |
EBIT Margin |
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18.9% |
19.9% |
20.9% |
21.9% |
22.9% |
23.9% |
24.9% |
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Int Expense |
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-1 |
-1 |
-1 |
-1 |
-1 |
-1 |
-1 |
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PBT |
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78 |
82 |
86 |
90 |
94 |
98 |
103 |
Taxes @38.5% |
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-30 |
-31 |
-33 |
-35 |
-36 |
-38 |
-39 |
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NI |
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48 |
50 |
53 |
55 |
58 |
61 |
63 |
EPS |
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1.80 |
1.90 |
1.99 |
2.09 |
2.19 |
2.28 |
2.38 |
FD Sh |
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26.5 |
26.5 |
26.5 |
26.5 |
26.5 |
26.5 |
26.5 |
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D&A |
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21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
21 |
NI+D&A = CFFO |
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|
69 |
71 |
74 |
76 |
79 |
82 |
84 |
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Capex |
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-28 |
-28 |
-28 |
-28 |
-28 |
-28 |
-28 |
FCF |
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41 |
43 |
46 |
48 |
51 |
54 |
56 |
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Impact of Stock Buyback |
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Amount left ($M) |
100 |
($M) |
// buyback auth thru 11/14/09 / no shares repurchased during Q109 |
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Assumed price |
23 |
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# Sh |
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4.3 |
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FD Sh |
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22.2 |
22.2 |
22.2 |
22.2 |
22.2 |
22.2 |
22.2 |
EPS |
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2.16 |
2.27 |
2.39 |
2.50 |
2.62 |
2.73 |
2.85 |
It should be noted that we assume a price compression of 10% for Arbitron's base business even though it has been increasing due to annual price increases. Also, for purposes of being conservative in our forecast, we did not assume the 4% price increases for the PPM business as specified in the Company's contracts. Lastly, we assume no increase in revenues for their ancillary businesses. Our EPS numbers increase by approximately $0.35 to $0.52 (depending upon which margin scenario we assume) if we were to factor in the 4% price increases set forth in their PPM contracts and assume no price decline for their traditional diary system.
The street consensus P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples are below (including 2008 and LTM multiples). Importantly, we modeled Arbitron more conservatively than the analysts as we wanted to insure a margin of safety as best as possible.
|
2008 |
2009E |
2010E |
2011E |
LTM |
Net Rev |
369 |
393 |
425 |
459 |
373 |
EPS street |
1.37 |
1.45 |
1.86 |
2.27 |
1.24 |
P/E |
11.6x |
10.9x |
8.5x |
7.0x |
12.8x |
EBITDA |
68 |
83 |
100 |
118 |
71 |
EV/EBITDA |
7.3x |
5.9x |
4.9x |
4.2x |
7.0x |
1. The rollout of the PPM throughout major markets which will continue to positively impact operating results.
2. The resolution of legal challenges relating to the PPM.
3. The realization by investors that Nielsen will not take meaningful market share.
4. The company will meet its financial guidance on a quarterly and annual basis.
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